Área de Livre-Comércio das Américas: incentivos econômicos e políticos

O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a economia política da Área de Livre Comércio das Américas a partir de um jogo político seqüencial não-cooperativo de Stackelberg entre uma grande economia e uma pequena economia, onde a disputa política entre grupos lobistas rivais define as preferências unilaterais dos governos no primeiro estágio e o equilíbrio "coalition-proof" de Stackelberg define o formato do acordo de livre comércio no segundo estágio. Finalmente, discutese algumas modificações na estrutura inicial do jogo que possam aumentar o poder de negociação da pequena economia.

Uma Contribuição à Contabilidade das Sociedades Cooperativas: Estudo de Caso sobre a Contabilização dos Atos Cooperativos e não Cooperativos em uma Cooperativa de Produção Vinícola do Sul do Brasil, de Acordo com a Norma Brasileira de Contabilidade - NBC T 10.8.

The main goal of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the appropriate accounting treatment of the operations in cooperatives, which differentiates them from other Brazilian commercial societies. This treatment is objectively examined under the lens of the norm NBC T 10.8 of Federal Council of Accounting, which determines distinction between cooperative acts and non-cooperative acts. The theoretical foundation of this paperwork is centered in examining, from both the cooperative doctrine and the accounting theory viewpoint, the issues related to the origin, nature and purpose of the cooperatives, as well as the accounting regulation applicable to them. The author developed a method to treat adequately the norm NBC T 10.8 and applied it to a case study of a wine producer cooperative in southern Brazil. As a result of this work, it is demonstrated that NBC T 10.8 eliminated a historical deficiency that permeated the accounting practice in cooperatives, whose accounting procedures - implicit in both technical and scientific content in NBC T 10.8 ¿ are presented in a detailed manner.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.