Career concerns: a human capital perspective

We introduce human capital accumulation, in the form of learning by doing, in a life cycle model of career concerns and analyze how human capital acquisition a ects implicit incentives for performance. We show that standard results from the career concerns literature can be reversed in the presence of human capital accumulation. Namely, implicit incentives need not decrease over time and may decrease with the degree of uncertainty about an individual's talent. Furthermore, increasing the pre-cision of output measurement can weaken rather than strengthen implicit incentives. Overall, our results contribute to shed new light on the ability of markets to discipline moral hazard in the absence of explicit contracts linking pay to performance.

Development and evaluation of a range anxiety-reducing business model for connected full electric vehicles

This thesis develops and evaluates a business model for connected full electric vehicles (FEV) for the European market. Despite a promoting political environment, various barriers have thus far prevented the FEV from becoming a mass-market vehicle. Besides cost, the most noteworthy of these barriers is represented by range anxiety, a product of FEVs’ limited range, lacking availability of charging infrastructure, and long recharging times. Connected FEVs, which maintain a constant connection to the surrounding infrastructure, appear to be a promising element to overcome drivers’ range anxiety. Yet their successful application requires a well functioning FEV ecosystem which can only be created through the collaboration of various stakeholders such as original equipment manufacturers (OEM), first tier suppliers (FTS), charging infrastructure and service providers (CISP), utilities, communication enablers, and governments. This thesis explores and evaluates how a business model, jointly created by these stakeholders, could look like, i.e. how stakeholders could collaborate in the design of products, services, infrastructure, and advanced mobility management, to meet drivers with a sensible value proposition that is at least equivalent to that of internal combustion engine (ICE) cars. It suggests that this value proposition will be an end-2-end package provided by CISPs or OEMs that comprises mobility packages (incl. pay per mile plans, battery leasing, charging and battery swapping (BS) infrastructure) and FEVs equipped with an on-board unit (OBU) combined with additional services targeted at range anxiety reduction. From a theoretical point of view the thesis answers the question which business model framework is suitable for the development of a holistic, i.e. all stakeholder-comprising business model for connected FEVs and defines such a business model. In doing so the thesis provides the first comprehensive business model related research findings on connected FEVs, as prior works focused on the much less complex scenario featuring only “offline” FEVs.

Os movimentos sociais de junho de 2013 e a Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro

A pesquisa tem como objetivo avaliar a relação dos movimentos sociais de junho de 2013 com a Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro, quando da ruptura dos diálogos e a ocupação desta em dois momentos distintos: a discussão e votação do plano de cargos, carreiras e salários dos professores da rede pública municipal, e a composição e instalação da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito dos ônibus. Para tanto, foram criadas 5 categorias de análise: 1. Política e Participação; 2. Manifestações, Mobilizações e Movimentos; 3. Ocupa Câmara; 4. CPI dos Ônibus e Plano de Cargos e Salários dos Professores; 5. Diálogos. O trabalho também apresenta recomendações que visam a elaboração de um plano de trabalho para o exercício de mandato parlamentar que aperfeiçoe os mecanismos de participação, transparência, democracia direta e interativa na Câmara Municipal do Rio de Janeiro e, desta forma, conecte.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

A influência do volume na performance dos fundos de investimento em ações no Brasil

Tendo como base a literatura internacional sobre fundos mútuos, o presente estudo busca encontrar algumas características que influenciam a performance dos fundos de investimentos em ações no Brasil de janeiro de 1999 até abril de 2005. O objetivo principal do trabalho é perceber se os fundos de investimento em ações têm retorno decrescente de escala. Ao mesmo tempo, sabe-se que a persistência de uma boa rentabilidade depende do grau de profissionalismo dos gestores e também de uma boa relação entre o gestor responsável e o investidor e, um contrato ótimo entre ambos. Observou-se que o volume não tem influência negativa no retorno do fundo, pelo contrário, quanto maior o fundo melhor é a rentabilidade do mesmo. Os resultados também apresentaram que os fundos que cobram taxa de performance têm um desempenho melhor do que os que não cobram. Foi identificado também que os fundos que utilizam a marca d água como incentivo de remuneração aos gestores têm rentabilidade um pouco maior do que os fundos que pagam taxa de performance, mas não utilizam a marca d água no regulamento. Chegou-se a conclusão que há uma relação direta entre incentivo e desempenho. Os resultados aqui encontrados buscam facilitar o conhecimento e a tomada de decisão de pesquisadores, investidores, empresas gestoras, Corretoras e Distribuidoras, fundos de pensão e dos demais interessados na indústria de fundos de investimento em ações no Brasil.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

Financial guarantees in Brazilian life insurance and pension plans

Recently regulated Brazilian life and pension products offer a benefit structure composed of minimum guaranteed annual rate, in°ation adjustment according to a price index and participation on an investment fund performance. We present a valuation model for these products. We establish a fair condition relationship between minimum guarantees and participation rates, and explore its behavior over a space of maturities, interest rates, and also fund and price index volatilities and correlation. Besides consistency to reference models, we found that the effect of the fund volatility is conditioned to the price index volatility level and the correlation between them.