A efetividade dos códigos de ética empresarial na percepção do executivo brasileiro de empresas nacionais sujeitas à lei Sarbanes-Oxley – Uma análise exploratória baseada no modelo de Singh

As empresas buscam criar um contexto capacitante no qual a confiança é elemento preponderante para tais objetivos. Em 2002, após os conhecidos escândalos de governança corporativa, o Congresso dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) sancionou a Lei Sarbanes-Oxley (SOx), com o objetivo de proteger os investidores e resgatar a confiança abalada. Empresas norte-americanas de capital aberto foram obrigadas a adotar códigos de ética corporativos, garantindo a máxima efetividade na prevenção de fraudes praticadas por empregados, sob pena de pesadas sanções cíveis e criminais para as empresas e seus executivos. O presente estudo visa verificar a efetividade dos Códigos de Ética Empresarial (CEE) na percepção do empregado brasileiro de empresa nacional subordinada à SOx. Com base no modelo de Singh (2011), foram analisadas 18 variáveis independentes de efetividade dos códigos de ética corporativos. Os resultados revelaram que 84,4% dos respondentes ao questionário avaliaram positivamente os CEE de suas respectivas empresas. Mas o modelo de Singh (2011) não refletiu integralmente os fatores por ele identificados, permitindo a proposição de um novo modelo de efetividade dos CEE. Novas pesquisas deverão contemplar a análise dos aspectos culturais brasileiros que podem impactar na efetividade dos CEE. Estudos de caso, considerando o universo de funcionários de uma única empresa, poderão aprofundar as pesquisas sobre o tema, além de possibilitar à empresa estudada um diagnóstico mais real da efetividade de seu código de ética.

The consumer litigation industry: chasing dragon kings in lawyer-client networks

The community of lawyers and their clients form a scale-free bipartite network that develops naturally as the outcome of the recommendation process through which lawyers form their client base. This process is an example of preferential attachment where lawyers with more clients are more likely to be recommended to new clients. Consumer litigation is an important market for lawyers. In large consumer societies, there always a signi cant amount of consumption disputes that escalate to court. In this paper we analyze a dataset of thousands of lawsuits, reconstructing the lawyer-client network embedded in the data. Analyzing the degree distribution of this network we noticed that it follows that of a scale-free network built by preferential attachment, but for a few lawyers with much larger client base than could be expected by preferential attachment. Incidentally, most of these also gured on a list put together by the judiciary of Lawyers which openly advertised the bene ts of consumer litigation. According to the code of ethics of their profession, lawyers should not stimulate clients into litigation, but it is not strictly illegal. From a network formation point of view, this stimulation can be seen as a separate growth mechanism than preferential attachment alone. In this paper we nd that this composite growth can be detected by a simple statistical test, as simulations show that lawyers which use both mechanisms quickly become the \Dragon-Kings" of the distribution of the number of clients per lawyer.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

A ética nas propagandas veiculadas em tv segundo a ótica dos consumidores

A ética na propaganda tem sido analisada do ponto de vista dos anunciantes e das agências. Pouco, no entanto, se encontra no tocante à ótica do consumidor. A presente tese tem como objetivo analisar a opinião dos consumidores a respeito de comerciais veiculados na televisão, à luz do direito natural, do Código de Defesa do Consumidor e do código de Auto-Regulamentação Publicitária. o estudo exploratório serve de base para estudos ulteriores, que se fazem necessários e urgentes, tendo em vista·a formação ética de um enorme contingente de jovens existentes no País.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.