Welfare and fiscal policy with public goods and infrastructure

We construct and simulate a model to study the welfare and macroeconomic impact of government actions when its productive role is taken into account. The trade-off between public investment and public consumption is also investigated, since public consumption is introduced as a public good that directly affects individuals' well-being. Our results replicate econometric evidence showing that part of the observed slowdown of U.S. productivity growth can be explained by the reduction of investment in infrastructure which also implied a sizable welfare 1085 to the popu1ation. Depending on the methodology used we found a welfare cost ranging from 4.2% to 1.16% of GNP. The impact of fiscal policy can be qualitative and quantitative distinct depending on Whether we assume a higher or smaller output elasticity to infrastructure. If it is high enough, increases in tax rates may stimulate accumulation and production, which is the opposite prediction of standard ncocJassica1 models.

Municipalities secession and uncertainty on public goods provision

This paper investigates the causes of municipalities secession in Brazil. The theoretical model proposes that the median voter is not fully informed about the efficiency effect of secession on public good provision and uses the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s municipalities within the state to account for his voting. Our empirical results confirms that prediction

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

A note on policy, the composition of public expenditures and economic growth

In this article we study the growth and welfare effects of fiscal and monetary policies in economies where public investment is part of the productive process we present four different models that share the same technology with public infrastructure as a separate argument of the production function. We show that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization we show that the optimal tax rate is greater than the rate that maximizes growth and the optimal rate of money creation is below the growth maximizing rate. With public infrastructure in the production function we no longer obtain superneutrality in the Sidrausky model.

A note on growth, welfare and public policy

In this note the growth anti welfare effects of fiscal anti monetary policies are investigated in three economies where public investment is part of the productive process It is shown that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation but that there is no direct relationship between government size, productivity and growth or between inflation and growth. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization and the optimal tax rate and government size are greater than those that maximize growth. Money is not superneutral anti the optimal rate of money creation is below the maximizing rate of growth.

A guerra tributária intermunicipal: uma análise sobre os efeitos da política de harmonização tributária sobre o fenômeno da arrecadação dos municípios da região metropolitana de São Paulo

A proposta deste trabalho é avaliar a adoção da EC n° 37, de 12 de junho de 2002, regulada pela LC 116, em 31 de julho de 2003, como instrumentos de contenção da guerra fiscal entre os municípios. Desse modo, procura-se avaliar os impactos da adoção de uma alíquota de piso para o ISSQN sobre a arrecadação dos municípios, tomando os municípios que compõem a RMSP como principal objeto de análise. A importância do tema é identificada na relação entre entes federativos, a discussão em torno da autonomia financeira e tributária na federação brasileira e como estas questões impactam a oferta de bens públicos. Este trabalho se vale de um modelo simples elaborado para compreender a arrecadação tributária via ISSQN e procura inferir os resultados ocasionados pela adoção de uma medida externa de harmonização de alíquotas tributárias, resultados positivos e significantes são encontrados para tais efeitos. Espera-se que este trabalho contribua e aponte novas perspectivas de estudos na área de federalismo fiscal, especialmente para estudos voltados para governos locais no Brasil. Ao mesmo tempo, espera-se contribuir para o desenvolvimento de pesquisas em torno das alíquotas, da arrecadação, do modelo tributário nacional e para as discussões sobre alocação de competências entre os entes federativos.

Public versus private provision of infrastructure in a neoclassical growth model

This article studies the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public (“infrastructure”). A positive externality due to infrastructure capital is assumed, so that the government could improve upon decentralized allocations internalizing the externality, but public investmentis …nanced through distortionary taxation. It is shown that privatization is welfare-improving for a large set of economies and that after privatization under-investment is optimal. When operation inefficiency in the public sectoror subsidy to infrastructure accumulation are introduced, gains from privatization are higherand positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Private or public? a taxonomy of optimal ownership and management regimes

We develop a theory of public versus private ownership based on value diversion by managers. Government is assumed to face stronger institutional constraints than has been assumed in previous literature. The model which emerges from these assumptions is fexible and has wide application. We provide amapping between the qualitative characteristics of an asset, its main use - including public goods characteristics, and spillovers toother assets values - and the optimal ownership and management regime. The model is applied to single and multiple related assets. We address questions such as; when is it optimal to have one of a pair ofr elated assets public and the other private; when is joint management desirable; and when should a public asset be managed by the owner of a related private asset? We show that while private ownership can be judged optimal in some cases solely on the basis of qualitative information, the optimality of any other ownership and management regimes relies on quantitative analysis. Our results reveal the situations in which policy makers will have difficulty in determining the opimal regime.

Espirito Santo : a industrialização como fator de desautonomia relativa

A monografia e uma análise histórico-dialética, de 1535 a 1976, procurando mostrar como o Estado do Espírito Santo formou-se e consolidou-se como região periférica e subdesenvolvida e como ele se integraria agora ao capital ismo nacional, a partir da implantação, em seu território, de alguns projetos industriais de vulto os chamados Grandes Projetos de Impacto. Partindo de uma análise sobre a formação do Centro Ocidental e do Estado brasileiro visa a entender o processo de transformação do Espírito Santo. Mostra, então, as formações do Centro Ocidental e do Estado Nacional. Para o primeiro, evidencia a viagem do sistema capital ista, da democracia 1iberal e do liberalismo econômico ao pluralismo político e à estrutura econômica oligopolica. Na formação do segundo, fica patenteada a evolução do Estado intervencionista/autoritário brasileiro, enxertado pela tentativa liberal da Repúb ica Velha e pela tentativa de implantação de um Estado Racional-Legal no Estado Novo. Assim, fica explícita a especificidade dependente-associada do capital ismo brasileiro, da fase primário-exportadora à fase industrial, e pode-se concluir que o Espírito Santo reproduziu as fases centrais, articulando-se sempre defasadamente aos centros nacionais e internacionais. Tornando patente a interdependencia do Estado do Espírito Santo em relação aos centros inter e in tra nacionais, a monografia passa a descrever o seu processo de formação econômica, social e política, procurando dar conta de suas peculiaridades. Chega à conclusão que a histórica capixaba pode ser dividida em quatro fases. Essencialmente baseadas numa economia de subsistência e, posteriormente, numa economia primário-exportadora, as três fases chamadas regionais litoranea, serrana e pioneina - configuram o ritmo e a direção da ocupação e degradação do território estadual e a marcha do café. A fase atual é de mudanças. são previstas, principalmente, a partir do momento em que os Grandes Projetos começarem a operar, transformações rápidas e desconcertantes, em função dos seis bilhões de dólares de investimentos que serão efetuados num Estado em que o orçamento não cobre sequer as despesas de pessoal. Na medida em que a implantação destes Grandes Projetos poderia reforçar o potencial de ingerência do Governo Federal na esfera estadual, além de trazer para o palco um novo foco de poder, o das corporações estrangeiras envolvidas, contribuir-se-ia para a marginalização dos poderes público e privado capixabas e o Espírito Santo correria o risco de perder sua já reduzida autonomia. Assim, seria configurado um processo iminente de marginalização estadual, tratado na monografia como processo de desautonomia relativa. O trabalho caracteriza esse processo com a análise das transformações potenciais que advirão'em decorrência da operação dos empreendimentos, indicando os riscos que o Estado enfrentará. Segundo ele, as principais mudanças dizem respeito à elevação substancial da Renda Interna Estadual, ao agravamento da concentração individual, espacial e setorial da renda, ao excessivo' adensamento demográfico na area metropolitana da Grande Vitória e ao estímulo à implantação de inúmeras indústrias complementares e satélites.

Intergovernmental transfers and public spending in Brazilian municipalities

We estimate the effects of unconditional (full fiscal decentralization) versus conditional (partial fiscal decentralization) block grants on local public spending in Brazilian municipalities. Our results suggest that the effect of unconditional and conditional transfers do not differ statistically. Their combination promotes a full crowding-in effect on aggregate public spending — i.e., for $1 of unconditional and conditional grant receipts; we find $1 of additional local public expenditures, greater than the corresponding effect of local income, providing further evidence for the flypaper effect. Moreover, the effect of unconditional transfers on education (health) spending is smaller than the effect of conditional education (health) transfers but greater than the corresponding effect of local income. We consider four strategies to identify causal effects of federal grants and the local income on fiscal responses regarding Brazilian local governments: (i) a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, (ii) Redistributive rules of education funds, (iii) Oil and Gas production, and (iv) Rainfall deviations from the historical mean.

The impact of mayor leadership on education: evidence from Brazil

What are the impacts of female mayors on education? It is well known that in Brazil, like in many other countries around the globe, women are underrepresented in political posts. Understanding the impacts of this discrepancy on policy choice and redistribution across many areas of inquiry is, therefore, an important research endeavor. Extant literature shows a strong link between women and the economic development of the areas they govern, specifically that they provide public goods relevant to the needs of women constituents. However, despite the efforts to explore the impacts of gender political leaders, we still do not know what is the consequence of gender on policy outcomes. Exploring a rich dataset on Brazilian municipalities, I intend to enrich the literature on the role of female politicians on politics. I employ a regression discontinuity design using Brazilian elections and indicators on education based on the basic education development index (IDEB), education expenditures and local policies. I find that municipalities where a woman enters into power do not perform better on education and do not present more investments or policies to improve education.