Um teste de paridade coberta de juros, ajustada por prêmio de risco, para a economia brasileira entre 2007 e 2010

O conceito de paridade coberta de juros sugere que, na ausência de barreiras para arbitragem entre mercados, o diferencial de juros entre dois ativos, idênticos em todos os pontos relevantes, com exceção da moeda de denominação, na ausência de risco de variação cambial deve ser igual a zero. Porém, uma vez que existam riscos não diversificáveis, representados pelo risco país, inerentes a economias emergentes, os investidores exigirão uma taxa de juros maior que a simples diferença entre as taxas de juros doméstica e externa. Este estudo tem por objetivo avaliar se o ajustamento das condições de paridade coberta de juros por prêmios de risco é suficiente para a validação da relação de não-arbitragem para o mercado brasileiro, durante o período de 2007 a 2010. O risco país contamina todos os ativos financeiros emitidos em uma determinada economia e pode ser descrito como a somatória do risco de default (ou risco soberano) e do risco de conversibilidade percebidos pelo mercado. Para a estimação da equação de não arbitragem foram utilizadas regressões por Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários, parâmetros variantes no tempo (TVP) e Mínimos Quadrados Recursivos, e os resultados obtidos não são conclusivos sobre a validação da relação de paridade coberta de juros, mesmo ajustando para prêmio de risco. Erros de medidas de dados, custo de transação e intervenções e políticas restritivas no mercado de câmbio podem ter contribuído para este resultado.

Earnings at Risk para as Instituições Não-Financeiras e as Exigências da Lei Americana Sarbanes-Oxley

A demanda pela responsabilidade corporativa nunca foi tão grande. A necessidade de aliar a governança corporativa a atividades de controle eficientes nunca foi tão clara. Essa dissertação tem como objetivo responder a questão sobre se a abordagem Top Down do Earnings at Risk pode ser considerada como compatível às demandas da Sarbanes Oxley, e adicionalmente, um método eficiente de gerenciamento de riscos para as empresas não financeiras. Baseado nos resultados que encontramos a abordagem Top Down do Earnings at Risk não atende às demandas impostas pela Sarbanes-Oxley. Embora a SOX atente para a eficácia e não para eficiência dos controles utilizados pelas empresas, decisões gerenciais baseadas neste método podem conduzir a empresa a possíveis erros.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Comparing value-at-risk methodologies

In this paper, we compare four different Value-at-Risk (V aR) methodologies through Monte Carlo experiments. Our results indicate that the method based on quantile regression with ARCH effect dominates other methods that require distributional assumption. In particular, we show that the non-robust methodologies have higher probability to predict V aRs with too many violations. We illustrate our findings with an empirical exercise in which we estimate V aR for returns of S˜ao Paulo stock exchange index, IBOVESPA, during periods of market turmoil. Our results indicate that the robust method based on quantile regression presents the least number of violations.

Essays in corporate risk management

This research investigates the factors that lead Latin American non-financial firms to manage risks using derivatives. The main focus is on currency risk management. With this purpose, this thesis is divided into an introduction and two main chapters, which have been written as stand-alone papers. The first paper describes the results of a survey on derivatives usage and risk management responded by the CFOs of 74 Brazilian non-financial firms listed at the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA), and the main evidence found is: i) larger firms are more likely to use financial derivatives; ii) foreign exchange risk is the most managed with derivatives; iii) Brazilian managers are more concerned with legal and institutional aspects in using derivatives, such as the taxation and accounting treatment of these instruments, than with issues related to implementing and maintaining a risk management program using derivatives. The second paper studies the determinants of risk management with derivatives in four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). I investigate not only the decision of whether to use financial derivatives or not, but also the magnitude of risk management, measured by the notional value of outstanding derivatives contracts. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to use derivatives holdings information in emerging markets. The use of a multi-country setting allows the analysis of institutional and economic factors, such as foreign currency indebtedness, the high volatility of exchange rates, the instability of political and institutional framework and the development of financial markets, which are issues of second-order importance in developed markets. The main contribution of the second paper is on the understanding of the relationship among currency derivatives usage, foreign debt and the sensitivity of operational earnings to currency fluctuations in Latin American countries. Unlikely previous findings for US firms, my evidence shows that derivatives held by Latin American firms are capable of producing cash flows comparable to financial expenses and investments, showing that derivatives are key instruments in their risk management strategies. It is also the first work to show strong and robust evidence that firms that benefit from local currency devaluation (e.g. exporters) have a natural currency hedge for foreign debt that allows them to bear higher levels of debt in foreign currency. This implies that firms under this revenue-cost structure require lower levels of hedging with derivatives. The findings also provide evidence that large firms are more likely to use derivatives, but the magnitude of derivatives holdings seems to be unrelated to the size of the firm, consistent with findings for US firms.

Análise empírica do value-at-risk por simulação histórica com atualização de volatilidade para fundos de ações no Brasil

Há mais de uma década, o Value-at-Risk (VaR) é utilizado por instituições financeiras e corporações não financeiras para controlar o risco de mercado de carteiras de investimentos. O fato dos métodos paramétricos assumirem a hipótese de normalidade da distribuição de retornos dos fatores de risco de mercado, leva alguns gestores de risco a utilizar métodos por simulação histórica para calcular o VaR das carteiras. A principal crítica à simulação histórica tradicional é, no entanto, dar o mesmo peso na distribuição à todos os retornos encontrados no período. Este trabalho testa o modelo de simulação histórica com atualização de volatilidade proposto por Hull e White (1998) com dados do mercado brasileiro de ações e compara seu desempenho com o modelo tradicional. Os resultados mostraram um desempenho superior do modelo de Hull e White na previsão de perdas para as carteiras e na sua velocidade de adaptação à períodos de ruptura da volatilidade do mercado.

Essays on regulation and risk

In this thesis, we investigate some aspects of the interplay between economic regulation and the risk of the regulated firm. In the first chapter, the main goal is to understand the implications a mainstream regulatory model (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) have on the systematic risk of the firm. We generalize the model in order to incorporate aggregate risk, and find that the optimal regulatory contract must be severely constrained in order to reproduce real-world systematic risk levels. We also consider the optimal profit-sharing mechanism, with an endogenous sharing rate, to explore the relationship between contract power and beta. We find results compatible with the available evidence that high-powered regimes impose more risk to the firm. In the second chapter, a joint work with Daniel Lima from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), we start from the observation that regulated firms are subject to some regulatory practices that potentially affect the symmetry of the distribution of their future profits. If these practices are anticipated by investors in the stock market, the pattern of asymmetry in the empirical distribution of stock returns may differ among regulated and non-regulated companies. We review some recently proposed asymmetry measures that are robust to the empirical regularities of return data and use them to investigate whether there are meaningful differences in the distribution of asymmetry between these two groups of companies. In the third and last chapter, three different approaches to the capital asset pricing model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) are tested with recent Brazilian data and estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) as a unifying procedure. We find that ex-post stock returns generally exhibit statistically significant coskewness with the market portfolio, and hence are sensitive to squared market returns. However, while the theoretical ground for the preference for skewness is well established and fairly intuitive, we did not find supporting evidence that investors require a premium for supporting this risk factor in Brazil.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The risk of falling into the acceleration trap during a privatization process: a case study of a European telecommunication company

A privatização de uma empresa é uma mudança empresarial disruptiva que geralmente coincide com o fim de uma posição de monopólio e da subsequente entrada num ambiente competitivo. Os desafios que a privatização coloca são tão árduos que eles levam muitas vezes a liderança (leadership) para executar planos ambiciosos de mudança empresarial. No entanto, a literatura mostra que muitos deles falharam. Na verdade, esses planos preveem mudanças bruscas e importantes que tendem a empurrar a empresa privatizada na armadilha de aceleração (acceleration trap). Um tipo de “burnout organizacional” (organizational burnout) onde a exaustão e a resignação da força de trabalho afetam drasticamente o desempenho da empresa. A tese, portanto, focalizou em estudar a ligação entre um processo de privatização e o risco de cair na armadilha de aceleração. Uma investigação preliminar sobre a literatura das mudanças empresariais permitiu a concepção de um quadro preliminar teórico que sugere a existência de dois moderadores (moderators) deste relacionamento entre um processo de privatização e a armadilha de aceleração: um “choque cultural” (cultural clash) e um “fraco clima de liderança transformacional” (weak transformational leadership). Em seguida, um estudo de caso - baseado numa empresa de telecomunicações europeia e conduzido através de uma abordagem metodológico não puramente indutivo (non-purely inductive approach) - confirma, mas também aprofunda a compreensão da ação desses dois moderadores. A respeito do moderador “choque cultural” (cultural clash moderator), a análise de dados do estudo de caso da empresa de telecomunicações europeia mostra a importância exercitado tanto por um “choque de identidade corporativa” (corporate identity conflict) como por um “conflito de identidade gerencial” (management identity conflict). Quanto ao moderador “fraco liderança transformacional”, a análise dos dados destaca o papel da “falta de confiança na nova gerência” (lack of trust in the new management), mas também de “sentido do trabalho” (lack of job sense), principalmente através da perda de “orgulho no trabalho” (loss of proudness). Finalmente, a análise dos dados salienta que a “não aceitação do novo sistema de incentivos” (non-acceptance of the new incentive system) afeta significativamente a relação entre a privatização e a armadilha de aceleração, contribuindo tanto para um “choque cultural” como para um “fraco clima de liderança transformacional”.

Nonparametric tail risk, macroeconomics and stock returns: predictability and risk premia

This paper proposes a new novel to calculate tail risks incorporating risk-neutral information without dependence on options data. Proceeding via a non parametric approach we derive a stochastic discount factor that correctly price a chosen panel of stocks returns. With the assumption that states probabilities are homogeneous we back out the risk neutral distribution and calculate five primitive tail risk measures, all extracted from this risk neutral probability. The final measure is than set as the first principal component of the preliminary measures. Using six Fama-French size and book to market portfolios to calculate our tail risk, we find that it has significant predictive power when forecasting market returns one month ahead, aggregate U.S. consumption and GDP one quarter ahead and also macroeconomic activity indexes. Conditional Fama-Macbeth two-pass cross-sectional regressions reveal that our factor present a positive risk premium when controlling for traditional factors.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Dynamic D-Vine copula model with applications to Value-at-Risk (VaR)

Regular vine copulas are multivariate dependence models constructed from pair-copulas (bivariate copulas). In this paper, we allow the dependence parameters of the pair-copulas in a D-vine decomposition to be potentially time-varying, following a nonlinear restricted ARMA(1,m) process, in order to obtain a very flexible dependence model for applications to multivariate financial return data. We investigate the dependence among the broad stock market indexes from Germany (DAX), France (CAC 40), Britain (FTSE 100), the United States (S&P 500) and Brazil (IBOVESPA) both in a crisis and in a non-crisis period. We find evidence of stronger dependence among the indexes in bear markets. Surprisingly, though, the dynamic D-vine copula indicates the occurrence of a sharp decrease in dependence between the indexes FTSE and CAC in the beginning of 2011, and also between CAC and DAX during mid-2011 and in the beginning of 2008, suggesting the absence of contagion in these cases. We also evaluate the dynamic D-vine copula with respect to Value-at-Risk (VaR) forecasting accuracy in crisis periods. The dynamic D-vine outperforms the static D-vine in terms of predictive accuracy for our real data sets.