Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Decision making naturalized: the interweaving of the unconscious, the emotional and the rational in decisions taken in a contigent world

Dadas as limitações e inadequações presentes, tanto no arquétipo do tomador de decisão como um agente racional, adotado nas teorias econômicas e gerenciais, quanto no estereótipo de um ser transcendental, tão presente na vida prosaica, se faz necessário substituí-los por uma nova perspectiva: onde o tomador de decisão é um animal emocional, frágil diante do acaso, e fruto de um processo evolutivo.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

Processo decisório em contabilidade sob efeito da vaguidade.

O modelo racional de decisão tem sido objeto de estudo constante na academia de vários países, contribuindo para evolução do ser racional como importante tomador de decisão. A evolução destes estudos tem aberto questionamentos quanto à capacidade de racionalidade que temos como tomadores de decisão, deleitando assim em várias teorias novas que pesquisam estas limitações no decidir. Especialmente aplicadas a teorias econômicas, estudos como Inteligência Artificial, Contabilidade Mental, Teoria dos Prospectos, Teoria dos Jogos entre outras se destacam neste cenário de estudo das finanças comportamentais. A contabilidade como ferramenta de apoio as decisões financeiras ocupa posição de destaque. Esta tem em seu escopo de trabalho normas (aquilo que deveria ser feito) que regulam sua atuação, em alguns casos esta regulamentação não é precisa em suas especificações, deixando janelas que levam seus profissionais a erros de interpretação. A imprecisão contábil pode causar viés em suas classificações. Os profissionais, deparados com este legado podem se utilizar de heurísticas para interpretar da melhor maneira possível os acontecimentos que são registrados na contabilidade. Este trabalho tem a intenção de análise de alguns pontos que consideramos importantes quando temos imprecisão contábil, respondendo as seguintes perguntas: a imprecisão de normas contábeis causa viés na decisão? O profissional que se depara com imprecisão contábil se utiliza de Heurística para decidir? Quais os erros mais comuns de interpretação sob incerteza contábil? Para que o assunto fosse abordado com imparcialidade de maneira a absorver retamente quais são as experiências dos profissionais que atuam na área contábil, foi elaborado um questionário composto por uma situação possível que leva o respondente a um ambiente de tomada de decisões que envolva a prática contábil. O questionário era dividido em duas partes principais, com a preocupação de identificar através das respostas se existe imprecisão contábil (sob a luz do princípio da prudência) e quais heurísticas que os respondentes se utilizam com mais freqüência, sendo o mesmo aplicado em profissionais que atuam na área contábil e que detenham experiências profissionais relacionadas à elaboração, auditoria ou análise de demonstrações contábeis. O questionário aplicado na massa respondente determinou, através das respostas, que existe, segundo os profissionais, interpretações diferentes para os mesmos dados, caracterizando assim zona cinzenta, segundo Penno (2008), ou seja, interpretações que podem ser mais agressivas ou mais conservadoras conforme a interpretação do profissional. Já quanto às estratégias simplificadoras, ou heurísticas, que causam algum tipo de enviesamento no processo decisório, alguns foram identificadas como: associações pressupostas, interpretação errada da chance, regressão a media e eventos disjuntivos e eventos conjuntivos, que reforçam a pesquisa dando indícios de que os respondentes podem estar tomando decisões enviesadas. Porém, não se identificou no estudo tomada de decisões com enviesamentos como recuperabilidade e insensibilidades ao tamanho da amostra. Ao final do estudo concluímos que os respondentes têm interpretações diferenciadas sobre o mesmo assunto, mesmo sob a luz do princípio contábil da prudência, e ainda se utilizam de estratégias simplificadoras para resolverem assuntos quotidianos.

Formação de agenda e formulação de uma política pública no Brasil: o caso do Fundo Social do Pré-Sal

Entender o processo que engendra o Fundo Social do Pré-Sal demanda compreender a nova regulação do petróleo, aprovada em 2010. Esta tese empreende análise da trajetória da regulação do petróleo no Brasil, partindo da aprovação da Lei do Petróleo (1997), e avalia como ideias e interesses interagem com instituições vigentes, ação política e condições econômicas, para gerar nova configuração setorial. Combinando visão abrangente do institucionalismo histórico aos métodos robustos do institucionalismo da escolha racional para determinação das preferências dos atores, este trabalho aponta para a determinação histórica das escolhas dos agentes. Em termos empíricos, mostra como as condições econômicas foram determinantes na permeabilidade da política econômica brasileira aos interesses representados pelas instituições multilaterais, esclarece a importância do volume de reservas de petróleo na determinação do novo marco regulatório; e aponta razão para a escalada de valor da Petrobras após 1997.

Rational expectations and the service of public debt: a recursive approach

This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.