Intellectual property and competition as complementary policies: a test using an ordered probit model

Este Artigo Testa a Proposição da Teoria Econômica de que Propriedade Intelectual e Defesa da Concorrência são Políticas Complementares. um Modelo Probit Ordenado é Utilizado para Estimar os Efeitos Marginais do Uso e Qualidade do Enforcement dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual em uma Medida da Gravidade dos Problemas Relacionados À Concorrência. os Resultados Obtidos Reforçam a Noção de que as Políticas de Concorrência e Propriedade Intelectual não são Contraditórias.

O Sistema Tributário Brasileiro e sua Perspectivas Face à Iminente Reforma Tributária

Since 1995 we have observed a great dissatisfaction with tax policy in Brazil. The government, the economic power and also the population agree that the tax burden is excessively high and unfair. This can be confirmed when we draw a parallel between the evolution of income distribution and tax burden. Despite this common sense, many political and economic powers present different solutions, according to their interests, in order to improve the Brazilian tax system. Meanwhile, this inefficient tax structure, which strengthens the well-known economic and social problems, perpetuates and, as a consequence, leads the country to an undesirable condition. This work evaluates the tax policy in Brazil from 1995 to 2000, providing a critical analysis on how the government dealt with taxation in this period to achieve its own goals.

O Papel da elasticidade da renda tributável na avaliação do custo de eficiência da tributação

O trabalho utiliza conceitos da economia do bem estar e a elasticidade da renda tributável para analisar o custo social das reações comportamentais dos contribuintes do imposto de renda sobre as pessoas físicas no Brasil, em resposta a uma mudança de política tributária. A elasticidade da renda tributável despertou grande atenção recente, motivada pela perspectiva de estimar em conjunto todas as reações comportamentais a uma mudança no sistema tributário através de um único parâmetro, mensurando custos de eficiência e de bem estar suportados pela economia de forma relativamente simples. O trabalho aborda a utilização de medidas de variação de bem estar para avaliar mudanças na política tributária e faz uma resenha da literatura sobre a elasticidade da renda tributável, conceitos, características, vantagens e limitações. Um modelo de preferências é especificado para exemplificar a dimensão das reações à tributação e os custos de eficiência envolvidos, e discutir a viabilidade do emprego da elasticidade da renda tributável como parâmetro estrutural.

Capitalização do imposto de propriedade no preço de mercado dos imóveis

Esta dissertação estima e discute a capitalização do imposto de propriedade no preço de imóveis, isto é, quanto um aumento de IPTU reduz os preços de imóveis e vice-versa. Por um modelo de diferença em diferenças e algumas tentativas de falseamento, obtiveram-se fortes evidências de capitalização, onde, em média, 100% de variação no imposto altera por volta de 30% o preço dos imóveis. Com isto, políticas de isenção ou redução de IPTU com fins sociais podem ser questionadas, pois dificultariam o acesso à moradia das famílias mais pobres, contribuindo para o processo de favelização. Ao mesmo tempo, maiores patamares do imposto poderiam ser utilizados não somente para elevar as receitas municipais ou como contrapartida ao uso de serviços públicos locais, mas também para tornar os preços dos imóveis mais acessíveis, reduzindo a pobreza e estimulando o crescimento das cidades.

Condicionantes políticos das reformas tributárias na América Latina

Seriam as reformas tributárias condicionadas por fatores políticos? Verificando a escassez de trabalhos empíricos sobre o tema, elaboramos definição própria de reforma tributária e adotamos uma tipologia para esses fenômenos. Em seguida, compilamos a base de dados de reformas tributárias a partir das respostas aos formulários da pesquisa de campo IPES 2006, realizada pelo Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, com apoio do Centro Interamericano de Administrações Tributárias (CIAT). Esses formulários foram preenchidos por funcionários especialistas dos ministérios de finanças latino-americanos, que reportaram reformas entre 1990 e 2004. Depois, construímos os índices de reformas tributárias, que foram utilizados como variáveis dependentes em nossos modelos. Os índices contribuem para o desenvolvimento de estudos quantitativos sobre reformas tributárias, portando flexibilidade para testar diversas hipóteses. Eles tornaram possível analisar separadamente os determinantes das reformas da tributação da renda e do consumo, das reformas gerais e direcionadas, das reformas tendentes a aumentar ou reduzir tributos. Nos testes, destacou-se a influência da lista fechada, indicando que a disciplina parlamentar é importante para aprovar reformas. Em menor número de especificações, foram também relevantes a magnitude distrital, o bicameralismo, o poder de decreto do presidente da república e seu ciclo eleitoral. Não captamos evidência de fatores políticos conjunturais, como a ideologia partidária e maioria do governo no parlamento. Do mesmo modo, a influência dos poderes presidenciais de agenda e veto não se confirmou. O domínio de um partido na coalizão de governo foi relevante somente quando vinculado à lista fechada nas eleições. Em geral, os resultados confirmam o impacto de fatores político-institucionais sobre reformas tributárias, não se observando o mesmo para fatores político-conjunturais. Além disso, foram observadas diferenças nos condicionantes políticos que definem reformas na tributação da renda e do consumo, direcionadas e gerais, expansivas e redutoras (incentivos). O estudo contribui para análise quantitativa dos condicionantes políticos das reformas tributárias na América Latina e fornece dados antes indisponíveis. Oferece evidência empírica, considerando diferentes tipos de reformas e de fatores políticos. O estudo conclui pela necessidade de incorporar as variáveis políticas nas análises que envolvam reformas tributárias, até então marcadas pelo domínio dos argumentos econômicos. Além disso, sugere que o aperfeiçoamento das instituições políticas é importante para melhorar as decisões de política tributária na América Latina.

Property rights as a public policy tool: an empirical analysis of the social and economic effects

Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. However, the evaluation of the causal effects of land titling is a difficult task. The Brazilian government through a program called "Papel Passado" has issued titles, since 2004, to over 85,000 families and has the goal to reach 750,000. Furthermore, another topic in Public Policy that is crucial to developing economies is income generation and child labor force participation. Particularly, in Brazil, about 5.4 million children and teenagers between 5 and 17 years old are still working. This thesis examines the direct impact of securing a property title on income and child labor force participation. In order to isolate the causal role of ownership security, this study uses a comparison between two close and very similar communities in the City of Osasco case (a town with 650,000 people in the São Paulo metropolitan area). One of them, Jardim Canaã, was fortunated to receive the titles in 2007, the other, Jardim DR, given fiscal constraints, only will be part of the program schedule in 2012, and for that reason became the control group. Also, this thesis also aims to test if there is any relationship between land title and happiness. The estimates suggest that titling results in a substantial decrease of child labor force participation, increase of income and happiness for the families that received the title compared to the others.

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

A note on policy, the composition of public expenditures and economic growth

In this article we study the growth and welfare effects of fiscal and monetary policies in economies where public investment is part of the productive process we present four different models that share the same technology with public infrastructure as a separate argument of the production function. We show that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization we show that the optimal tax rate is greater than the rate that maximizes growth and the optimal rate of money creation is below the growth maximizing rate. With public infrastructure in the production function we no longer obtain superneutrality in the Sidrausky model.

Welfare and fiscal policy with public goods and infrastructure

We construct and simulate a model to study the welfare and macroeconomic impact of government actions when its productive role is taken into account. The trade-off between public investment and public consumption is also investigated, since public consumption is introduced as a public good that directly affects individuals' well-being. Our results replicate econometric evidence showing that part of the observed slowdown of U.S. productivity growth can be explained by the reduction of investment in infrastructure which also implied a sizable welfare 1085 to the popu1ation. Depending on the methodology used we found a welfare cost ranging from 4.2% to 1.16% of GNP. The impact of fiscal policy can be qualitative and quantitative distinct depending on Whether we assume a higher or smaller output elasticity to infrastructure. If it is high enough, increases in tax rates may stimulate accumulation and production, which is the opposite prediction of standard ncocJassica1 models.

A note on growth, welfare and public policy

In this note the growth anti welfare effects of fiscal anti monetary policies are investigated in three economies where public investment is part of the productive process It is shown that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation but that there is no direct relationship between government size, productivity and growth or between inflation and growth. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization and the optimal tax rate and government size are greater than those that maximize growth. Money is not superneutral anti the optimal rate of money creation is below the maximizing rate of growth.

Access to knoledge in Brazil: new research on intellectual property, innovation and development

The present volume is the fruit of a research initiative on Access to Knowledge begun in 2004 by Yochai Benkler, Eddan Katz, and myself. Access to Knowledge is both a social movement and an approach to international and domestic policy. In the present era of globalization, intellectual property and information and communications technology are major determinants of wealth and power. The principle of access to knowledge argues that we best serve both human rights and economic development through policies that make knowledge, knowledge-creating tools, and nowledgeembedded goods as widely available as possible for decentralized innovation and use. Open technological standards, a balanced approach to intellectual property rights, and expansion of an open telecommunications infrastructure enable ordinary people around the world to benefit from the technological advances of the information age and allow them to generate a vibrant, participatory and democratic culture. Law plays a crucial role in securing access to knowledge, determining whether knowledge and knowledge goods are shared widely for the benefit of all, or controlled and monopolized for the benefit of a few.

Taxing hard-to-tax markets

Tax enforcement costs constrain the government s ability to observe economic transactions, giving rise to hard-to-tax (HTT) markets. In these markets transactions are untaxed and consumers are better o¤ than in taxed markets. This paper studies a novel approach to combat evasion in HTT markets: consumer auditing, which rewards consumers for re- questing transaction receipts. We develop a Hotelling-type spatial model of sales taxation to analyze the welfare and distributional e¤ects of the implementation of this policy. We and that consumer auditing allows for a lower tax rate and greater provision of the public good in the economy. We show that this policy not only can enhance welfare, but also equalize utilities of consumers across markets

Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in pollution intensity

Environmental policy affects the distribution of market shares if intermediate goods are differentiated in their pollution intensity. When innovations are environment-friendly, a tax on emissions skews demand towards new goods which are the most productive. In this case, the tax has to increase along a balanced growth path to keep the market shares of goods of different vintages constant. Comparing balanced growth paths, we find that an increase in the burden of environmental taxation spurs innovation because it increases the market share of recent vintages. As a result the cost of environmental policy in terms of slower growth is weaker and may even be absent.

Fiscal policy in Brazil: from counter-cyclical response to crisis

The main goal of this article is to identify the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output in Brazil from 1997 to 2014, and, more specifically, to estimate those effects when the output falls below its potential level. To do so, we estimate VAR (vector autoregressive) models to generate impulse-response functions and causality/endogeneity tests. Our most remarkable results indicate the following channel of economic policy in Brazil: to foster output, government spending increases causing increases in both tax rates and revenue and the short-term interest rate. A fiscal stimulus via spending seems efficient for economic performance as well as monetary policy; however, the latter operates pro-cyclically in the way we defined here, while the former is predominantly countercyclical. As the monetary shock had a negative effect on GDP growth and GDP growth responded positively to the fiscal shock, it seems that the economic policy has given poise to growth with one hand and taken it with the other one. The monetary policy is only reacting to the fiscal stimuli. We were not able to find any statistically significant response of the output to tax changes, but vice versa seems work in the Brazilian case.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.