Towards a measure of income inequality freed from the volatility caused by variations in the rate of unemployment

By mixing together inequalities based on cyclical variables, such as unemployment, and on structural variables, such as education, usual measurements of income inequality add objects of a di§erent economic nature. Since jobs are not acquired or lost as fast as education or skills, this aggreagation leads to a loss of relavant economic information. Here I propose a di§erent procedure for the calculation of inequality. The procedure uses economic theory to construct an inequality measure of a long-run character, the calculation of which can be performed, though, with just one set of cross-sectional observations. Technically, the procedure is based on the uniqueness of the invariant distribution of wage o§ers in a job-search model. Workers should be pre-grouped by the distribution of wage o§ers they see, and only between-group inequalities should be considered. This construction incorporates the fact that the average wages of all workers in the same group tend to be equalized by the continuous turnover in the job market.

On the nature of income inequality across nations

In this paper, we investigate the nature of income inequality across nations. First, rather than functional forms or parameter values in calibration exercises that can potentially drives results, we estimate, test, and distinguish between types of aggregate production functions currently used in the growth literature. Next, given our panel-regression estimates, we perform several exercises, such as variance decompositions, simulations and counter-factual analyses. The picture that emerges is one where countries grew in the past for different reasons, which should be an important ingredient in policy design. Although there is not a single-factor explanation for the difference in output per-worker across nations, inequality, followed by distortions to capital accumulations and them by human capital accumulation.

Measurements of income inequality: a critique. Inflation and income inequality: a link through the job- search process

In this paper I claim that, in a long-run perspective, measurements of income inequality, under any of the usual inequality measures used in the literature, are upward biased. The reason is that such measurements are cross-sectional by nature and, therefore, do not take into consideration the turnover in the job market which, in the long run, equalizes within-group (e.g., same-education groups) inequalities. Using a job-search model, I show how to derive the within-group invariant-distribution Gini coefficient of income inequality, how to calculate the size of the bias and how to organize the data in arder to solve the problem. Two examples are provided to illustrate the argument.

Wealth composition, endogenous fertility and the dynamics of income inequality

This paper analyzes how differences in the composition of wealth between human and physical capital among families affect fertility choices. These in tum influence the dynamics of wealth and income inequality across generations through a tradeoffbetween quantity and quality of children. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical capital has only a wealth effect on number of children, whereas human capital increases the time cost of child-rearing in addition to the wealth effect. I construct a model combining endogenous fertility with borrowing constraints in human capital investments, in which weaIth composition is determined endogenously. The model is calibrated to the PNAD, a Brazilian household survey, and the main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model implies that the crosssection relationship between fertility and wealth typically displays a U-shaped pattem, reflecting differences in wealth composition between poor and rich families. Also, the quantity-quality tradeoff implies a concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and wealth. Second, as the economy develops and families overcome their bOlTowing constraints, the negative effect of weaIth on fertility becomes smaller, and persistence of inequality declines accordingly. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with both implications .

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

Income inequality: the role of impatience in a job-search process

This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a jobsearch process when di§erent cohorts of homogeneous workers are allowed to have di§erent degrees of impatience. Using the fact the average wage under the invariant Markovian distribution is a decreasing function of the time preference (Cysne (2004)), I show that the Lorenz curve and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality can be easily derived in this case. An example with arbitrary measures regarding the wage o§ers and the distribution of time preferences among cohorts provides some quantitative insights into how much income inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the probability of unemployment and of the probability that the worker does not Önd a job o§er each period.

Distribution strategies for the base of the pyramid: an exploratory study in Brazil

Access has been one of the main difficulties companies have faced in emerging markets (PRAHALAD, 2005). The capillarity of the market, the existence of small, not professionalized and sometimes informal retailers, the lack of infrastructure and high transportation costs are some of the distribution challenges companies face in poorer regions. The literature concerning the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) is still recent and only after the seminal article by Prahalad and Hart (2002), it evolved into many different management perspectives. However, there is a lack of researches concerning distribution strategies to the BoP. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to identify, in the perception of executives working in the market, the conditions associated to a satisfactory distribution for the BoP market in Brazil and to build a substantive theory that helps to shed light to the understanding of the distribution phenomenon adopted by consumer goods companies to reach the BoP market in Brazil. In order to accomplish the objectives of this thesis, a grounded theory methodology (Glaser; Strauss, 1967; Corbin; Strauss, 2008) was used. This approach helped to identify the channel strategies used by local and global companies in the market. Many techniques for data collection were applied. The most important one was in-depth interviews with 26 executives from 24 different consumer goods companies in Brazil. Among the companies there were small, medium and large enterprises; which were also grouped as manufacturers, distributors and retailers. Furthermore, secondary data were examined to identify business strategies to reach BoP and map global distribution initiatives. A database from a consumer panel was also used to analyze what and where BoP consumers purchase non-durable goods. It was verified that small and traditional retailing is a very strong format in BoP markets and in the Northern/Northeastern regions. Cash & Carry is a format that is growing a lot. On the other hand, hypermarkets are not very used by low income population. The results suggest that three major categories are associated to a satisfactory distribution: (a) willingness, which means the effort, knowledge and enthusiasm a firm has to operate at BoP markets; (b) well-done execution, which is related to designing correctly the marketing channel and operating efficiently in an environment full of obstacles, such as lack of infrastructure, capillarity, lack of safety, regional differences and informality, and (c) relationship, which was perceived to be friendlier and essential at BoP markets, since it is very difficult for manufacturers to reach the entire market alone. It is more likely to have a satisfactory distribution when manufacturers establish strong relationships in the marketing channel. Besides, small retailers have a perception of isolation and expect a higher level of relationship. These major categories explain also the competitive advantage that local companies have in relation to MNCs and large companies. Despite of the limitations of an exploratory study, it is expected that this thesis will contribute to the BoP knowledge as well as to the identification of the peculiarities of distribution in BoP markets.

Sacrifice and efficiency of the income tax schedule

We investigate the efficiency of equal sacrifice tax schedules in an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971): a continuum of individuals with identical preferences defined over consumption and leisure who differ with respect to their labor market productivity. Using a separable specification for preferences we derive the minimum equal sacrifice allocation and recover the tax schedule that implements it. The separable specification allows us to use the methodology developed by Werning (2007b) to check whether the schedule is efficient, that is, whether there is no alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. We find that inefficiency does not arise for most parametrizations we use to approximate the US economy. For the few cases for which inefficiency does arise, it does so only for very high levels of income and marginal tax rates.

On the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules

In an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971), we investigate the efficiency of labor income tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle. Starting from a given government revenue level, we use Werning’s (2007b) approach to assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule to the one derived under the equal sacrifice principle that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. For our preferred parametrizations of the problem we find that inefficiency only arises at very high levels of income. We also show how the multipliers of the Pareto problem may be extracted from the data and used to find the implicit marginal social weights associated with each level of income.

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.