The effects of external and internal strikes on total factor productivity

This paper examines structural changes that occur in the total factor productivity (TFP) within countries. It is possible that some episodes of high economic growth or economic decline are associated with permanent productivity shocks, therefore, this research has two objectives. The Örst one is to estimate the structural changes present in TFP for a sample of 81 countries between 1950(60) and 2000. The second one is to identify, whenever possible, episodes in the political and economic history of these countries that may account for the structural breaks in question. The results suggest that about 85% of the TFP time-series present at least one structural break, moreover, at least half the structural changes can be attributed to internal factors, such as independence or a newly adopted constitution, and about 30% to external shocks, such as oil shock or shocks in international interest rates. The majority of the estimated breaks are downwards, indicating that after a break the TFP tends to decrease, implying that institutional rearrangements, external shocks, or internal shocks may be costly and from which it is very di¢ cult to recover.

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.