Risk sharing and the household collective model

When the joint assumption of optimal risk sharing and coincidence of beliefs is added to the collective model of Browning and Chiappori (1998) income pooling and symmetry of the pseudo-Hicksian matrix are shown to be restored. Because these are also the features of the unitary model usually rejected in empirical studies one may argue that these assumptions are at odds with evidence. We argue that this needs not be the case. The use of cross-section data to generate price and income variation is based Oil a definition of income pooling or symmetry suitable for testing the unitary model, but not the collective model with risk sharing. AIso, by relaxing assumptions on beliefs, we show that symmetry and income pooling is lost. However, with usual assumptions on existence of assignable goods, we show that beliefs are identifiable. More importantly, if di:fferences in beliefs are not too extreme, the risk sharing hypothesis is still testable.

Value and momentum strategies in the Brazilian stock market: the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath

Esta dissertação analisa o desempenho de três estratégias de investimento em carteiras de custo zero (“value”, “momentum” e uma combinação 50/50 delas, que é chamada de “combo”) no mercado de ações brasileiro durante a última década. Os resultados são comparados aos encontrados por Asness, Moskowitz e Pedersen (2009) para quatro mercados: EUA, Reino Unido, Europa Continental, e Japão. Uma análise específica é feita em torno da crise financeira de 2008, comparando os resultados pré- e pós-crise. O índice de Sharpe é usado para ajustar os desempenhos por seus riscos, e para classificar as estratégias para diferentes horizontes de investimento. Os resultados mostram um ótimo desempenho da estratégia “combo” nos últimos três anos, período que inclui a crise de 2008, mas considerando todo o período analisado a estratégia “value” obteve o melhor desempenho. Esse resultado difere dos resultados encontrados para os quatro mercados de referência, onde a estratégia combo tem o melhor desempenho. A análise do horizonte de investimento mostra que a escolha do investidor pode mudar com diferentes horizontes.

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).