6 resultados para non-expected utililty
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
Com o emprego do modelo de dois setores de acumulação ótima de capital em economia aberta, determina-se o impacto sobre a trajetória do câmbio, dos salários, do investimento, da poupança e, portanto, da dívida externa e do estoque de capital, de uma elevação permanente e não antecipada da produtividade da economia. Em geral, após um choque positivo permanente de produtividade há redução da poupança, piora do balanço de pagamentos em transações correntes e valorização do câmbio. Todos fenômenos que do ponto de vista do modelo são de equilíbrio intertemporal, conseqüência da elevação da renda permanente e do excesso de demanda por bens domésticos que sucede o ganho de produtividade. Supondo que os programas de estabilização elevaram a produtividade da economia é possível com a estrutura analítica construída racionalizar qualitativamente os fenômenos observados após estes planos.
Resumo:
The Rational Agent model have been a foundational basis for theoretical models such as Economics, Management Science, Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory, mainly by the ¿maximization under constraints¿ principle, e.g. the ¿Expected Utility Models¿, among them, the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory, from Savage, placed as most influence player over theoretical models we¿ve seen nowadays, even though many other developments have been done, indeed also in non-expected utility theories field. Having the ¿full rationality¿ assumption, going for a less idealistic sight ¿bounded rationality¿ of Simon, or for classical anomalies studies, such as the ¿heuristics and bias¿ analysis by Kahneman e Tversky, ¿Prospect Theory¿ also by Kahneman & Tversky, or Thaler¿s Anomalies, and many others, what we can see now is that Rational Agent Model is a ¿Management by Exceptions¿ example, as for each new anomalies¿s presentation, in sequence, a ¿problem solving¿ development is needed. This work is a theoretical essay, which tries to understand: 1) The rational model as a ¿set of exceptions¿; 2) The actual situation unfeasibility, since once an anomalie is identified, we need it¿s specific solution developed, and since the number of anomalies increases every year, making strongly difficult to manage rational model; 3) That behaviors judged as ¿irrationals¿ or deviated, by the Rational Model, are truly not; 4) That¿s the right moment to emerge a Theory including mental processes used in decision making; and 5) The presentation of an alternative model, based on some cognitive and experimental psychology analysis, such as conscious and uncounscious processes, cognition, intuition, analogy-making, abstract roles, and others. Finally, we present conclusions and future research, that claims for deeper studies in this work¿s themes, for mathematical modelling, and studies about a rational analysis and cognitive models possible integration. .
Resumo:
O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar se o ajustamento das condições de paridade de juros por expectativa do mercado (paridade descoberta) e por prêmios de risco (paridades coberta e descoberta) leva à validação da relação de não-arbitragem subjacente, ou pelo menos a resultados econométricos mais próximos de sua validação. Para isso, combinamos taxas de retornos de instrumentos de renda fixa domésticos e norte-americanos e aplicamos o arcabouço econométrico de séries de tempo. Como primeiro passo de investigação, aplicamos a paridade de juros (descoberta e coberta) na sua forma tradicional. No passo seguinte aplicamos os testes econométricos às condições de paridade ajustadas por um prêmio de risco. No caso da PDJ, não obtivemos resultados satisfatórios, mesmo ajustando pelos prêmios de risco. Esse ajuste propiciou uma mudança nos sinais dos coeficientes na direção correta, mas a magnitude do coeficiente da desvalorização cambial efetiva passou a destoar bastante da magnitude das outras séries. Apesar de termos obtido a validade da PCJ na forma tradicional, não esperaríamos este resultado, pois isso implicaria que o prêmio de risco país seria nulo para este período. Ajustando a PCJ pelo prêmio de risco de não-pagamento passa-se a não obter co integração entre as séries, ou seja, o prêmio de risco de não-pagamento teria um comportamento independente do prêmio futuro e do diferencial de juros. As possíveis causas para a não obtenção dos resultados esperados são: intervalo amostraI menor que 3 anos, erro de medida dos dados de survey ou tentativa do Banco Central de controlar a taxa de câmbio nominal e as taxas de juros domésticas simultaneamente.
Resumo:
Employing the two sector model of capital accumulation in an open economy, the impact on the path of the following variables: exchange rate, wages, investment, saving, and consequently externaI debt and capital stock afier a permanent and non expected elevation of the economy productivity is determinated. Afier this positive shock, saving rate decreases, current transaction deteriorates and the exchange rate appreciates. Those are equilibrium phenomena from 3D intertemporaI point of view due to the permanent income raise and to the domestic good excess demand that follows the productivity increase. Assuming that the stabilization programa augment the economy productivity, the model could rationalize qualitatively the stylized facts witnessed after those programa.
Resumo:
We study an intertemporal asset pricing model in which a representative consumer maximizes expected utility derived from both the ratio of his consumption to some reference level and this level itself. If the reference consumption level is assumed to be determined by past consumption levels, the model generalizes the usual habit formation specifications. When the reference level growth rate is made dependent on the market portfolio return and on past consumption growth, the model mixes a consumption CAPM with habit formation together with the CAPM. It therefore provides, in an expected utility framework, a generalization of the non-expected recursive utility model of Epstein and Zin (1989). When we estimate this specification with aggregate per capita consumption, we obtain economically plausible values of the preference parameters, in contrast with the habit formation or the Epstein-Zin cases taken separately. All tests performed with various preference specifications confirm that the reference level enters significantly in the pricing kernel.
Resumo:
In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions—particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions. Governments choose property rules when expected gains from compliance are sufficiently high and expected losses to the constrained country are sufficiently low. Liability rules are preferable when dispute costs are relatively high, because inefficiencies in the compensation process reduce the number of socially inefficient disputes filed.