Welfare costs of inflation: the case for interest-bearing money and empirical estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next. we extend this approach to ao economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Fmally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

A model is presented in which banks accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. Alt though theories about the coexistence of money and credit are inherently difficult, the model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are well monitored, and can credibly allow fiat-money withdraws to whom needs its, thus qualifying to become safe brokers of idle capital. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

Divisia indexes, money and welfare

We suggest the use of a particular Divisia index for measuring welfare losses due to interest rate wedges and in‡ation. Compared to the existing options in the literature: i) when the demands for the monetary assets are known, closed-form solutions for the welfare measures can be obtained at a relatively lower algebraic cost; ii) less demanding integrability conditions allow for the recovery of welfare measures from a larger class of demand systems and; iii) when the demand speci…cations are not known, using an index number entitles the researcher to rank di¤erent vectors of opportunity costs directly from market observations. We use two examples to illustrate the method.

Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies

Pooled procurement has an important role in reducing acquisition prices of goods. A pool of buyers, which aggregates demand for its members, increases bargaining power and allows suppliers to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production. Such aggregation demand e ect lowers prices paid for buyers. However, when a buyer with a good reputation for paying suppliers in a timely manner is joined in the pool by a buyer with bad reputation may have its price paid increased due to the credit risk e ect on prices. This will happen because prices paid in a pooled procurement should refect the (higher) average buyers' credit risk. Using a data set on Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, we nd evidence supporting both e ects. We show that the prices paid by public bodies in Brazil are lower when they buy through pooled procurement than individually. On the other hand, federal agencies (i.e. good buyers) pay higher prices for products when they are joined by state agencies (i.e. bad buyers) in a pool. Such evidence suggests that pooled procurement should be carefully designed to avoid that prices paid increase for its members.

WeIfare costs of inflation the case for interest-bearing money and empiricaI Estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next, we extend this approach to an economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Finally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

A coordination approach to the essentiality of money

The essentiality of money is commonly justi ed on e¢ ciency grounds. In this paper, we propose an alternative view on the essentiality of money. We consider an economy with llimited monitoring where agents have to coordinate on the use of two alternative technologies of exchange, money and credit. We show that although credit strictly dominates money from an e¢ ciency perspective, money is essential for coordination reasons. If agents are patient, the region of parameters where they coordinate in the use of money strictly contains the region of parameters where they coordinate in the use of credit

Show me the money and I will bring you the head: evaluation of the effects of self-interest and anger on whistleblowing

Though many of those who decided to report wrongdoings in their organizations were able to tell their stories (e.g. Bamford, 2014, Armenakis 2004), it is fair to say that there is still much left to uncover. The paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, it provides preliminary evidence that the wrongdoing linked with individual financial loss leads to higher whistleblowing rate. Secondly, it shows how the experience of anger is related to the higher likelihood to report the wrongdoer but only if the wrongful act is perceived as a cause of one’s financial loss. Finally, the paper establishes first steps for the future development of an experimental procedure that would enable to predict, and measure whistleblowing behavior in the lab environment.

Money supply and capital accumulation on the transition path revisited

Fischer (1979) and Asako (1983) analyze the sign of the correlation between the growth rate of money and the rate of capital accumulation on the transition path. Both plug a CRRA utility (based on a Cobb-Douglas and a Leontief function, respectively) into Sidrauski's model - yet return contrasting results. The present analysis, by using a more general CES utility, presents both of those settings and conclusions as limiting cases, and generates economic gures more consistent with reality (for instance, the interest-rate elasticity of the money demands derived from those previous works is necessarily 1 and 0, respectively).

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Historically, payment systems and capital intermediation interact. Friedman (1959), and many observers of bank instabilities, have ad- vocated separating depositary from credit institutions. His proposal meets today an ever-increasing provision of inside money, and a short- age of monetary models of bank intermediation. In this paper, we eval- uate the proposal from a new angle, with a model in which isolating a safe payments system from commercial intermediation undermines information complementarities in banking activities. Some features of the environment resemble the models in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

Credit union correspondents and financial inclusion in Brazil: an exploratory study

A rede de correspondentes bancários do Brasil tem sido estudada há mais de uma década, em particular por causa da sua importância no aumento do alcance de serviços financeiros para regiões distantes dos maiores centros urbanos. O uso de correspondentes por cooperativas de crédito não tem recebido destaque, apesar do papel importante das cooperativas na inclusão financeira. Esta dissertação adota uma abordagem “multimétodo” para efetuar uma pesquisa exploratória dos correspondentes de cooperativas de crédito no Brasil. A pesquisa visa, por um lado, alargar a compreensão dos incentivos que levam cooperativas a usarem correspondentes, e por outro, avaliar se esses correspondentes merlhoram a inclusão financeira. A pesquisa é formada por um estudo de caso assim como por análise de dados relativos ao registro de correspondentes bancários e de dados financeiros das cooperativas. Os resultados apontam que o uso de correspondentes bancários por cooperativas está relacionado à busca de maior eficiência e redução de filas nas agências. A melhoria da inclusão financeira por esses correspondentes limita-se a um serviço único – o recebimento de pagamentos. Não obstante, em 2014, cooperativas de correspondentes de crédito tinham um papel importante no fornecimento de serviços de recebimento de contas em 690 municípios brasileiros, dos quais 200 tinham baixos níveis de inclusão financeira. Apesar da escassa disponibilidade de serviços dos correspondentes das cooperativas, os resultados sugerem que esses atores poderiam adquirir uma importância maior na promoção de inclusão financeira no futuro.

Pompidou & Pompeia: a parallel between the management strategies of two cultural institutions in the French and Brazilian contexts

A presente pesquisa foi conduzida na forma de um estudo de caso de duas instituições culturais no contexto francês e brasileiro. O Centro Pompidou é um projeto presidencial de museu financiado pelo Estado, com a missão de tornar a arte moderna em todas as suas expressões acessíveis ao público em geral. O Sesc Pompeia é um centro multidisciplinar de cultura e esporte - financiado pelo dinheiro dos impostos e administrado pela Federação do Comércio . O Sesc Pompéia é dedicado à oferta de educação informal através do cultivo da mente e do corpo. O estudo examina se as teorias de dependência de recursos e de poder podem ser utilizadas para conceituar a relação que o Centro Pompidou e do Sesc Pompéia tem com seus stakeholders financeiros. Mais especificamente, será discutido em que medida o grau de dependência influencia a estratégia de gestão das instituições. O objetivo é de responder a pergunta seguinte: quais são as estratégias que as instituições adotam para reduzir sua dependência com relação a seus principais stakeholders financeiros? Finalmente algumas implicações práticas de gestão serão elaboradas a partir do paralelo entre as estratégias das duas instituições.

Rational expectations and the service of public debt: a recursive approach

This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.

Inflation persistence and flexible prices

The inability of rational expectation models with money supply rules to deliver inflation persistence following a transitory deviation of money growth from trend is due to the rapid adjustment of the price level to expected events. The observation of persistent inflation in macroeconomic data leads many economists to believe that prices adjust sluggishly and/or expectations must not be rational. Inflation persistence in U.S. data can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend. In the vector autocorrelation function both inflation and output are highly persistent and there are significant positive dynamic cross-correlations relating inflation and output. This paper shows that a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using a Taylor rule can account for these patterns. There are no sticky prices and no liquidity effects. Agents decisions in a period are taken only after all shocks are observed. The monetary policy rule transforms output persistence into inflation persistence and creates positive cross-correlations between inflation and output.

Value-for-money e geração de valor público na atuação das organizações sociais de saúde : contribuições para o governo do estado de São Paulo

O fato de que o Estado brasileiro deve, de acordo com sua Carta Magna, garantir o direito de seus cidadãos à saúde não significa, necessariamente, que a provisão destes serviços tem de ser feita diretamente pelo poder público. As parcerias com organizações sociais, previstas na Lei Federal 9.637/1998 e regulamentadas pelos Contratos de Gestão, pretendem oferecer uma alternativa à eficiência, agilidade e flexibilidade na assistência à saúde. Entretanto, a estrutura dos contratos de gestão com Organizações Sociais de Saúde (OSS), elaborada com a pactuação de metas e indicadores de desempenho, não pode ser considerada, isoladamente, como fator garantidor da prestação adequada de tais serviços públicos. É fundamental considerar neste contexto os arranjos organizados pelo poder público para assegurar que os serviços oferecidos representam o que, de fato, os cidadãos consideram valor. O presente trabalho tem como objeto as parcerias com OSS no âmbito do governo do estado de São Paulo. As entrevistas realizadas e as pesquisas empreendidas na confecção deste estudo revelam que, caso se pretenda trabalhar com estas parcerias sob uma perspectiva de value-for-money e geração de valor público, faz-se necessário aprimorar os mecanismos de escuta aos cidadãos, os arranjos de governança colaborativa entre entes federados, o alinhamento com órgãos de controle e, sobretudo, qualificar a capacidade organizacional do Estado e das OSS, por meio da revisão das metas e indicadores dispostos nos contratos de gestão.

Cyclicality of SME Lending and Government Involvement in Banks

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potential detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending by local banks with vs. without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a deviation from strict profit maximization and a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25 percent less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for savings banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the banking structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.