Monetary union and productivity differences in mercosur countries

This paper investigates cross-country productivity convergence among Mercosur members plus associates (Chile and Bolivia) and Peru, during the period 1960-1999. The testing strategy is based on the definitions of time-series convergence by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), and applies sequentially the multivariate unit root tests proposed by Sarno and Taylor (1998), Flôres, Preumont and Szafarz (1995) and Breuer, Mc Nown and Wallace (1999). The last two tests allow to identify the countries that converge. Our results show evidence of convergence among the four Mercosur countries, using either Argentina or Brazil as benchmark. Weaker evidence of convergence is also found with Bolivia. The results point out that monetary union among the Southern Cone economies, though a far objective, is not without sense.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Ataques especulativos sobre dívidas e regimes monetários

A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.

Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.