5 resultados para state of nature

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


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By virtue of the volume and nature of their attributions, including secondary school as well as problem-areas such as security and traffic, the Brazilian states are the ultimate responsible entities for young people. This study argues in favour of granting greater freedom for the states to define their own public policy parameters to deal with local features and to increase the degree of learning about such actions at the national level. In empirical terms, the study assesses the impacts of new laws, such as the new traffic code (from the joint work with Leandro Kume, EPGE/FGV doctor’s degree student) and traces the statistics for specific questions like drugs, violence and car accidents. The findings show that these questions produce different results for young men and women.The main characters in these dramas are young single males, suggesting the need for more distinguished public policies according not only to age, but also by gender. The study also reveals that the magnitude of these problems changes according to the youth’s social class. Prisons concern poorer men (except for the functional illiterate) while fatal car accidents and the confessed use of drugs concern upper-class boys.

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Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.

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O presente estudo teve como objetivo testar se a situação econômica teve um impacto sobre os hábitos de consumo de cinema na França, no período contemporâneo (1992-2012). O estudo aborda a relação entre indicadores econômicos e consumo de cinema em um nível agregado e, em seguida, analisa se os vários tipos de filmes, tipos de cinemas e categorias de cinéfilos foram mais ou menos foram afetados pelo estado da economia. No nível agregado, estudos semelhantes já foram realizados em outros países. Este estudo confirma os resultados para a França: como em outros países desenvolvidos, a situação da economia tem pouca influência no consumo de cinema e o setor é resiliente. Este trabalho também traz novas análises detalhadas sobre o comportamento de vários sub-tipos de filmes, segmentos de locais e categorias de consumidores. Ele demonstra que para a maior parte dessas sub-categorias, drivers do mercado são oferta e preço, e que a situação da economia tem pouca influência. Quanto ao tipo de cinema, o estudo argumenta que, comparativamente, cinemas grandes conseguem crescer durante o período de crise.

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The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

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The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.