Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Os preços administrados e a condução de política monetária no Brasil

Esta dissertação trata da questão dos preços administrados no Brasil sob a argumentação de que os mesmos apresentam uma persistência mais acentuada do que os demais preços da economia. Para alcançar este objetivo foram verificados alguns testes de persistência inflacionária. Em seguida, utilizou-se a metodologia dos Vetores de Correção de Erro (VEC) para estudar a relação dos preços administrados com as variáveis mais importantes da economia brasileira, tais como, produto, taxa de câmbio, preços livres e taxa de juros Selic. Por fim, utilizou-se do instrumental de Mankiw e Reis (2003) para verificar qual o índice de preços seria mais adequado para manter a atividade econômica brasileira mais próxima de seu nível potencial. Os resultados encontrados foram os seguintes: 1) observou-se persistência do IPCA representada pelos preços administrados; 2) a autoridade monetária responde a choques dos preços monitorados com maior veemência do que a choques nos preços livres; 3) o exercício de Mankiw e Reis (2003) apontou que a porcentagem dos preços monitorados deve ser menor que a atual do IPCA em um índice de preços estabilizador. Desta forma, mostra-se que a presença dos preços administrados dificulta pronunciadamente a condução de política monetária no Brasil.

Inferring conduct under the threat of entry : the case of Brazilian cement industry

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, pricecost margins estimated using this established technique are considerably biased downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Earnings dynamics and inequality in Venezuela: 1995-1997

In this paper, we decompose the variance of logarithmic monthly earnings of prime age males into its permanent and transitory components, using a five-wave rotating panel from the Venezuelan “Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo” from 1995 to 1997. As far as we know, this is the first time a variance components model is estimated for a developing country. We test several specifications and find that an error component model with individual random effects and first order serially correlated errors fits the data well. In the simplest model, around 22% of earnings variance is explained by the variance of permanent component, 77% by purely stochastic variation and the remaining 1% by serial correlation. These results contrast with studies from industrial countries where the permanent component is predominant. The permanent component is usually interpreted as the results of productivity characteristics of individuals whereas the transitory component is due to stochastic perturbations such as job and/or price instability, among others. Our findings may be due to the timing of the panel when occurred precisely during macroeconomic turmoil resulting from a severe financial crisis. The findings suggest that earnings instability is an important source of inequality in a region characterized by high inequality and macroeconomic instability.