Microinsurance: income risk, social security and the demand for private onsurance by low-income families

Insurance provision against uncertainties is present in several dimensions of peoples´s lives, such as the provisions related to, inter alia, unemployment, diseases, accidents, robbery and death. Microinsurance improves the ability of low-income individuals to cope with these risks. Brazil has a fairly developed financial system but still not geared towards the poor, especially in what concerns the insurance industry. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The Brazilian government provides a relatively developed social security system considering other countries of similar income level which crowds-out the demand for insurance and savings. On the other hand, this same public infrastructure may help to foster microfinance products supply. The objective of this paper is to analyze the demand for different types of private insurance by the low-income population using microdata from a National Expenditure Survey (POF/IBGE). The final objective is to help to understand the trade-offs faced for the development of an emerging industry of microinsurance in Brazil.

Sale of credit portfolio and risk : the case of financial institutions in Brazil

Este estudo analisa se as vendas de carteiras de crédito são utilizadas por instituições financeiras para gestão de risco, de acordo com Stanton(1998) e Murray(2001) ou para captação recursos, como apontado em Cebenoyan e Strahan(2001) e Dionne e Harchaoui(2003). Duas hipóteses foram testadas quanto às vendas de carteira de crédito: 1) implicam em melhor rating na carteira remanescente; ou 2) promovem alavancagem financeira - com piora na carteira remanescente -, controlando para a existência de coobrigação e para quem esses ativos foram transferidos. A amostra inclui informações trimestrais de 145 instituições financeiras do primeiro trimestre de 2001 ao segundo trimestre de 2008. Os resultados oferecem evidências empíricas de que as instituições financeiras utilizam estas vendas para melhora do rating da carteira de crédito remanescente, ou seja, elas transferem, em sua maioria, ativos de baixa qualidade, garantindo bons ratings e melhorando a liquidez. Adicionalmente, seguindo a proposta Dionne e Harchaoui(2003) - que além de testar, evidenciam que exigências regulatórias promovem alavancagem em ativos de alto risco - foi observada a relação entre o Índice de Basiléia e rating da carteira de crédito. As conclusões foram semelhantes às encontradas por Dionne e Harchaoui(2003): quanto mais adequada – maior Índice de Basiléia - uma instituição financeira for, maiores as chances de ela possuir uma carteira de crédito com qualidade ruim.

Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

Nonparametric tail risk, macroeconomics and stock returns: predictability and risk premia

This paper proposes a new novel to calculate tail risks incorporating risk-neutral information without dependence on options data. Proceeding via a non parametric approach we derive a stochastic discount factor that correctly price a chosen panel of stocks returns. With the assumption that states probabilities are homogeneous we back out the risk neutral distribution and calculate five primitive tail risk measures, all extracted from this risk neutral probability. The final measure is than set as the first principal component of the preliminary measures. Using six Fama-French size and book to market portfolios to calculate our tail risk, we find that it has significant predictive power when forecasting market returns one month ahead, aggregate U.S. consumption and GDP one quarter ahead and also macroeconomic activity indexes. Conditional Fama-Macbeth two-pass cross-sectional regressions reveal that our factor present a positive risk premium when controlling for traditional factors.

Business Plan, financial and risk analysis from the start-up mathrix

Mathrix is an e-learning math website that will be launched in March 2016. This master thesis offered a unique chance to interact with experienced supervisors in venture capitalism and project investment. It could serve as guidelines for entrepreneurs who intend to raise funds. Starting with the company’s business plan, the thesis focuses on estimating the company’s value with its return on investment using three scenarios and taking into consideration the risks evolved.

Asymmetric auctions and risk aversion within independent private valoues

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric (heterogeneous) contestants as an independent-private-values all-pay auction. The asymmetry is either with respect to the distribution of valuations for the prize or the risk preferences. By characterizing equilibria in tnonotone strategies we show that tournaments \:vith man~y heterogenous contestants are qualitatively distinct. First, with two (or many ex-ante identical) participants, a contestant always exerts some effort with positive probability. In contrast, with many asymmetric participants, one 1night not exert any effort at all, even if there is a positive probability that he has the highest valuation among ali. Second, in tournan1ents with t'wo (o r n1any ex-ante h01nogenous) contestants, equilibrium effort densities are decreasing. This prediction is at odds with experimental evidence that shows the empírica! density might be increasing at high effort levels. V\.lith rnany heterogeneous contestants, however. the increasing bid density is consistent with an equilibrium behavior.