The effects of longevity and distortions on education and retirement

This article studies the impact of longevity and taxation on life-cycle decisions and long-run income. Individuals allocate optimally their total lifetime between education, working and retirement. They also decide at each moment how much to save or consume out of their income, and after entering the labor market how to divide their time between labor and leisure. The model incorporates experience-earnings profiles and the return-to-education function that follows evidence from the labor literature. In this setup, increases in longevity raises the investment in education - time in school - and retirement. The model is calibrated to the U.S. and is able to reproduce observed schooling levels and the increase in retirement, as the evidence shows. Simulations show that a country equal to the U.S. but with 20% smaller longevity will be 25% poorer. In this economy, labor taxes have a strong impact on the per capita income, as it decreases labor effort, time at school and retirement age, in addition to the general equilibrium impact on physical capital. We conclude that life-cycle effects are relevant in analyzing the aggregate outcome of taxation.

Monopolies life cycle, bureaucratization, and Schumpeterian growth

This paper analyzes the links between the internaI organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the opportunity of internaI collusion, firms go through a whole life cycle, getting more bureaucratized and Iess efficient over time. vVeak creative destruction in the economy facilitates informal collusion inside firms and exacerbates bureaucratization. As bureaucratization affects the firms' profitability and the return to innovation, stationary equilibrium growth depends in turn on the efficiency of collusive side-contracts within firms.

The impact of social security reform on occupational and retirement behavior : a quantitative assessment for Brazil

Population ageing is a problem that countries will have to cope with within a few years. How would changes in the social security system affect individual behaviour? We develop a multi-sectoral life-cycle model with both retirement and occupational choices to evaluate what are the macroeconomic impacts of social security reforms. We calibrate the model to match 2011 Brazilian economy and perform a counterfactual exercise of the long-run impacts of a recently adopted reform. In 2013, the Brazilian government approximated the two segregated social security schemes, imposing a ceiling on public pensions. In the benchmark equilibrium, our modelling economy is able to reproduce the early retirement claiming, the agents' stationary distribution among sectors, as well as the social security deficit and the public job application decision. In the counterfactual exercise, we find a significant reduction of 55\% in the social security deficit, an increase of 1.94\% in capital-to-output ratio, with both output and capital growing, a delay in retirement claims of public workers and a modification in the structure of agents applying to the public sector job.

Old-age benefits and retirement decisions of rural elderly in Brazil

I estimate the impact of social security benefits on retirement decisions of rural workers by studying changes in the roles governing social security in Brazil. I focus on a 1991 reform, which brought a reduction in the minimum eligibility age for males and females, a doubling of benefit values and the extension of benefits to non-heads of households. Because beneficiaries are not subject to means or retirement tests, I estimate apure income effect. I find that a reduction in the minimum eligibility age for old-age benefits was an important determinant in the reduction in labor supply of elderly rural workers in Brazil. Finally, I find that benefit take-up rates are larger among the better educated, but least-schooled workers show the largest labor supply responses to the reform.

Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Os extremos do ciclo de vida: trabalho infantil e aposentadoria precoce

Este trabalho procura analisar dois problemas bastante graves que afligem a sociedade brasileira. De um lado, a entrada precoce na força de trabalho, que tem sua face mais perversa no trabalho infantil; de outro, a saída também precoce da força de trabalho de adultos em idade ainda produtiva. Ambos fenômenos são empobrecedores para a sociedade e atuam como mecanismo de geração e perpetuação de pobreza. O trabalho infantil, discutido na primeira parte do trabalho, prejudica a educação. A saída precoce da força de trabalho, analisado na segunda parte do trabalho, é um desperdício de recursos. Na terceira parte é desenvolvida uma análise formal que procura mostrar o quanto um sistema de aposentadorias como o sistema previdenciário brasileiro, que garante uma renda por vida às pessoas após um certo anos de trabalho, pode induzir escolhas que embora ótimas do ponto de vista privado são bastante custosas do ponto vista social. Especificamente, procura-se mostrar como esta legislação pode incentivar tanto a entrada quanto a saída precoce do mercado de trabalho.

Economic growth and complementarity between stages of human capital

We study the impact of the different stages of human capital accumulation on the evolution of labor productivity in a model calibrated to the U.S. from 1961 to 2008. We add early childhood education to a standard continuous time life cycle economy and assume complementarity between educational stages. There are three sectors in the model: the goods sector, the early childhood sector and the formal education sector. Agents are homogenous and choose the intensity of preschool education, how long to stay in formal school, labor effort and consumption, and there are exogenous distortions to these four decisions. The model matches the data very well and closely reproduces the paths of schooling, hours worked, relative prices and GDP. We find that the reduction in distortions to early education in the period was large and made a very strong contribution to human capital accumulation. However, due to general equilibrium effects of labor market taxation, marginal modification in the incentives for early education in 2008 had a smaller impact than those for formal education. This is because the former do not decisively affect the decision to join the labor market, while the latter do. Without labor taxation, incentives for preschool are significantly stronger.