Brazilian international and inter-state trade flows: an exploratory analysis using the gravity model

Recent efforts toward a world with freer trade, like WTO/GATT or regional Preferential Trade Agreements(PTAs), were put in doubt after McCallum's(1995) finding of a large border effect between US and Canadian provinces. Since then, there has been a great amount of research on this topic employing the gravity equation. This dissertation has two goals. The first goal is to review comprehensively the recent literature about the gravity equation, including its usages, econometric specifications, and the efforts to provide it with microeconomic foundations. The second goal is the estimation of the Brazilian border effect (or 'home-bias trade puzzle') using inter-state and international trade flow data. It is used a pooled cross-section Tobit model. The lowest border effect estimated was 15, which implies that Brazilian states trade among themselves 15 times more than they trade with foreign countries. Further research using industry disaggregated data is needed to qualify the estimated border effect with respect to which part of that effect can be attributed to actual trade costs and which part is the outcome of the endogenous location problem of the firm.

The effect of guia exame's ratings on the brazilian fund industry: an analysis of net-worth flows

This paper infers the impact the publication Guia Exame (the guide) has on the Brazilian fund industry, more specifically on the ability the concerned funds develop on attracting new investment. The impact is measured using the event-study analysis based on the variation of net worth subsequently to the event of being rated, according to the methodology applied by the guide to rank the funds. We used five years of fund ratings according to Guia Exame (2000-2004) and analyzed the changes of these funds net worth. We also compared the event amongst different categories of funds. The results found confirm the expected effects according to star rankings and asset manager size in all years.

Capital flows and monetary control under a domestic currency substitution regime: the recent Brazilian experience

The 90s have witnessed a resumption in capital flows to Latin America. due to the conjugation of low interest rates in the US and economic reforms in most LA countries. In Brazil. however. substantial capital flows have becn induced by the extremely high domestic interest rates practiced by the Central Bank as a measure of last reson given the absence of successful stabilization policies. These very high interest rates were needed to prevent capital flight in a context of a surprisingly stable inflation rate above 20% a month. and keep interest bearing govemment securities preferable to foreign assets as money substitutes. We carefully describe how this domestic currency substitution regime (interest bearing govemment securities are substituted for MIas cash holdings) requires the Central Bank to renounce aoy control over monerary aggregates. In this domestic currency substitution regime. hyperinflation is the most likely outcome of an isolated (i.e.. without fiscal adjusanents) attempt by the Brazilian Central Bank to control money.

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

Brazil’s 35 years-old quasi-stagnation: facts and theory

Brazil is growing around 1% per capita a year from 1981; this means for a country that is supposed to catch up, quasi-stagnation. Four historical new facts explain why growth was so low after the Real Plan: the reduction of public savings, and three facts that reduce private investments: the end of the unlimited supply of labor, a very high interest rate, and the 1990 dismantling of the mechanism that neutralized the Dutch disease, which represented a major competitive disadvantage for the manufacturing industry. New-developmental theory offers an explanation and two solutions for the problem, but does not underestimate the political economy problems involved

The effect of guia exame’s ratings on the brazilian fund industry: an analysis of net-worth flows

This paper infers the impact the publication “Guia Exame” (the guide) has on the Brazilian fund industry, more specifically on the ability the concerned funds develop on attracting new investment. The impact is measured using the event-study analysis based on the variation of net worth subsequently to the event of being rated, according to the methodology applied by the guide to rank the funds. We used five years of fund ratings according to Guia Exame (2000-2004) and analyzed the changes of these funds’ net worth. We also compared the event amongst different categories of funds. The results found confirm the expected effects according to star rankings and asset manager size in all years.

Quasi-experimental estimates of fiscal spillovers and spatial interactions among Brazilian cities

Nós usamos a metodologia de Regressões em Descontinuidade (RDD) para estimar o efeito causal do Fundo de Participação dos Municípios (FPM) recebido por um município sobre características dos municípios vizinhos, considerando uma variedade de temas: finanças públicas, educação, saúde e resultados eleitorais. Nós exploramos a regra que gera uma variação exógena da transferência em munícipios próximos às descontinuidades no repasse do fundo de acordo com faixas de população. Nossa principal contribuição é estimar separadamente e em conjunto o efeito spillover e o efeito direto do FPM, considerando ambos municípios vizinhos ou apenas um deles próximos às mudanças de faixa. Dessa forma, conseguimos entender melhor a interação entre municípios vizinhos quando há uma correlação na probabilidade de receber uma transferência federal. Nós mostramos que a estimativa do efeito direto do FPM sobre os gastos locais diminui em cerca de 20% quando controlamos pelo spillover do vizinho, que em geral é positivo, com exceção dos gastos em saúde e saneamento. Nós estimamos um efeito positivo da transferência sobre notas na prova Brasil e taxas de aprovação escolares em municípios vizinhos e na rede estadual do ensino fundamental. Por outro lado, o recebimento de FPM por municípios vizinhos de pequena população reduz o provimento de bens e serviços de saúde em cidades próximas e maiores, o que pode ocorrer devido à redução da demanda por serviços de saúde. A piora de alguns indicadores globais de saúde é um indício, no entanto, de que podem existir problemas de coordenação para os prefeitos reterem seus gastos em saúde. De fato, quando controlamos pela margem de vitória nas eleições municipais e consideramos apenas cidades vizinhas com prefeitos de partido diferentes, o efeito spillover é maior em magnitude, o que indica que incentivos políticos são importantes para explicar a subprovisão de serviços em saúde, por um lado, e o aumento da provisão de bens em educação, por outro. Nós também constatamos um efeito positivo do FPM sobre votos para o partido do governo federal nas eleições municipais e nacionais, e grande parte desse efeito é explicado pelo spillover do FPM de cidades vizinhas, mostrando que cidades com dependência econômica do governo federal se tornam a base de sustentação e apoio político desse governo. Por fim, nós encontramos um efeito ambíguo do aumento de receita devido ao FPM sobre a competição eleitoral nas eleições municipais, com uma queda da margem de vitória do primeiro colocado e uma redução do número de candidatos, o que pode ser explicado pelo aumento do custo fixo das campanhas locais.