Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Corporate capital structure revisited: incomplete markets and default

After Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their capital structure irrelevance proposition, analysis of corporate Önancing choices involving debt and equity instruments have generally followed two trends in the literature, where models either incorporate informational asymmetries or introduce tax beneÖts in order to explain optimal capital structure determination (Myers, 2002). None of these features is present in this paper, which develops an asset pricing model with the purpose of providing a positive theory of corporate capital structure by replicating main aspects of standard contractual practice observed in real markets. Alternatively, the imperfect market structure of the economy is tailored to match what is most common in corporate reality. Allowance for default on corporate debt with an associated penalty of seizure of Örmís future cash áows by creditors is introduced, for instance. In this context, a qualitative assessment of Önancial managersídecisions is carried out through numerical procedures.

Essays on international finance, default and inflation

This thesis is composed by three papers, each one of them corresponding to one chapter. The first and the second chapters are essays on international finance appraising default and inflation as equilibrium outcomes for crisis time, in particular, for confidence crisis time that leads to speculative attack on the external public debt issued by emerging economies. With this background in mind, welfare effects from adopting common currency (chapter 1) and welfare effects from increasing the degree of economic openness (chapter 2) are analyzed in numerical exercises, based on DSGE framework. Cross-countries results obtained are then presented to be compared with empirical evidence and to help on understanding past policy decisions. Some policy prescriptions are also suggested. In the third chapter we look to the inflation targeting regime applied to emerging economies that are subject to adverse shocks, like the external debt crisis presented in the previous chapters. Based on a more theoretical approach, we appraise how pre commitment framework should be used to coordinate expectations when policymaker announcement has no full credibility and self fulfilling inflation may be possible.

Risco soberano e probabilidade de default implícita em swaps de crédito

Este trabalho propõe um modelo de forma reduzida livre de arbitragem para a extração de probabilidades de default a partir de spreads de Swaps de Crédito e aplica-o realizando uma análise da percepção de risco da dívida soberana brasileira confrontando dois momentos com contextos econômicos distintos. É utilizada uma modelagem paramétrica da estrutura temporal das probabilidades condicionais de default para a qual se testa duas formas funcionais distintas: Constante por Partes e Linear por Partes. Os resultados fornecem evidências que corroboram a aplicabilidade do modelo e indicam uma clara vantagem da modelagem Linear por Partes, por se ajustar melhor aos dados e possuir implicações convenientes na estrutura a termo das taxas de juros ajustadas ao risco de default.

Financiamento para o subdesenvolvimento, o Brasil e o segundo consenso de Washington

While in the social and in the ethical realms the Cardoso administration was successful, its economic outcomes were frustrating. In this administration’s eight years the investment rate did not increase and income per capita growth lagged, while the public debt and the foreign debt increased substantially. This poor economic performance may be explained by three chained causes: a mistake in agenda setting, the adoption of the Second Washington Consensus, and the alienation of elites. The decision of setting high inflation as the major problem to be tackled instead of achieving equilibrium in foreign accounts represented a major macroeconomic mistake, which can be explained by the Second Washington Consensus. This consensus proposed in the 1990s that highly indebted countries should grow counting on foreign savings, although this is not the experience among OECD countries. The outcome was to evaluate the real, to increase artificially wages and consumption, so that instead of growth what we have been increased indebtedness. Why this flopped strategy was adopted? Rich countries’ interests are not difficult to guess. On the part of Brazil, the only explanation is Brazilian elites’ alienation in relation to the country’s national interest. As a final outcome, the Cardoso administration ends with another balance of payments crisis, which was empowered by the coming presidential elections. Yet, the solvency situation of the Brazilian economy have been improving since the 1999 successful floatation of the real, so that I believe that, adopted a policy that deepens fiscal adjustment, while lowers the interest rate, and avoids new evaluation of the real, the country will eventually be able to avoid default.

Avaliação do risco de crédito: aplicação do modelo KMV para obter a probabilidade de default no setor siderúrgico

Credit risk management has assumed increasing importance for the managers and directors of enterprises. Thus, different approaches aimed to measure the probability of default are under discussion nowadays. This paper evaluates models that have become more popular over the last 30 years in order forecast defaults or to provide information regarding to financial difficulties of enterprises. This paper will focus on the KMV model in order to estimate the probability of default, its methodology based on market value of the asset and its volatility and finally estimate the probability of default. Finally, to test the KMV model will be used a sample of global steel companies that have credit in Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), which will allow us to make comparisons with the models presented in this work.

Prêmio sobre o risco (risk premium) dos títulos soberanos e política fiscal discricionária vs. regras de política fiscal para um país em desenvolvimento: o caso do Brasil

O projeto de pesquisa é parte do projeto entitulado "Credibilidade de Políticas Monetárias e Fiscais para o Brasil: Risco Soberano, Instituições, Âncoras Nominais, e Acesso aos Mercados Financeiros Internacionais". Dentro do atual plano de estabilização, um estudo empírico sobre a economia brasileira fornece um exemplo vívido do impacto de vários fatores, como o grau de institucionalização das políticas monetárias e orçamentárias que tem sido utilizadas desde a implementação do Plano Real, que aumentariam a credibilidade, sustentando a política cambial e o fluxo positivo do capital internacional, na percepção do mercado do risco de suspensão de pagamento (default risk) da dívida externa de um país em desenvolvimento. O foco dentro deste projeto de pesquisa será na questão de pesquisa: "Prêmio sobre o risco (risk premium) dos títulos soberanos e política fiscal discricionária vs regras de política fiscal para um país em desenvolvimento: o caso do Brasil".

Price setting and macroeconomic variables: evidence from Brazilian CPI

Esta tese investiga as estratégias de precificação em ambientes macroeconômicos distintos, utilizando uma base de dados única para o IPC da Fundação Getulio Vargas. A base de dados primária consiste em um painel de dados individuais para bens e serviços representando 100% do IPC para o período de 1996 a 2008. Durante este período, diversos eventos produziram uma variabilidade macroeconômica substancial no Brasil: duas crises em países emergentes, uma mudança de regime cambial e monetário, racionamento de energia, uma crise de expectativas eleitorais e um processo de desinflação. Como consequência, a inflação, a incerteza macroeconômica, a taxa de câmbio e o produto exibiram uma variação considerável no período. No primeiro capítulo, nós descrevemos a base de dados e apresentamos as principais estatísticas de price-setting para o Brasil. Em seguida, nos capítulos 2 e 3, nos construímos as séries de tempo destas estatísticas e das estatísticas de promoções, e as relacionamos com as variáveis macroeconômicas utilizando análises de regressões. Os resultados indicam que há uma relação substancial entre as estatísticas de price-setting e o ambiente macroeconômico para a economia brasileira.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Default mercado de crédito parcelado para bens duráveis : veículos automotores

The present work aims to study the macroeconomic factors influence in credit risk for installment autoloans operations. The study is based on 4.887 credit operations surveyed in the Credit Risk Information System (SCR) hold by the Brazilian Central Bank. Using Survival Analysis applied to interval censured data, we achieved a model to estimate the hazard function and we propose a method for calculating the probability of default in a twelve month period. Our results indicate a strong time dependence for the hazard function by a polynomial approximation in all estimated models. The model with the best Akaike Information Criteria estimate a positive effect of 0,07% for males over de basic hazard function, and 0,011% for the increasing of ten base points on the operation annual interest rate, toward, for each R$ 1.000,00 on the installment, the hazard function suffer a negative effect of 0,28% , and an estimated elevation of 0,0069% for the same amount added to operation contracted value. For de macroeconomics factors, we find statistically significant effects for the unemployment rate (-0,12%) , for the one lag of the unemployment rate (0,12%), for the first difference of the industrial product index(-0,008%), for one lag of inflation rate (-0,13%) and for the exchange rate (-0,23%). We do not find statistic significant results for all other tested variables.

Mobilidades Urbanas - Brevíssimas notas sobre o projeto 'Emerging Middle Classes and Low Carbon Mobilities: Setting long term foundations for transnational research'

Em uma conjuntura de expansão urbana, intensificação do consumo, mudança climática e escassez de petróleo, o tema das mobilidades assume inquestionável importância econômica, social e ambiental. O seminário internacional "Mobilidades Urbanas: Alicerces para Pesquisas Transnacionais" volta-se, por um lado, para a fomentação do debate em torno do paradigma das novas mobilidades - envolvendo mobilidade espacial e socioeconômica, entre outras - e de sua aplicabilidade no contexto brasileiro; por outro, para a capacitação de pesquisadores cujas investigações tematizam os processos de mobilidade social e espacial a partir de perspectivas comparativas e transnacionais.

US real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies

This paper empirically investigates the impact of changes in US real interest rates on sovereign default risk in emerging economies using the method of identification through heteroskedasticity. Policy-induced increases in US interest rates starkly raise default risk in emerging market economies. However, the overall correlation between US real interest rates and the risk of default is negative, demonstrating that the effects of other variables dominate the anterior relationship

Estudo sobre o efeito de variáveis macro econômico e do spread de credit default swap no risco de evento de crédito soberano

Este trabalho explora a realização de default soberano em função da estrutura de spreads de CDS (Credit Default Swap). Pode-se dizer que os spreads revelam a probabilidade de default de um país. Aplicamos a metodologia proposta neste trabalho para Argentina, Coreia, Equador, Indonésia, México, Peru, Turquia, Ucrânia, Venezuela e Rússia. Nós mostramos que um modelo de um único fator seguindo um processo lognormal captura a probabilidade de default. Também mostramos que as variáveis macro econômicas inflação, desemprego e crescimento não explicam a variável dependente do estudo (probabilidade de default). Cada país reage de maneira diferente a crise econômica que a leva a não honrar seus compromissos com as dívidas contraídas.