Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Trade and infrastructure: evidences from the Andean Community

This paper presents evidence on the key role of infrastructure in the Andean Community trade patterns. Three distinct but related gravity models of bilateral trade are used. The first model aims at identifying the importance of the Preferential Trade Agreement and adjacency on intra-regional trade, while also checking the traditional roles of economic size and distance. The second and third models also assess the evolution of the Trade Agreement and the importance of sharing a common border, but their main goal is to analyze the relevance of including infrastructure in the augmented gravity equation, testing the theoretical assumption that infrastructure endowments, by reducing trade and transport costs, reduce “distance” between bilateral partners. Indeed, if one accepts distance as a proxy for transportation costs, infrastructure development and improvement drastically modify it. Trade liberalization eliminates most of the distortions that a protectionist tariff system imposes on international business; hence transportation costs represent nowadays a considerably larger barrier to trade than in past decades. As new trade pacts are being negotiated in the Americas, borders and old agreements will lose significance; trade among countries will be nearly without restrictions, and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of costs and competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, will only be achieved by an improvement in infrastructure services at all points in the production-distribution chain.

Relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection in telecommunications, electricity and water supply

The purpose of this article is to discuss the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection these relations in three key sectors of Brazil’s infrastructure: telecommunications, electricity and water supply. A study of the literature points to two general principles. First, the need for consumer protection depends on the “degree of sovereignty” enjoyed by consumers, defined in terms of the cost of consumer organization, consumers’ ability to evaluate services, and the level of competition in each sector. Second, the less sovereignty consumers enjoy the more consumer protection institutions are involved with regulation agencies. The evidence for the Brazilian case apparently corroborates these points. In addition, it is important to stress that consumer complaints in regulated sectors seem to have increased more intensely than in others. The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 presents theoretical elements and aspects of the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection evidenced by international experience. Section 2 analyzes the Brazilian experience and in particular the available statistics on consumer complaints about telecommunications, electricity and water supply, submitted to Fundação Procon-SP during the nineties. The last section points to possible configurations of the institutional relations between competition policy, regulation and consumer protection, showing how the existing configuration of these areas in the three infrastructure sectors discussed confirms that the theoretical framework proposed has reasonable predictive power.