On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Growth, structural change and technological capabilities Latin America in a comparative perspective

Countries differ in terms of technological capabilities and complexity of production structures. According to that, countries may follow different development strategies: one based on extracting rents from abundant endowments, such as labor or natural resources, and the other focused on creating rents through intangibles, basically innovation and knowledge accumulation. The present article studies international convergence and divergence, linking structural change with trade and growth through a North South Ricardian model. The analysis focuses on the asymmetries between Latin America and mature and catching up economies. Empirical evidence supports that a shift in the composition of the production structure in favor of R&D intensive sectors allows achieving higher rates of growth in the long term and increases the capacity to respond to demand changes. A virtuous export-led growth requires laggard countries to reduce the technological gap with respect to more advanced ones. Hence, abundance of factor endowments requires to be matched with technological capabilities development for countries to converge in the long term.

A robust poverty profile for Brazil using multiple data sources

This paper presents a poverty profile for Brazil, based on three different sources of household data for 1996. We use PPV consumption data to estimate poverty and indigence lines. “Contagem” data is used to allow for an unprecedented refinement of the country’s poverty map. Poverty measures and shares are also presented for a wide range of population subgroups, based on the PNAD 1996, with new adjustments for imputed rents and spatial differences in cost of living. Robustness of the profile is verified with respect to different poverty lines, spatial price deflators, and equivalence scales. Overall poverty incidence ranges from 23% with respect to an indigence line to 45% with respect to a more generous poverty line. More importantly, however, poverty is found to vary significantly across regions and city sizes, with rural areas, small and medium towns and the metropolitan peripheries of the North and Northeast regions being poorest.

Regulação e eficiência da remuneração dos administradores de companhias abertas brasileiras

Este trabalho trata da remuneração dos administradores de companhias abertas brasileiras. Em primeiro lugar, a questão é caracterizada como um problema decorrente da relação de principal-agente existente entre administradores e acionistas dessas companhias. Em seguida, defende-se que, em decorrência da complexidade da estrutura societária que constitui essa relação e da posição privilegiada de que os administradores desfrutam para influenciar na fixação de sua própria remuneração, é necessário criar barreiras que imponham custos adicionais aos administradores que procuram extrair benefícios pessoais de sua posição. O principal fator identificado com a criação dessas barreiras é a ampla divulgação da remuneração paga pelas companhias a seus executivos. Na literatura brasileira são levantados diversos argumentos contrários à divulgação. Esses argumentos, contudo, não parecem suficientes para retirar o mérito da decisão regulatória de exigir a divulgação. Por fim, são discutidas as possíveis consequências da divulgação sobre o valor e a forma das remunerações, concluindo-se que, embora existam efeitos negativos, o resultado líquido da divulgação é positivo.

Criação de valor no relacionamento entre empresas químicas e seus clientes

Relacionamentos entre fornecedores e compradores são fatores importantes para a melhoria do desempenho das empresas. A literatura nem sempre confirma que a relação entre relacionamento e desempenho é positiva. Alguns estudos demonstram que uma empresa pode ter vantagem competitiva e não apresentar desempenho financeiro superior. A falta de um modelo integrativo para os benefícios do relacionamento, as diferentes formas de captura de valor pelas partes e a influência do contexto no relacionamento podem ser apontadas como causas destes resultados inconclusivos. Para contribuir nesta discussão, o presente estudo propõe e testa um modelo de criação e captura de valor como forma de avaliar os benefícios dos relacionamentos de forma integrada, na presença de incerteza e competição. O uso do valor como variável dependente em estudos sobre relacionamentos comprador-fornecedor é uma inovação, mas mostra-se mais adequado, pois é mais abrangente que a medição de desempenho, a qual enfoca somente a captura de valor pelas partes, e não o valor total criado no relacionamento. Para o teste do modelo, a Visão Relacional da Estratégia foi adotada como perspectiva teórica. Ela tem grande aderência aos conceitos de criação de valor, embora a operacionalização de seus quatro construtos, chamados de recursos relacionais, não encontre um padrão na literatura. Desta forma, outra contribuição a que o estudo se propôs foi testar esses construtos separadamente. Uma survey foi conduzida junto a empresas químicas com operação no Brasil. Foi testada uma nova forma de operacionalização da criação de valor, com três variáveis dependentes distintas (valor capturado pelo fornecedor, valor capturado pelo comprador e valor gerado ao longo do tempo). Este modelo possibilitou observar a existência de benefícios capturados pelas partes e advindos do relacionamento, além de fornecer evidências de que há diferenças entre a captura de valor pelo comprador e pelo fornecedor. Não foi possível comprovar a validade discriminante de três dos construtos da visão relacional, o que confirma a necessidade de uma evolução de sua operacionalização. Por fim, observou-se que os recursos relacionais impactam na criação de valor e que a incerteza e a competição influenciam a captura de valor pelas partes e o valor criado no relacionamento.

Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence

Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.

Rent-sharing in Brazil: using trade liberalization as a natural experiment

This paper examines the extent of rent-sharing in Brazil, between 1988 and 1995, combining two different data sets: annual industrial surveys (pIA) and annual household surveys (PNADs). The aim is to use the trade liberalization policies that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s as a "natural experiment" to examine the impact ofproduct market rents on wages. We first estimate inter-industry wage differentials in Brazil, using the household surveys, afier controlling for various observable workers' characteristics. In a reduced form fixed effects equation, these controlled inter-industry differentials are seen to depend on the industries' rate of effective tariff. We also find that LSDV estimates of the effect of value-added per worker (computed using the industrial surveys) on the wage differentials are positive, but somewhat small. However, we find that instrumenting the valued-added with the effective tariffs more than doubles the estimated rent-sharing coefficient. The paper concludes that rent-sharing is prevalent in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and this mechanism transferred part of the productivity gains due to trade liberalization to manufacturing workers in the form ofhigher (controlled) wage premium.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Coordenação no sistema agroindustrial da borracha natural : um estudo das relações entre produtores rurais e usinas beneficiadoras paulistas

O enfoque da Nova Economia Institucional é utilizado no estudo de sistemas agroindustriais brasileiros, mas ainda há poucos trabalhos sobre as relações entre produtores rurais e indústrias processadoras. O objetivo deste estudo é aferir o alinhamento das características das transações com os modos de governança adotados na comercialização de borracha natural entre produtores rurais e indústrias de beneficiamento primário. Busca-se confrontar os resultados com as previsões da teoria da Economia dos Custos de Transação, que prevê a adoção da governança mais eficiente, contingenciada ao ambiente transacional. Esta pesquisa utiliza um enfoque pioneiro para o setor. A primeira parte consiste na exploração qualitativa das transações entre produtores rurais e usinas beneficiadoras e na descrição dos elementos que compõe o sistema agroindustrial da borracha natural no Estado de São Paulo. Os resultados desta etapa são utilizados para refinar as hipóteses da etapa quantitativa, que relacionam os modos de governança adotados aos investimentos em ativos específicos, como o plantio de seringueiras, à frequência, à incerteza e à assistência técnica associadas à transação. Os resultados, apesar das limitações devido ao tamanho pequeno da amostra, sugerem que a quantidade de borracha comercializada influi positivamente na adoção de modos de governança mais coordenados e que a recorrência das transações provavelmente está associada a contratos relacionais. A hipótese da endogeneidade é rejeitada.

A model of the rule of law

Economic development requires some limits on what those in power can do | the rule of law | but how can restraints be imposed on the powerful when there is no-one above them? This paper studies equilibrium rules allocating power and resources established by selfinterested incumbents under the threat of rebellions from inside and outside the group in power. Commitment to uphold individuals' rights can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as incumbents would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables incumbents to commit to otherwise time-inconsistent laws by ensuring more people receive rents under the status quo, and thus want to defend it.

Cultural strategies: how do national cultures impact the operations strategy?

Through the assessment of the fourth round of the High Performance Manufacturing (HPM) project and the introduction of Hofstede’s Cultural Classification, the present work aims to deepen the comprehension of the impact of National Cultures on firms’ Operations Strategy. The ANOVA comparisons of four Operations Strategy elements in countries with different industrialization and development backgrounds (e.g. Germany, China, Brazil and South Korea) suggest that while Integrating Leadership and Implementation of Manufacturing Strategy are affected by the cultural levels of Power Distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism and Uncertainty Avoidance, the other two elements of Operations Strategy, Functional Integration and Formal Manufacturing Strategy, show effects of the degree of Individualism vs. Collectivism and Long-Term Orientation. The results of the study are expected to offer new perspectives on the planning and implementation of strategic and operations management for both practitioners and academics. More specifically, the analysis of cross-cultural influence over operations strategy may contribute to a better understanding of how cooperative behavior may lead firms to generate higher rents through the strengths and weaknesses of their relations, particularly in terms of global supply chains.

Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.