O computador na escola: um exame de uma prática

Este estudo objetivou contribuir para um melhor entendimento do processo de informatização em nossas escolas, enfatizando uma vertente ainda pouco explorada pelos pesquisadores: as possíveis mudanças organizacionais decorrentes da utilização do microcomputador. Esta temática foi introduzida, nesta dissertação, a partir da contextualização de algumas das inúmeras dimensões pedagógicas, históricas, econômicas, políticas e sociais, que entremeadas, formam o intrincado tecido da informatização da educação. Para seu desenvolvimento, tornou-se necessário adaptar-se a proposta de Robert Shirley (1976) para o exame de mudanças organizacionais e utilizou-se de algumas categorias de análise sugeridas por Sheingold e outras (1983). Realizou-se uma pesquisa, em estabelecimento educacional localizado na zona oeste da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, que pode ser classificada como um estudo de caso de caráter exploratório. Nesta pesquisa foram empregadas a observação não participante, entrevistas padronizadas e não padronizadas, questionários e análise documental. Em relação às estratégias de mudança, não se constatou o aparecimento dos novos papéis, a preparação formal dos professores não atingiu a maior parte do corpo docente e o acesso aos microcomputadores, restrito aos alunos do primeiro segmento do 12 grau, viu-se bastante limitado. Os sistemas de coordenação revelaram-se bastante centralizados e a distribuição de pOder mostrou-se hierarquizada, com forte submissão à autoridade da família proprietária. Diante de tal quadro, a participação dos professores, apesar de solicitada pela coordenação de informática, era na verdade imposta pela direção. O software adotado pela instituição foi o LOGO, utilizado ao lado da análise do discurso da criança. A síntese dos resultados evidenciou o crescente processo de mercantilização do ensino em nosso país e do uso da informática como um novo atrativo para a matrícula de novos alunos. Como conseqOência disto, surge a necessidade de novos estudos para se confirmar a relevância pedagógica da informatização do ensino ou para constatar-se, em escolas preocupadas apenas com o faturamento, sua importância comercial.

EDF and the Brazilian Power Sector

Electricité de France (EDF) is a leading player in the European energy market by being both the first electricity producer in Europe and the world’s leading nuclear plant operator. EDF is also the first electricity producer and supplier in France. However, Europe, EDF’s core market, is currently underperforming: the European sovereign debt crisis is lowering significantly the growth perspective of an energy market that has already reached its maturity. As a consequence, European energy companies are now looking at international markets and especially BRIC economies where economic growth potential remains high. Among them, Brazil is expected to keep its strong economic and electricity demand growth perspectives for the coming decades. Though Brazil has not been considered as a strategic priority for EDF after the Light reversal in 2006, the current economic situation has led the Group to reconsider its position toward the country. EDF’s current presence in Brazil is limited to its stake in UTE Norte Fluminense, a thermal plant, located in the state of Rio de Janeiro. This report investigates the possibility and the feasibility of EDF’s activities expansion in Brazil and what added value it could bring for the Brazilian power market. Considering that the status quo would not allow EDF to take full advantage of Brazil’s future growth, this work is identifying the various options that are currently opened to EDF: market exit, status quo, EDF alone, local partner. For that purpose, this study collects and analyses the latest energy market data as well as generation companies’ information which are necessary to give a relevant overview of the current brazilian power sector and to present EDF strategic options for the country.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

The power of the purse : what do the data say on US federal budget allocation to the states?

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states and tests the capability of congressional, electoral and partisan theories to explain such allocation. We find that socio-economic characteristics are important explanatory variables but are not sufficient to explain the disparities in the distribution of federal monies. First, prestige committee membership is not conducive to pork-barrelling. We do not find any evidence that marginal states receive more funding; on the opposite, safe states tend to be rewarded. Also, states that are historically "swing" in presidential elections tend to receive more funds. Finally, we find strong evidence supporting partisan theories of budget allocation. States whose governor has the same political affiliation of the President receive more federal funds; while states whose representatives belong to a majority opposing the president party receive less funds.