Firm heterogeneity and lobbying

The structure of protection across sectors is usually interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model incorporating firm heterogeneity into a lobbying setup `a la Grossman and Helpman (1994), in a monopolistic competitive environment. We obtain that increased sectorial dispersion cause a fall in equilibrium tariff provided that the exporter’s cutoff is above the mean of the distribution. Also, higher average productivity brings about a fall in the equilibrium tariff, whereas an increase in export costs cause an increase in the tariff. JEL Classification codes: D43, D7, F12, F13, L11

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Advocacy das organizações da sociedade civil: um estudo comparativo entre Brasil e Estados Unidos

As organizações da sociedade civil e suas formas de atuação têm ganhado importância tanto na sociedade como nos estudos acadêmicos. Uma das suas formas de atuação que vem se destacando é o papel de influenciar políticas públicas, também conhecido por advocacy, advocacy em políticas públicas e lobbying, dependendo do contexto e país de análise. O significado de advocacy e como esse fenômeno se manifesta constituem o foco deste estudo exploratório que busca, por meio de revisão da literatura, de entrevistas em profundidade e estudos de casos, comparar a atuação de três organizações da sociedade civil: o Independent Sector nos Estados Unidos, o Grupo de Institutos, Fundações e Empresas (GIFE) e a Associação Brasileira de Organizações não Governamentais (ABONG) no Brasil. Essas organizações se caracterizam por ser associações que representam outras organizações da sociedade civil e fazem advocacy em políticas públicas como parte de sua estratégia. É analisado como ocorre esse advocacy e qual o papel dessa forma de atuação dentro de um contexto de democracia deliberativa que pressupõe a discussão, a deliberação por parte dos cidadãos na esfera pública, de assuntos de seu interesse, como a elaboração, a execução e o monitoramento de políticas públicas.

Aspectos cognitivos da formulação de estratégias políticas: um estudo de caso no setor de etanol brasileiro

Teorias consideradas mainstream em estratégia dão reduzida ênfase ao relacionamento entre empresas e governos. A importância desse relacionamento é fundamental, dado que a influência governamental pode ter papel determinante na lucratividade das empresas. A este campo de estudos das atividades das empresas na tentativa de moldar as políticas públicas denominou-se Corporate Political Activity (CPA) ou ainda estratégias políticas. A importância da atividade se traduz nos valores investidos pelas empresas nestas atividades, que tem apresentado crescimento. As despesas com lobbying nos Estados Unidos representaram US$ 3,3 bilhões em 2011, frente a US$ 1,7 bilhões em 2001. As contribuições totais de campanha no Brasil foram da ordem de R$ 3,7 bilhões em 2010, comparados a R$ 1,7 bilhões doados em 2006. Este trabalho trata da influência dos aspectos cognitivos na formação de estratégias políticas no setor sucroalcooleiro brasileiro. Utilizando-se as proposições da existência de comunidades cognitivas formadas a partir do esforço em interpretar desafios estratégicos, que por sua vez levam a criação de estruturas cognitivas compartilhadas (Porac e Thomas, 2002), explorou-se como estas estruturas cognitivas influenciam as escolhas em CPA (Hillman et al., 2004). Os resultados dão suporte à influência das estruturas cognitivas nas escolhas em CPA. A partir da definição das dimensões que compõe as estruturas cognitivas de cada uma das comunidades, demonstrou-se que as escolhas em CPA estavam ligadas a estas estruturas, e não puramente a decisões racionais e econômicas. Ao demonstrar suporte à influência cognitiva sobre as escolhas em CPA, este trabalho contribui para as discussões sobre os antecedentes “não estruturais” (ou como colocam Cook e Berry (1995) comportamentais) que afetam as escolhas em CPA.

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

All-pay auctions with endogenous asymmetries

We study N-bidders, asymmetric all-pay auctions under incomplete information. First, we solve for the equilibrium of a parametric model. Each bidder’s valuation is independently drawn from an uniform [0, αi] where the parameter αi may vary across bidders. In this game, asymmetries are exogenously given. Next, a two-stage game where asymmetries are endogenously generated is studied. At the first stage, each bidder chooses the level of an observable, costly, value-enhancing action. The second stage is the bidding sub-game, whose equilibrium is simply the equilibrium of the, previously analyzed, game with exogenous asymmetries. Finally, natural applications of the all pay-auction in the context of political lobbying are considered: the effects of excluding bidders, as well as, the impact of caps on bids.

O gás sob pressão: o mapeamento de stakeholders e o lobby no parlamento

Este estudo objetivou identificar os stakeholders que influenciam a agenda do gás de xisto no parlamento brasileiro. A pesquisa teve uma abordagem qualitativa, uma vez que não houve preocupação com os números e sim com a percepção dos entrevistados. Além disso, os dados coletados na pesquisa de campo foram interpretados e alinhados com o referencial teórico desse trabalho. Quanto à metodologia, foi classificada como exploratória, uma vez que ainda há pouco conhecimento sobre a influência de grupos de interesse no Congresso Nacional, do tipo pesquisa de campo e de estudo de caso por se tratar especificamente da exploração do gás de xisto. A coleta de dados foi feita por meio de entrevistas e da aplicação de questionário com um roteiro previamente estabelecido. Após a análise dos dados, concluiu-se que há duas correntes que atuam na agenda do gás de xisto. A primeira tem um posicionamento que preza pela precaução, ou seja, é necessário que se descubra os impactos da exploração da atividade no meio ambiente antes que se decida iniciar a exploração e a produção do gás de xisto. A segunda corrente defende a exploração desse gás não convencional como forma de reduzir os custos de produção e aumentar a competitividade do país. Foram identificados 39 stakeholders que influenciam o andamento do Projeto de Lei 6904/2013, que suspende a autorização e a exploração do gás de xisto por um período de cinco anos. Isso mostra que os grupos de interesse, uns mais poderosos que outros, têm papel importante na formulação de políticas públicas e, através do lobby, buscam influenciar os tomadores de decisão de acordo com os seus objetivos.

Comparison and analysis of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports of the top five companies ranked on the 2013 CSR RepTrak

In the 1970s, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) was discussed by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman in his article “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.” (Friedman, 1970). His view on CSR was contemptuous as he referred to it as “hypocritical window-dressing” a reflection of the view of Corporate America on CSR back then. For a long time short-term maximization of shareholder value was the only maxim for top management across industries and companies. Over the last decade, CSR has become a more important and relevant factor of a company’s reputation, shifting the discussion from whether CSR is necessary to how best CSR commitments should be done (Smith, 2003). Inevitably, companies do have an environmental, social and economic impact, thereby imposing social costs on current and future generations. In 2013, 50 of the world biggest companies have been responsible for 73 percent of the total carbon dioxide (CO2) emission (Global 500 Climate Change Report 2013). Post et al. (2002) refer to these social costs as a company’s need to retain its “license to operate”. In the late 1990s, CSR reporting was nearly unknown, which drastically changed during the last decade. Allen White, co-founder of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), said that CSR reporting”… has evolved from the extraordinary to the exceptional to the expected” (Confino, 2013). In confirmation of this, virtually all of the world’s largest 250 companies report on CSR (93%) and reporting by now appears to be business standard (KPMG, 2013). CSR reports are a medium for transparency which may lead to an improved company reputation (Noked, 2013; Thorne et al, 2008; Wilburn and Wilburn, 2013). In addition, it may be used as part of an ongoing shareholder relations campaign, which may prevent shareholders from submitting Environmental and Social (E&S)1 proposals (Noked, 2013), based on an Ernst & Young report 1 The top five E&S proposal topic areas in 2013 were: 1. Political spending/ lobbying; 2. Environmental sustainability; 3. Corporate diversity/ EEO; 4.Labor/ human rights and 5. Animal testing/ animal welfare. Three groups of environmental sustainability proposal topics of sub-category number two (environmental sustainability) 6 2013, representing the largest category of shareholder proposals submitted. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) even goes as far as to claim that CSR reports are “…becoming critical to a company’s credibility, transparency and endurance.” (PwC, 2013).

Sistemas de regulação do comércio internacional em confronto: o marco dos estados e o marco das transnacionais

This article revisits a past article by the authors in which they propose a new methodology for analyzing trade issues, cross-cutting through the three ―layers‖ of international trade regulation: so-called multisystem of trade regulation. In this text the authors include another approach to international trade regulation studies, proposing a better understanding of the influence of transnational enterprises in the shaping of modern internal trade. In this sense, the transnationals are not only influencing international trade regulation through lobbying in traditional fora (especially in plurilateral and preferential trade agreements), but they are also becoming sources of their own private regulations, particularly regarding private standards. In this sense, the study of international trade regulation must take into account the activities and interests of these indispensible actors, critically analyzing the differences between the regulatory logic of states against the one keen to transnationals