Purchasing power parity and the unit root tests: a robust analysis

Empirical evidence suggests that real exchange rate is characterized by the presence of near-unity and additive outliers. Recent studeis have found evidence on favor PPP reversion by using the quasi-differencing (Elliott et al., 1996) unit root tests (ERS), which is more efficient against local alternatives but is still based on least squares estimation. Unit root tests basead on least saquares method usually tend to bias inference towards stationarity when additive out liers are present. In this paper, we incorporate quasi-differencing into M-estimation to construct a unit root test that is robust not only against near-unity root but also against nonGaussian behavior provoked by assitive outliers. We re-visit the PPP hypothesis and found less evidemce in favor PPP reversion when non-Gaussian behavior in real exchange rates is taken into account.

Purchasing power parity: the choice of price index

Looking closely at the PPP argument, it states that the currencies purchasing power should not change when comparing the same basket goods across countries, and these goods should all be tradable. Hence, if PPP is valid at all, it should be captured by the relative price indices that best Öts these two features. We ran a horse race among six di§erent price indices available from the IMF database to see which one would yield higher PPP evidence, and, therefore, better Öt the two features. We used RER proxies measured as the ratio of export unit values, wholesale prices, value added deáators, unit labor costs, normalized unit labor costs and consumer prices, for a sample of 16 industrial countries, with quarterly data from 1975 to 2002. PPP was tested using both the ADF and the DFGLS unit root test of the RER series. The RER measured as WPI ratios was the one for which PPP evidence was found for the larger number of countries: six out of sixteen when we use DF-GLS test with demeaned series. The worst measure of all was the RER based on the ratio of foreign CPIs and domestic WPI. No evidence of PPP at all was found for this measure.

On the purchasing power parity for Latin-American countries

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis of long-run purchasing power parity (PPP) for all Latin American countries. These countries share similar economic history and contagious effects from currency crises, which might lead to comovements in their real exchange rates. New time series unit root tests found evidence of PPP for the vast majority of countries. In the panel data framework, tests for the null of unit root, null of stationarity, and unit root under multiple structural breaks indicated stationary real exchange rates. Thus, there is convincing evidence that PPP holds for Latin-American countries in the post-1980 period.

An econometric study on purchasing-power parity

Neste trabalho abordamos alguns “puzzles” da Paridade do Poder de Compra (PPC) ainda não resolvidos; durante esse processo propomos um novo modelo não-linear e estudamos o papel da agregação temporal e de bases de dados abrangendo apenas um pequeno período histórico. A hipótese de que não existe uma força de convergência agindo sobre o câmbio real ajustado (ARER) foi fortemente rejeitada estatisticamente, e a não-linearidade se mostrou um questão importante. As meia-vidas encontradas para o Brasil usando os modelos padrão parecem ser uma das menores já encontradas para um país, e chegamos à conclusão de que a velocidade de convergência em direção a PPC ainda não pode ser considerada um consenso. Pretendemos, em adição, dar contribuições através do levantamento e esclarecimento de alguns resultados e problemas potenciais concernentes ao estudo da PPC.

Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.