Why designate market makers? affirmative obligations and market quality

We study why most financiaI markets designate one or more agents who precommit to provide more liquidity than they would endogenously choose, and identify two reasons that such affirmative obligations can improve welfare. The first relies on the insight that the informational component of the competi tive bid-ask spread represents a transfer across traders, not a social cost to completing trades. As such, this trading cost dissuades efficient trading, while a restriction on spread widths encourages efficient trading. Secondly, a restriction on spread widths encourages traders to become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values in the wake of information events. We consider the setting where competition ensures that affirmative obligations impose net trading losses on designated market makers that must be compensated by side payments, as observed on the Euronext limit order market, and also the setting where the designated market maker is allowed some advantages relative to limit order traders so that profits can be eamed during tranquil periods to offset losses incurred when affirmative obligations are binding, as observed on the NYSE.

Optimal-state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflationary inertia

This paper examines the output losses caused by disinflation and the role of credibility in a model where pricing mIes are optimal and individual prices are rigid. Individual nominal rigidity is modeled as resulting from menu costs. The interaction between optimal pricing mIes and credibility is essential in determining the inflationary inertia. A continued period of high inflation generates an asymmetric distribution of price deviations, with more prices that are substantially lower than their desired leveIs than prices that are substantially higher than the optimal ones. When disinflation is not credible, inflationary inertia is engendered by this asymmetry: idiosyncratic shocks trigger more upward than downward adjustments. A perfect1y credible disinflation causes an immediate change of pricing rules which, by rendering the price deviation distribution less asymmetric, practically annihilates inflationary inertia. An implication of our model is that stabilization may be sucessful even when credibility is low, provided that it is preceded by a mechanism of price alignment. We also develop an analytical framework for analyzing imperfect credibility cases.

Is what you say what you do? Analyzing and comparing the effect of buyer-supplier relationship in the Brazilian and Chinese supplier selection criteria

Choosing properly and efficiently a supplier has been challenging practitioners and academics since 1960’s. Since then, countless studies had been performed and relevant changes in the business scenario were considered such as global sourcing, quality-orientation, just-in-time practices. It is almost consensus that quality should be the selection driver, however, some polemical findings questioned this general agreement. Therefore, one of the objectives of the study was to identify the supplier selection criteria and bring this discussion back again. Moreover, Dickson (1966) suggested existing business relationship as selection criterion, then it was reviewed the importance of business relationship for the company and noted a set of potential negative effects that could rise from it. By considering these side effects of relationship, this research aimed to investigate how the relationship could influence the supplier selection and how its harmful effects could affect the selection process. The impact of this phenomenon was investigated cross-nationally. The research strategy adopted was a controlled experiment via vignette combined with discrete choice analysis. The data collections were performed in China and Brazil. By examining the results, it could be drawn five major findings. First, when purchasers were asked to declare their supplier selection priorities, quality was stated as the most important independently of country and relationship. This result was consistent with diverse studies since 60’s. However, when purchasers were exposed to a multi-criteria trade-off situation, their actual selection priorities deviate from what they had declared. In the actual decision-making without influence of buyer-supplier relationship, Brazilian purchasers focused on price and Chinese buyers prioritized delivery then price. This observation reinforced some controversial prior studies of Verma & Pullman (1998) and Hirakubo & Kublin (1998). Second, through the introduction of the buyer-supplier relationship (operationalized via relational capital) in the supplier selection process, this research extended the existing studies and found that Brazilian buyers still focused on price. The relationship became just another criterion for supplier selection such as quality and delivery. However, from the Chinese sample, the results suggested that quality was totally discarded and the decision was majorly made through price and relationship. The third finding suggested that relational capital could legitimate the quality and sustainability of the supplier and replaces these selection criteria and made the decisional task less complex. Additionally, with the relational capital, the decision-makings were associated to few biases such as availability cognition, commitment, confirmatory and perceived biases. By analyzing the purchasers’ behavior, relational capital inducted buyers of both countries to relax in their purchasing requirements (quality, delivery and sustainability) leading to potential negative effects. In the Brazilian sample, the phenomenon of willing to pay a higher price for a lower quality offer demonstrated to be a potential counterproductive and suboptimal decision. Finally, the last finding was associated to the cultural effect on the buyers’ decisions. From the outcome, it is possible to observe that if a purchaser’s cultural background is more relation-oriented, the more he will tend to use relational capital as a decision heuristic, thus, the purchaser will be more susceptible to the potential relationship’s side effects