Contratos de aliança e formas híbridas de contratos de construção

Este trabalho analisa a sistemática de contratações inerentes à atividade de construção civil, inserida num ambiente de liberdade de contratação e levando em consideração a criação de modelos atípicos e, portanto, híbridos. Para tal, faz-se necessária uma gama de subsídios: aplicação de argumentos econômicos; capacidade de operacionalizar objetivamente as demandas oriundas de tais modalidades de contratos, que sempre visa maximizar seus resultados; necessidade de velocidade e economia de tempo nas construções. Há de se destacar que os referidos modelos de contrato são híbridos, sim, mas nem por isso ilícitos, posto que, no direito brasileiro, vigora o princípio de liberdade de contratar, desde que tais contratações estejam assentadas em princípios básicos estabelecidos por lei, quais sejam: objeto lícito, agentes capazes e atendimento à forma prescrita ou não defesa em lei. Esse ambiente de liberdade de contratação propiciou a criação de modelos atípicos e moventes de contratos de construção, que variam e se mesclam entre si sob os mais diversos aspectos, com destaque para: alocação de riscos; forma de remuneração e aplicação de penalidades, o que impacta diretamente na forma, conteúdo e valor do orçamento a ser apresentado. Desse modo, é imperioso que as rédeas desses diversos modelos de contratação estejam direcionadas pelo racional econômico, não só em grandes obras de infraestrutura, mas também em outros empreendimentos, fazendo emergir uma cultura de participação entre os contratantes, de forma a propiciar obras mais rápidas e com um menor custo, que seria de fundamental importância para o desenvolvimento do país.

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

Public versus private provision of infrastructure in a neoclassical growth model

This article studies the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public (“infrastructure”). A positive externality due to infrastructure capital is assumed, so that the government could improve upon decentralized allocations internalizing the externality, but public investmentis …nanced through distortionary taxation. It is shown that privatization is welfare-improving for a large set of economies and that after privatization under-investment is optimal. When operation inefficiency in the public sectoror subsidy to infrastructure accumulation are introduced, gains from privatization are higherand positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.