Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Special interests and political business cycles

In this paper we bridge the gap between special interest politics and political business cycle literature. We build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange rates.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Relacionando o comprometimento organizacional e a responsabilidade social corporativa

A competitividade e a responsabilidade social têm sido temas de constante discussão nos meios acadêmicos e econômicos. De um lado, as empresas buscam a competitividade através da eficiência, da excelência e da melhora constante de desempenho. Este desempenho, conforme já colocado por Bateman e Strasser (1984), encontra entre suas bases o comprometimento dos empregados com a sua organização. De outro lado, a sociedade, e todos os grupos nela atuantes, cobram de maneira cada vez mais forte e ampla que as empresas ajam de forma socialmente responsável. Neste sentido, o presente trabalho buscou analisar um modelo de comprometimento organizacional e um de responsabilidade social corporativa que fornecessem as bases para a compreensão desses dois construtos e as possíveis relações entre eles. A partir dos modelos estudados, obtiveram-se quatro grupos de interesse para os quais as atividades de responsabilidade social corporativa podem ser direcionadas – stakeholders sociais e não sociais, empregados, consumidores e governo – e três dimensões do comprometimento organizacional – afetiva, normativa e instrumental. Através de análises de correlação e de regressão linear simples e algumas ponderações teóricas, concluiu-se que, para a amostra obtida, as atividades de responsabilidade social corporativa voltadas aos empregados e aos consumidores possuem relação positiva com os comprometimentos afetivo e normativo, enquanto que as ações de responsabilidade social corporativa voltadas a stakeholders sociais e não sociais e ao governo possuem relação direta apenas com o comprometimento afetivo. As demais relações entre a variável dependente e independente se mostraram inexistentes. Desta forma, este trabalho propõe que os gestores das organizações, conhecedores dos possíveis efeitos benéficos sobre o comprometimento organizacional de seus empregados e, conseqüentemente, seus resultados e desempenho, atuem no sentido de esclarecer e melhorar a percepção de seus empregados sobre as atividades de responsabilidade social corporativa. Além de aprofundar o conhecimento sobre as causas e antecedentes do comprometimento organizacional, acredita-se que os resultados demonstrados possam direcionar as organizações em suas ações de conscientização sobre responsabilidade social corporativa de forma mais efetiva.

Divisão de poder e autoridade civil: governança, políticas públicas e desenvolvimento local em projetos fomentados por agências multilaterais

Dentro do atual contexto de crescente urbanização e novas oportunidades econômicas, a relação entre economia local e governo emerge como uma área estratégica para a promoção do desenvolvimento. No presente contexto de consolidação democrática e reforma do Estado, a responsabilização está associada à capacidade dos cidadãos em atuar na definição de metas coletivas e na criação de mecanismos institucionais que garantam o controle público da ação governamental e seus líderes, incrementando a governabilidade e, se não a eficiência, a eficácia de políticas públicas e seus processos de gestão. Esse trabalho pretende contribuir para o entendimento do papel dos órgãos de financiamento multilaterais em projetos de DEL, nomeadamente, para compreensão e a avaliação desses programas quanto ao resgate e aperfeiçoamento de bases de legitimidade social em ações de governo vinculadas à processos de desenvolvimento e promoção democrática. De modo específico, esse trabalho ambiciona compreender a concepção de grupos de interesse e sociedade civil presentes nos contratos fomentados pelo banco, assim como, a relevância conferida à esses agentes pelos técnicos do banco por ocasião da formulação desses contratos. Ao investigar esses pontos a pesquisa objetiva contribuir para o debate acerca dos dilemas e desafios para a implementação de programas de desenvolvimento urbano promovidos por governos locais em conjunto com organismos multilaterais.

Um olhar crítico sobre o Conselho Nacional de Turismo: articulação do setor, legitimidade e auto-interesse na construção das políticas públicas

Esta dissertação examina o processo de produção de políticas públicas de turismo no Brasil e a institucionalização de instâncias participativas em âmbito federal. Para tanto, toma como objeto de estudo o Conselho Nacional de Turismo e seu funcionamento entre os anos de 2003 e 2006, com o propósito de identificar e analisar sua dinâmica política, considerando suas atribuições e sua representatividade. Com base em parâmetros teórico-conceituais advindos da Ciência Política e da Administração Pública, estabelece seu método de análise em dois pilares: de um lado, o contexto da criação e conformação de instâncias participativas no exercício da democracia e, mais especificamente, do crescimento dos conselhos de políticas públicas como instâncias deliberativas e de outro, as dinâmicas de interação - e competição - dos atores e grupos de interesse sobre a produção das políticas públicas de uma forma geral e, mais enfaticamente, considerando as especificidades das políticas de turismo. A partir da apreciação de tais parâmetros, a pesquisa tem como objetivo construir uma análise sobre as contradições e limitações deste órgão, que se apresenta simultaneamente como um instrumento participativo no contexto da democracia deliberativa e como mecanismo de governança junto à produção das políticas públicas de turismo.

Endogenous protection in Mercosul: an empirical analysis

This paper analyses the equilibrium structure of protection in Mercosul, developing empirical analyses based on the literature ensuing from the sequence of models set forth by Grossman and Helpman since 1994. Not only Mercosul’s common external tariff (CET) may be explained under a political economy perspective, but the existence of deviations, both at the level of the external tariffs and at that of the internal ones, make it interesting to contrast several structures under this approach. Different general equilibrium frameworks, in which governments are concerned with campaign contributions and with the welfare of the average voter, while organized special-interest groups care only about the welfare of their members, are used as the theoretical basis of the empirical tests. We build a single equation for explaining the CET and two fourequations systems (one equation for each member) for explaining deviations from the CET and from the internal free trade between members. The results (at the two-digit level) shed an interesting light on the sectoral dynamics of protection in each country; notably, Brazil seems to fit in better in the model framework, followed by Uruguay. In the case of the CET, and of deviations from it, the interaction between the domestic lobbies in the four countries plays a major role. There is also suggestion that the lobby structure that bid for deviations, be they internal or external, differs from the one which bid for the CET.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Influência no desenho de políticas públicas: conceitos pela participação e propostas de monitoramento

Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar os principais conceitos sobre influência no desenho de políticas públicas (grupos de interesse, grupos de pressão e lobby). Esses conceitos são relacionados aos temas de participação e legitimação, no contexto de policy reform, com o objetivo de explorar ideias sobre formas de monitoramento da influência de políticas públicas e apoiar os reformadores, positiva e efetivamente, em sua interação junto aos decisores públicos e outros públicos de interesse.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

O gás sob pressão: o mapeamento de stakeholders e o lobby no parlamento

Este estudo objetivou identificar os stakeholders que influenciam a agenda do gás de xisto no parlamento brasileiro. A pesquisa teve uma abordagem qualitativa, uma vez que não houve preocupação com os números e sim com a percepção dos entrevistados. Além disso, os dados coletados na pesquisa de campo foram interpretados e alinhados com o referencial teórico desse trabalho. Quanto à metodologia, foi classificada como exploratória, uma vez que ainda há pouco conhecimento sobre a influência de grupos de interesse no Congresso Nacional, do tipo pesquisa de campo e de estudo de caso por se tratar especificamente da exploração do gás de xisto. A coleta de dados foi feita por meio de entrevistas e da aplicação de questionário com um roteiro previamente estabelecido. Após a análise dos dados, concluiu-se que há duas correntes que atuam na agenda do gás de xisto. A primeira tem um posicionamento que preza pela precaução, ou seja, é necessário que se descubra os impactos da exploração da atividade no meio ambiente antes que se decida iniciar a exploração e a produção do gás de xisto. A segunda corrente defende a exploração desse gás não convencional como forma de reduzir os custos de produção e aumentar a competitividade do país. Foram identificados 39 stakeholders que influenciam o andamento do Projeto de Lei 6904/2013, que suspende a autorização e a exploração do gás de xisto por um período de cinco anos. Isso mostra que os grupos de interesse, uns mais poderosos que outros, têm papel importante na formulação de políticas públicas e, através do lobby, buscam influenciar os tomadores de decisão de acordo com os seus objetivos.