The human side of project management - an investigation of critical chain concepts in the Argentinean Project Environment

The global marketplace is rapidly intensifying. Longer product sales lives, greater profit margins or simply survival, is dependent on management¿s ability to create and lead change. Project Management has become an important competency, combined with other business practices to adapt to the trend of changing conditions. Critical Chain is a relatively new project methodology, elaborated by Eliyahu Goldratt in order to complete projects faster, make more efficient use of resources and securing the project deliverables. The methodology is based on the assumption that traditional project techniques such as CPM and PERT, do not recognize critical human behavior. The methodology claims that many project failures are a direct result of how safety is built into the task delivery times, and then wasted by human behavior such as Student Syndrome, Parkinson Law and Multitasking. However, there has been little or no previous research regarding this topic in the Argentine marketplace. This study intended to investigate to what extent the human behavior concepts of critical chain project management are present, by performing in-depth interviews with Argentine project stakeholders. It appears that the four human behavior concepts are present in Argentina and that the majority of Argentine companies are yet to apply project management techniques.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.