Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.

Executivo e legislativo no âmbito municipal: a formação de gabinetes no município de São Paulo (1989-2012)

O desenho político-institucional dos municípios brasileiros segue a lógica da esfera federal. Tal sistema tem por características gerais o termo de duração fixa e próprio, tanto para o Executivo quanto para o Legislativo, ou seja, ambos são eleitos diretamente – eleições majoritárias e proporcionais, respectivamente – sem estarem sujeitos à confiança mútua como no sistema parlamentarista. Dada a separação de poderes e o conflito que a literatura ressalta no âmbito federal entre Legislativo e Executivo, o estudo examina a estrutura da dinâmica dessa relação no âmbito municipal. Nesse sentido, o escopo tange as estratégias adotadas na formação dos gabinetes no município de São Paulo de 1989 a 2012, ou seja, contempla 6 (seis) diferentes gestões paulistanas. Para isso foi investigado o perfil político-partidário do secretariado e a correspondência em termos de cadeiras no Legislativo paulistano, bem como os resultados acerca da aprovação de proposituras de iniciativa do Executivo. Os resultados encontrados destacam que a distribuição de pastas não acarreta em um suporte da maioria do parlamento, como no caso federal. Entretanto, apesar da ausência desse apoio, praticamente todos os projetos do Executivo que chegaram ao Plenário foram aprovados. Assim, o estudo aponta que o compartilhamento de poder através da nomeação de secretários partidários é uma ferramenta importante do Executivo, porém pode não ser a única garantidora de uma coalizão majoritária que explique o sucesso legislativo do prefeito.

Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems

In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.