The Profile of a Manager in Higher Education Institution in Latin America: The Case of the EBAPE

The aim of this study is to analyze the profile of today’s manager, according to the classical management literature, working on internationalized higher education institute. This paper draws together knowledge about the manager’s profile in a corporate environment and how it can be appreciated in a higher education institute all of this taking into consideration the environment that nowadays exists in these institutions. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews, with professors of the Fundacao Getulio Vargas, more specific on their Public and Business Administration School (EBAPE), which had active roles on its development, internationalization and during some point in time their management. The findings obtained where analyzed under the perspective brought by the theoretical reference framework, and, based on this approach is represented the manager whom could have a better perspective to administrate a higher education institute.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

Controle acionário, remuneração de executivos e desempenho empresarial : evidências para o mercado brasileiro

Esse artigo buscou examinar como o tipo de controlador afeta a relação remuneração e desempenho da diretoria nas empresas brasileiras no período de 2010 a 2013. Primeiramente, o controle no Brasil ainda é majoritariamente exercido por firmas familiares, e que o capital também é concentrado, sendo em média 65% do capital detido pelos 5 maiores acionistas. Quanto a análise econometrica os resultados indicaram que: As empresas de controle familiar e governamental remuneram seus gestores com um valor menor em relação os outros tipos de controle; Não foi possível fazer inferência acerca da influência do controlador nas empresas institucionais; As empresas sem controlador remuneram o seu gestor com um valor maior de remuneração. Por fim, quanto ao desempenho, em nenhuma das equações o ROA foi significativo, demonstrando fracos mecanismos de remuneração ou capacidade do gestor em determinar sua compensação