The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Do virtual platforms impact user behavior? An experimental comparison between messages on the company's website and Facebook page.

Companies have looked for many new ways to communicate with their customers. In the current scenario, Facebook has proven to be an efficient communication tool between consumers and businesses. This study aims to understand the differences in the complaint messages sent to companies, through an experiment that measured the emotional tone and the lack of formality in each message received by the website and the Facebook page of the company. As expected, people are more informal on Facebook. However, contrary to our intuition, participants tended to display more emotions on the company website. The social norms theory and the impression management contributed to explain the phenomena found.

Empresas de controle familiar e informed trading: evidências de short selling no mercado brasileiro?

O objetivo desse trabalho é testar se no mercado brasileiro, empresas familiares são mais suscetíveis a insider trading.Testes feitos no mercado americano evidenciaram efeito do controle familiar no conteúdo informacional embutido em montagem de posições vendidas de companhias abertas. Lá, foram encontrados níveis acima do normal de posições short em companhias de controle familiar principalmente em momentos que antecipavam resultados negativos que iriam ser publicados. Não encontramos evidências claras de que o fato da companhia ter controle familiar poderia levá-la a apresentar ou não insider trading, já que por limitação do modelo não é possível comparar o nível de anormal short para empresas de controle familiar e outras pois essa variável é excluída do modelo. Entretanto, observamos nos modelos em painel fixo com interações que existe diferença do efeito de algumas variáveis de controle para empresas de controle familiar ou não sobre outras variáveis de controle o que poderia mostrar que alguma influência o controle familiar poderia ter sobre o insider trading. Testamos também se empresas de controle estatal apresentavam maior volume médio diário anormal de posições vendidas em momentos que antecediam surpresas de resultado, e também não encontramos evidências claras e diretas que isso acontecia.

The impact of content marketing on attitudes and purchase intentions of online shoppers : the case videos & tutorials and user-generated content

This thesis was written as part of a Double-Degree Masters program in Management, with focus in Marketing. Aligned with the nature of the degree, this study aims to be a useful tool for managers and marketers, which conduct business online. This thesis is a study of Content Marketing in the content of online commercial product pages. Its aim is to understand how to use content marketing to drive conversion, by understanding consumer attitudes and purchase intention towards content. A in-depth study of existing theories and exploratory primary research was developed in other to attain these objectives. Business-to-consumer electronic commerce (B2C e-commerce) has provided consumers and online retailers with a more effective medium to perform online transactions through commercial websites. Although consumers have realized that the benefits of online shopping; such as time saving, minimizing effort, convenience, broader selection, and wider access to information, they are still greatly unwilling to shop online. Consumers shop essentially for two motives, to meet experiential (fun) or goal-oriented (efficiency) needs (Wolfinbarger & Gilly, 2001). The information provided by content marketing seeks to focus on consumers need for information and entertainment, instead of focusing on the brand. Thus, it is expected that the type of content format will have different effects on the attitudes and purchase intention on the online shopper, depending on the online shopping purpose. Concretely, a goal-oriented shopper should find user generated content (UGC) to be more valuable content formats, since they decrease the amount of search effort. While on the other hand, videos & tutorials (VT) might be perceived as more valuable for a consumer looking to spend time and being entertained through online shopping. The exploratory research was characterized by a survey experiment with online consumers. Participants were exposed to stimuli of content marketing tested according to their attitudes and purchase intention. The focus was to understand the impact of two different content marketing tactics—User-generated content and Videos & Tutorials—on attitudes and purchase intentions and how they interact with content complexity. The results indicate that content marketing in commercial product pages is relevant in driving consumer attitudes and purchase intentions. Consumers are not motivated by a specific content marketing tactic, unless that content has a certain level of complexity. In that case, Ur-Generated Content becomes a relevant tactic in product pages, however VT is not.