Desenvolvimento do ensino, na área de saúde da Universidade Federal do Maranhão: (1919-1966)

Este trabalho originou-se de uma preocupaçao maior de contribuir, com algo realmente significativo, para a Universidade Federal do Maranhão. Para tantô, estabelecemos parâmetros, que nos fornecessem subsídios na elaboração do objeto proposto. Inicialmente, procuramos definir uma postura teórica metodológica que melhor se adaptasse, na compreensão dos interesses de uma classe hegemônica. No segundo capítulo fizemos uma retrospectiva histórica dos acontecimentos que marcaram o Ensino Superior no Brasil, com o cuidado de deixar bem claro o predomínio de uma classe dominante, interferindo na constituição da Universidade brasileira. Não temos a pretensão de esgotar todas as variáveis que atingiram direta ou ind1retamente o ensino, mas acreditamos fornecer alguns elementos que, no futuro, servirão de base para uma maior reflexão em torno de problemas tão significativos. No terceiro capítulo, procuramos analisar a Política Edu cacional Brasileira, selecionando alguns tópicos por considerarmos mais adaptados ao nosso estudo. Esta escolha foi bastante criterio sa, pelo volume de publicação existente, aliada a um conteúdo subs tancioso. No quarto capítulo, haja vista o nosso objetivo, utiliza mos, também, como parâmetro, a política Nacional de Saúde, direcio nada como tem sido até hoje, a atender uma população que a fortale ça como classe dominante, ao mesmo tempo, selecionando mecanismos _falaciosos para a manutenção do seu mercado de trabalho. No quinto capítulo, procuramos reconstruir o surgimento dos Cursos da Área de Saúde, da Universidade do Maranhão, tomando como pano de fundo as contradições de uma instituição que busca en contrar sua identidade, mas é limitada, a nível Nacional, a uma Po lítica de Educação e Saúde e, a nível regional, a disputa pela hegemonia, tendo em vista os interesses de grupos e não de uma socie dade • Na última parte, a título de conclusão, procuramos responder as questões por nós levantadas no primeiro capítulo, após a análise de todo conteúdo desenvolvido.Não nos esquecemos, também, de caracterizar, em cada capítulo, as condições do contexto sócio-político-econômico do País, em cada período analisado, proporcionando-nos uma visão dialética dos acontecimentos em pauta .

Word of mouth marketing in the digital age: a case study analysis of viral marketing campaigns

A era digital viu a ascensão da empresa focada no consumidor. Todos os dias, marcas e produtos são objeto de milhões de conversas em que os consumidores trocam pontos de vista, opiniões e informações antes de tomar a decisão de compra. Os profissionais de marketing entenderam a importância do boca a boca como um novo canal de comunicação estratégica e começaram a ancorar técnicas de boca a boca à estratégia de marketing global. A propaganda tornou-se um negócio de conversa: o novo desafio do marketing é criar um conteúdo envolvente e compartilhável que possa expandir e ressoar dentro de redes de sociais de consumidores. Quanto mais as pessoas falam sobre a sua marca, mais a probabilidade de ganhar a competição dura e aumentar as vendas. Mas como o boca a boca funciona? O que faz uma campanha de marketing um sucesso viral? Este trabalho tem como objetivo fornecer uma análise abrangente da teoria de marketing de boca a boca e usa um modelo descritivo para investigar as variáveis-chave de campanhas bem-sucedidas de marketing viral, a fim de proporcionar insights e sugestões para as práticas de marketing viral.

Tail risk in the hedge fund industry

The dissertation goal is to quantify the tail risk premium embedded into hedge funds' returns. Tail risk is the probability of extreme large losses. Although it is a rare event, asset pricing theory suggests that investors demand compensation for holding assets sensitive to extreme market downturns. By de nition, such events have a small likelihood to be represented in the sample, what poses a challenge to estimate the e ects of tail risk by means of traditional approaches such as VaR. The results show that it is not su cient to account for the tail risk stemming from equities markets. Active portfolio management employed by hedge funds demand a speci c measure to estimate and control tail risk. Our proposed factor lls that void inasmuch it presents explanatory power both over the time series as well as the cross-section of funds' returns.

Show me the money and I will bring you the head: evaluation of the effects of self-interest and anger on whistleblowing

Though many of those who decided to report wrongdoings in their organizations were able to tell their stories (e.g. Bamford, 2014, Armenakis 2004), it is fair to say that there is still much left to uncover. The paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, it provides preliminary evidence that the wrongdoing linked with individual financial loss leads to higher whistleblowing rate. Secondly, it shows how the experience of anger is related to the higher likelihood to report the wrongdoer but only if the wrongful act is perceived as a cause of one’s financial loss. Finally, the paper establishes first steps for the future development of an experimental procedure that would enable to predict, and measure whistleblowing behavior in the lab environment.

A conditional likelihood ratio test for structural models

This paper develops a general method for constructing similar tests based on the conditional distribution of nonpivotal statistics in a simultaneous equations model with normal errors and known reducedform covariance matrix. The test based on the likelihood ratio statistic is particularly simple and has good power properties. When identification is strong, the power curve of this conditional likelihood ratio test is essentially equal to the power envelope for similar tests. Monte Carlo simulations also suggest that this test dominates the Anderson- Rubin test and the score test. Dropping the restrictive assumption of disturbances normally distributed with known covariance matrix, approximate conditional tests are found that behave well in small samples even when identification is weak.

Wood : from the forest to the consumer

Illegal logging causes a number of environmental and social damages in countries where wood is sourced from native forests. Logging in protected areas is an act of irresponsibility that exacerbates the loss of biodiversity. In addition, uncontrolled deforestation and bushfires may aggravate climate change, not to mention the negative effects they impose on local populations, such as the impoverishment of rural communities whose livelihoods depend on forest products. Several studies show that Brazil ranks high in terms of irresponsible use of natural resources, including native wood from the Amazon. Even more worrisome is the fact that the state, despite being responsible for regulating logging activities, is one of the largest consumers of native wood, which subverts the goals of any government committed to sustainable environmental management. By monitoring the development and impacts of illegal timber production and consumption around the world, the Friends of the Amazon Network – an initiative by the Getulio Vargas Foundation with support from the British Government and the European Commission – identified a need to describe and evaluate, in a brief and instructive manner, the different mechanisms the state has available to reverse this predatory practice. One of the aspects discussed in this book is the role of civil servants in major efforts aimed at repressing illegal logging and timber production, as well as identifying products derived from these activities in order to prevent their consumption. This is the purpose of this publication, which uses detailed infographics and a journalistic approach, including interviews and true stories, to outline the complexity of Amazon timber’s chain of custody – from logging, processing and transportation to commercialization in the Brazilian market.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.