Risk sharing and the household collective model

When the joint assumption of optimal risk sharing and coincidence of beliefs is added to the collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998) income pooling and symmetry of the pseudo-Hicksian matrix are shown to be restored. Because these are also the features of the unitary model usually rejected in empirical studies one may argue that these assumptions are at odds with evidence. We argue that this needs not be the case. The use of cross-section data to generate price and income variation is based Oil a definition of income pooling or symmetry suitable for testing the unitary model, but not the collective model with risk sharing. AIso, by relaxing assumptions on beliefs, we show that symmetry and income pooling is lost. However, with usual assumptions on existence of assignable goods, we show that beliefs are identifiable. More importantly, if di:fferences in beliefs are not too extreme, the risk sharing hypothesis is still testable.

Asset pricing when risk sharing is limited by default: a theoretical framework

We study the asset pricing implications of an endowment economy when agents can default on contracts that would leave them otherwise worse off. We specialize and extend the environment studied by Kocherlakota (1995) and Kehoe and Levine (1993) to make it comparable to standard studies of asset pricillg. We completely charactize efficient allocations for several special cases. We illtroduce a competitive equilibrium with complete markets alld with elldogellous solvency constraints. These solvellcy constraints are such as to prevent default -at the cost of reduced risk sharing. We show a version of the classical welfare theorems for this equilibrium definition. We characterize the pricing kernel, alld compare it with the one for economies without participation constraints : interest rates are lower and risk premia can be bigger depending on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Quantitative examples show that for reasonable parameter values the relevant marginal rates of substitution fali within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.

Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies

Pooled procurement has an important role in reducing acquisition prices of goods. A pool of buyers, which aggregates demand for its members, increases bargaining power and allows suppliers to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production. Such aggregation demand e ect lowers prices paid for buyers. However, when a buyer with a good reputation for paying suppliers in a timely manner is joined in the pool by a buyer with bad reputation may have its price paid increased due to the credit risk e ect on prices. This will happen because prices paid in a pooled procurement should refect the (higher) average buyers' credit risk. Using a data set on Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, we nd evidence supporting both e ects. We show that the prices paid by public bodies in Brazil are lower when they buy through pooled procurement than individually. On the other hand, federal agencies (i.e. good buyers) pay higher prices for products when they are joined by state agencies (i.e. bad buyers) in a pool. Such evidence suggests that pooled procurement should be carefully designed to avoid that prices paid increase for its members.

The asymmetric behavior of the U.S public debt

Our main goal in this paper was to measure how e¢ cient is risk sharing between countries. In order to do so, we have used a international risk sharIn this paper we re-analyze the question of the U.S. public debt sustainability by using a quantile autoregression model. This modeling allows for testing whether the behavior of U.S. public debt is asymmetric or not. Our results provide evidence of a band of sustainability. Outside this band, the U.S. public debt is unsustainable. We also nd scal policy to be adequate in the sense that occasional episodes in which the public debt moves out of the band do not pose a threat to long run sustainability.

The private memory of aggregate shocks

We study constrained efficient aggregate risk sharing and its consequence for the behavior of macro-aggregates in a dynamic Mirrlees’s (1971) setting. Privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be independent of i.i.d. publicly observed aggregate shocks. Yet, private allocations display memory with respect to past aggregate shocks, when idosyncratic shocks are also i.i.d.. Under a mild restriction on the nature of optimal allocations the result extends to more persistent idiosyncratic shocks, for all but the limit at which idiosyncratic risk disappears, and the model collapses to a pure heterogeneity repeated Mirrlees economy identical to Werning [2007]. When preferences are iso-elastic we show that an allocation is memoryless only if it displays a strong form of separability with respect to aggregate shocks. Separability characterizes the pure heterogeneity limit as well as the general case with log preferences. With less than full persistence and risk aversion different from unity both memory and non-separability characterize optimal allocations. Exploiting the fact that non-separability is associated with state-varying labor wedges, we apply a business cycle accounting procedure (e.g. Chari et al. [2007]) to the aggregate data generated by the model. We show that, whenever risk aversion is great than one our model produces efficient counter-cyclical labor wedges.

Optimal regulation of oil fields under asymmetric information

Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.

Fiscal multipliers in an incomplete markets economy

This paper studies the behavior of fiscal multipliers in two different economic environments: complete markets and incomplete markets. Based on steady state analysis, output multipliers are found within a range between 0.49 and 0.66, when the markets are complete. Under incomplete markets, output multiplier was found in an interval between 0.75 and 0.94. These results indicates that the market structure, which reflects the degree of risk sharing and the intensity of the precautionary motive faced by individuals, plays a key role in determining the fiscal multipliers. In the second part of the paper, was performed an exercise to analyze the dynamic response of macroeconomic aggregates to an exogenous and unexpected rise in government spending financed by lump-sum taxes. In this case, impact output multipliers varies in a range between 0.64 and 0.68, under complete markets, and within 1.05 and 1.20 when markets are incomplete. The results found under incomplete markets are very close to that found on related literature which usually uses an econometric approach or calibrated/estimated New Keynesian models. These results shows that taking into account the deficiencies in the insurance mechanisms can be an interesting way to reconcile theoretical models with the results found on related current literature, without the need of ad-hoc assumptions relative to price stickness.

A participação nos lucros ou resultados e as contribuições previdenciárias: uma análise da jurisprudência do Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais

O trabalho tem como objeto o estudo de temas específicos relacionados à Participação dos trabalhadores nos Lucros ou Resultados (PLR) empresariais, tais como a periodicidade do pagamento, do pagamento de PLR a somente algumas áreas da empresa e das regras claras e objetivas sobre a forma do acordo celebrado entre empregado e empregador. A matéria será introduzida por meio do exame da controvérsia constitucional acerca da auto aplicabilidade do art. 7°, XI, da Constituição Federal de 1988, questão que é objeto do Recurso Extraordinário n° 569.441-RS, cuja repercussão geral foi recentemente reconhecida pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) e que ainda está pendente de julgamento. Após breve histórico sobre a legislação que regulamenta a PLR, por meio da análise prática da jurisprudência do Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (CARF), será apresentado o entendimento do tribunal acerca de temas controvertidos existentes na legislação (Lei n 10.101/2000) que regulamenta a matéria.

O comitê operacional como mecanismo de governança dos consórcios para exploração e produção do pré-sal

Este trabalho objetiva analisar aspectos jurídicos relacionados ao consórcio e ao Comitê Operacional que deverão ser constituídos no âmbito do novo modelo regulatório criado para a exploração e produção das reservas do pré-sal – o contrato de partilha de produção. Para esse fim, será feita uma análise do histórico do setor de petróleo e gás no Brasil, com o objetivo de contextualizar o novo modelo. Em seguida, serão analisados os principais aspectos presentes na doutrina e na legislação societária a respeito do consórcio, enfatizando-se as peculiaridades previstas na legislação do pré-sal. Passa-se, então, à análise de problemas relacionados à tomada de decisão no consórcio exigido pela lei do pré-sal e, consequentemente, no Comitê Operacional que o administrará. Para isso, serão examinados: (i) a teoria dos contratos incompletos; (ii) o modelo do principal-agente; (iii) os problemas de governança em uma sociedade de economia mista; e (iv) a teoria da dependência de recursos. Tendo por base o estudo realizado, a última parte buscará mostrar a necessidade de implementação de mecanismos de governança na execução dos contratos de partilha de produção, de modo a beneficiar todos os envolvidos.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Endogenous borrowing constraints and default when markets are incomplete

Incomplete markets and non-default borrowing constraints increase the volatility of pricing kernels and are helpful when addressing assetpricing puzzles. However, ruling out default when markets are in complete is suboptimal. This paper endogenizes borrowing constraints as an intertemporal incentive structure to default. It modeIs an infinitehorizon economy, where agents are allowed not to pay their liabilities and face borrowing constraints that depend on the individual history of default. Those constraints trade off the economy's risk-sharing possibilities and incentives to prevent default. The equilibrium presents stationary properties, such as an invariant distribution for the assets' solvency rate.

Teoria da agência e franchising: evidência empírica para o caso brasileiro

O presente estudo tem um duplo objetivo: (i) analisar os determinantes da escolha das firmas por um modelo de franchising na estratégia de expansão de seus negócios, e (ii) analisar como os termos de um contrato de franchising podem potencialmente ser influenciados por questões relativas a compartilhamento de risco, problemas de incentivo relacionados ao risco moral (moral hazard) e restrições de recursos financeiros. Essa discussão se dará seguindo a abordagem empírica proposta por Lafontaine (1992). Os modelos são estimados a partir de dados para uma amostra de 350 redes de franquias brasileiras relativas ao ano de 2011. Os resultados sugerem que a definição do valor da taxa de royalties leva em conta os problemas decorrentes do risco moral por parte dos franqueados e do compartilhamento de risco. Em particular, nos negócios onde o esforço dos franqueados afeta significativamente a provisão dos serviços prestados, observa-se uma tendência de cobrança de menores taxas de royalties e uma relação positiva entre risco e incentivos, com a cobrança de menores taxas de royalties em setores de atividade com maior risco. Em relação ao percentual de unidades franqueadas, obteve-se resultados coerentes com a expectativa teórica para o problema de risco moral do franqueado, de modo que quanto mais importante o trabalho do agente, maior o índice. Entretanto, para a restrição de capital, contrário a expectativa teórica, quanto maior a disponibilidade de recursos maior o número de franquias.

Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

Need and opportunity: what are the main security threats to the pharmaceuticals industry in Latin America?

Os preços altos de produtos farmacêuticos patenteados sempre têm sido uma polêmica na América Latina. Considerando as disparidades económicas na região e a falta histórica do desenvolvimento, muitas vezes os preços altos servem como barreiras contra o acesso aos medicamentos essenciais. Por um lado, as companhias farmacêuticas dizem que os preços elevados são necessários para financiar os processos de pesquisa e desenvolvimento e para gerar um retorno do investimento lucrativo. Por outro lado, os consumidores, tanto privados como públicos, dizem que os preços altos têm resultado em uma falta histórica de medicamentos baratos. Neste debate, ambos lados têm realizado uma série de manobras e contramanobras que têm exposto algumas das vulnerabilidades do setor. Utilizando vários métodos de análise e entrevistas com profissionais no setor, este projeto analisa as vulnerabilidades do setor para determinar o risco, ao mesmo tempo tentando a responder à pergunta: Quais são as ameaças principais na segurança da indústria farmacêutica na América Latina? Justificação deste projeto é o aumento dos crimes relacionados aos produtos farmacêuticos na última década, que têm exposto os pacientes a um número de riscos mais alto. Uma compreensão das ameaças principais é necessária para melhor mitigar o risco, garantir a integridade de produtos e preservar a saúde pública.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'