Financial regulation and international criminal policy: the anti-money laundering system in Brazil and Argentina

The objective of this paper is to present and compare the process and the results of the implementation of the anti-money laundering system in Brazil and Argentina. Considering that the internal transformations cannot be discussed without a clear understanding of the international apparatus, attention will be given to the description of the “international policy” designed and conducted by FATF. Therefore, its incorporation into two different national realities, the Brazilian and the Argentinean ones, will shed light not only on the transnational transformations both States underwent but also on the anti-money laundering regime itself. The paper is divided into five parts. The first one presents a brief introduction on the emergence and development of the relationship between financial regulation and criminal policy. The two following sections are designed to present an overview of the anti money laundering system in Brazil and Argentina and of the role of FATF in their implementation process. The fourth section presents two Brazilian examples of situations in which full advantage of the FATF regime was taken: the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money Laundering and the BacenJud, a communication channel between the financial system and the judicial power. To conclude, final comments will be presented in connection with the central questions of the project this paper is part of .

Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

Regulation and wage adjustment patterns : non parametric evidence from longitudinal data

This paper gives a first step toward a methodology to quantify the influences of regulation on short-run earnings dynamics. It also provides evidence on the patterns of wage adjustment adopted during the recent high inflationary experience in Brazil.The large variety of official wage indexation rules adopted in Brazil during the recent years combined with the availability of monthly surveys on labor markets makes the Brazilian case a good laboratory to test how regulation affects earnings dynamics. In particular, the combination of large sample sizes with the possibility of following the same worker through short periods of time allows to estimate the cross-sectional distribution of longitudinal statistics based on observed earnings (e.g., monthly and annual rates of change).The empirical strategy adopted here is to compare the distributions of longitudinal statistics extracted from actual earnings data with simulations generated from minimum adjustment requirements imposed by the Brazilian Wage Law. The analysis provides statistics on how binding were wage regulation schemes. The visual analysis of the distribution of wage adjustments proves useful to highlight stylized facts that may guide future empirical work.

Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.

A note on Brazilian financial regulation and governance

The question posed by Theme 4 of this workshop is indeed a very broad one and would demand a thorough research on the topics involved. I am afraid I did not have the proper time to think it over and I would not be able to provide a wide ranging answer to this question. Thus, I will be selective and I will present the following issues that need to be addressed to support Brazilian development: i) competition among banks; ii) high rate of interest on liquidity; iii) approval by the Congress of a Complementary Law to regulate the financial sector as required by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution; iv) exploitation of workers through the governance of the Job Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS) and iv) state-owned versus government owned enterprises.