Financiamento para o subdesenvolvimento, o Brasil e o segundo consenso de Washington

While in the social and in the ethical realms the Cardoso administration was successful, its economic outcomes were frustrating. In this administration’s eight years the investment rate did not increase and income per capita growth lagged, while the public debt and the foreign debt increased substantially. This poor economic performance may be explained by three chained causes: a mistake in agenda setting, the adoption of the Second Washington Consensus, and the alienation of elites. The decision of setting high inflation as the major problem to be tackled instead of achieving equilibrium in foreign accounts represented a major macroeconomic mistake, which can be explained by the Second Washington Consensus. This consensus proposed in the 1990s that highly indebted countries should grow counting on foreign savings, although this is not the experience among OECD countries. The outcome was to evaluate the real, to increase artificially wages and consumption, so that instead of growth what we have been increased indebtedness. Why this flopped strategy was adopted? Rich countries’ interests are not difficult to guess. On the part of Brazil, the only explanation is Brazilian elites’ alienation in relation to the country’s national interest. As a final outcome, the Cardoso administration ends with another balance of payments crisis, which was empowered by the coming presidential elections. Yet, the solvency situation of the Brazilian economy have been improving since the 1999 successful floatation of the real, so that I believe that, adopted a policy that deepens fiscal adjustment, while lowers the interest rate, and avoids new evaluation of the real, the country will eventually be able to avoid default.

O estado necessário para a democracia possível na América latina

Uma democracia consolidada pressupõe um estado capaz, e para ambos é necessária uma nação forte e uma sociedade civil ativa. Diversas democracias na América Latina não alcançaram tais requisitos porque não completaram suas respectivas revoluções capitalistas, e o excedente econômico continua dependendo do controle direto do estado. Este fato demonstra que a qualidade das democracias varia de país para país, e prevê que as democracias possíveis nos países mais pobres serão necessariamente democracias limitadas. Desde que a democracia tornou-se uma justificativa para pressões e intervenções externas, é um erro incluir no conceito de democracia mais do que as necessidades mínimas, práticas. Por outro lado, para melhorar a democracia é necessário aumentar a capacidade do estado não apenas para assegurar o respeito às leis, mas também para promover o desenvolvimento econômico e social.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.