Common cycles in macroeconomic aggregates (revised version)

Although there has been substantial research on long-run co-movement (common trends) in the empirical macroeconomics literature. little or no work has been done on short run co-movement (common cycles). Investigating common cycles is important on two grounds: first. their existence is an implication of most dynamic macroeconomic models. Second. they impose important restrictions on dynamic systems. Which can be used for efficient estimation and forecasting. In this paper. using a methodology that takes into account short- and long-run co-movement restrictions. we investigate their existence in a multivariate data set containing U.S. per-capita output. consumption. and investment. As predicted by theory. the data have common trends and common cycles. Based on the results of a post-sample forecasting comparison between restricted and unrestricted systems. we show that a non-trivial loss of efficiency results when common cycles are ignored. If permanent shocks are associated with changes in productivity. the latter fails to be an important source of variation for output and investment contradicting simple aggregate dynamic models. Nevertheless. these shocks play a very important role in explaining the variation of consumption. Showing evidence of smoothing. Furthermore. it seems that permanent shocks to output play a much more important role in explaining unemployment fluctuations than previously thought.

Current account and capital mobility hypothesis: Evidence from the G-7

This paper investigates an intertemporal optimization model in order to analyze the current account of the G-7 countries, measured as the present value of the future changes in net output. The study compares observed and forecasted series, generated by the model, using Campbell & Shiller’s (1987) methodology. In the estimation process, the countries are considered separately (with OLS technique) as well as jointly (SURE approach), to capture contemporaneous correlations of the shocks in net output. The paper also proposes a note on Granger causality and its implications to the optimal current account. The empirical results are sensitive to the technique adopted in the estimation process and suggest a rejection of the model in the G-7 countries, except for the USA and Japan, according to some papers presented in the literature.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous discount factors: (revised version, forthcoming 2006, Revista Economia)

This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a jobsearch process when di§erent cohorts of homogeneous workers are allowed to have di§erent degrees of impatience. Using the fact the average wage under the invariant Markovian distribution is a decreasing function of the discount factor (Cysne (2004, 2006)), I show that the Lorenz curve and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality can be easily derived in this case. An example with arbitrary measures regarding the wage o§ers and the distribution of time preferences among cohorts provides some insights into how much income inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the probability of unemployment and of the probability that the worker does not Önd a job o§er each period.

Time-series properties and empirical evidence of growth and infraestructure: revised version

After more than forty years studying growth, there are two classes of growth models that have emerged: exogenous and endogenous growth models. Since both try to mimic the same set of long-run stylized facts, they are observationally equivalent in some respects. Our goals in this paper are twofold First, we discuss the time-series properties of growth models in a way that is useful for assessing their fit to the data. Second, we investigate whether these two models successfully conforms to U.S. post-war data. We use cointegration techniques to estimate and test long-run capital elasticities, exogeneity tests to investigate the exogeneity status of TFP, and Granger-causality tests to examine temporal precedence of TFP with respect to infrastructure expenditures. The empirical evidence is robust in confirming the existence of a unity long-run capital elasticity. The analysis of TFP reveals that it is not weakly exogenous in the exogenous growth model Granger-causality test results show unequivocally that there is no evidence that TFP for both models precede infrastructure expenditures not being preceded by it. On the contrary, we find some evidence that infras- tructure investment precedes TFP. Our estimated impact of infrastructure on TFP lay rougbly in the interval (0.19, 0.27).

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

An intra-household approach to the welfare costs of inflation (Revised Version, Forthcoming 2006, Estudos Econômicos)

The literature on the welfare costs of ináation universally assumes that the many-person household can be treated as a single economic agent. This paper explores what the heterogeneity of the agents in a household might imply for such welfare analyses. First, we show that allowing for a one-person or for a many-person transacting technology impacts the money demand function and, therefore, the welfare costs of ináation. Second, more importantly, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which welfare assessments which depart directly from the knowledge of the money demand function (as in Lucas (2000)) are robust (invariant) under the number of persons considered in the household. Third, we show that Baileyís (1956) partial-equilibrium measure of the welfare costs of ináation can be obtained as a Örst-order approximation of the general-equilibrium welfare measure derived in this paper using a many-person transacting technology.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seigniorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92: revised version

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

Globalization and the Industrial Revolution (revised)

This paper argues that trade specialization played an indispensable role in supporting the Industrial Revolution. We calibrate a two-good and two-sector overlapping generations model to Englandís historical development and investigate how much different Englandís development path would have been if it had not globalized in 1840. The open-economy model is able to closely match the data, but the closed-economy model cannot explain the fall in the value of land relative to wages observed in the 19th century. Without globalization, the transition period in the British economy would be considerably longer than that observed in the data and key variables, such as the share of labor force in agriculture, would have converged to Ögures very distant from the actual ones.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Some notes about the determination of current account equilibrium real exchange rate and the relation between real exchange rate and productive specialization

The objective of these notes is to present a simple mathematical model of the determination of current account real exchange rate as defined by Bresser-Pereira (2010); i.e. the real exchange rate that guarantees the inter temporal equilibrium of balance of payments and to show the relation between Real Exchange rate and Productive Specialization at theoretical and empirical level.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.