Information asymmetry and transaction costs in a cross-cultural business transaction

The intent of this paper is to provide a practitioners insight into the present and foreseeable future of problem of transaction cost economics related to culture and business etiquette that may increase the of complexity of business communication. We will also explore whether it impacts participant's mindsets regarding opportunistic or passive aggressive behavior. We will study the role of culture, ethics, information asymmetry, and legal systems regarding their importance towards the business contracts and lack of knowledge in local environments. We will make connections to contract theory strategies and objectives and recommend business practices. Furthermore, economic theory explores the role of the impossibility of the perfect contract. Historical and present day operational factors are examined for the determination of forward-looking contract law indications worldwide. This paper is intended provide a practitioners view with a global perspective of a multinational, mid-sized and small corporations giving consideration in a non-partisan and non-nationalistic view, yet examines the individual characteristics of the operational necessities and obligations of any corporation. The study will be general, yet cite specific articles to each argument and give adequate consideration to the intricacies of the global asymmetry of information. This paper defends that corporations of any kind and size should be aware of the risk of international business etiquette and cultural barriers that might jeopardize the savings you could obtain from engaging international suppliers.

The theory of storage and the volatility in commadity markets

Esse estudo estende a metodologia de Fama e French (1988) para testar a hipótese derivada da Teoria dos Estoques de que o convenience yield dos estoques diminui a uma taxa decrescente com o aumento de estoque. Como descrito por Samuelson (1965), a Teoria implica que as variações nos preços à vista (spot) e dos futuros (ou dos contratos a termo) serão similares quando os estoques estão altos, mas os preços futuros variarão menos que os preços à vista quando os estoques estão baixos. Isso ocorre porque os choques de oferta e demanda podem ser absorvidos por ajustes no estoque quando este está alto, afetando de maneira similar os preços à vista e futuros. Por outro lado, quando os estoques estão baixos, toda a absorção dos choques de demanda ou oferta recai sobre o preço à vista, uma vez que os agentes econômicos têm pouca condição de reagir à quantidade demandada ou ofertada no curto prazo.

Essays on decision sciences: exploring cognition, information processing, and complexity

This thesis provides three original contributions to the field of Decision Sciences. The first contribution explores the field of heuristics and biases. New variations of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT--a test to measure "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind"), are provided. The original CRT (S. Frederick [2005] Journal of Economic Perspectives, v. 19:4, pp.24-42) has items in which the response is immediate--and erroneous. It is shown that by merely varying the numerical parameters of the problems, large deviations in response are found. Not only the final results are affected by the proposed variations, but so is processing fluency. It seems that numbers' magnitudes serve as a cue to activate system-2 type reasoning. The second contribution explores Managerial Algorithmics Theory (M. Moldoveanu [2009] Strategic Management Journal, v. 30, pp. 737-763); an ambitious research program that states that managers display cognitive choices with a "preference towards solving problems of low computational complexity". An empirical test of this hypothesis is conducted, with results showing that this premise is not supported. A number of problems are designed with the intent of testing the predictions from managerial algorithmics against the predictions of cognitive psychology. The results demonstrate (once again) that framing effects profoundly affect choice, and (an original insight) that managers are unable to distinguish computational complexity problem classes. The third contribution explores a new approach to a computationally complex problem in marketing: the shelf space allocation problem (M-H Yang [2001] European Journal of Operational Research, v. 131, pp.107--118). A new representation for a genetic algorithm is developed, and computational experiments demonstrate its feasibility as a practical solution method. These studies lie at the interface of psychology and economics (with bounded rationality and the heuristics and biases programme), psychology, strategy, and computational complexity, and heuristics for computationally hard problems in management science.

The macroeconomics of price adjustments under information frictions and menu costs

Esta tese se dedica ao estudo de modelos de fixação de preços e suas implicações macroeconômicas. Nos primeiros dois capítulos analiso modelos em que as decisões das firmas sobre seus preços praticados levam em conta custos de menu e de informação. No Capítulo 1 eu estimo tais modelos empregando estatísticas de variações de preços dos Estados Unidos, e concluo que: os custos de informação são significativamente maiores que os custos de menu; os dados claramente favorecem o modelo em que informações sobre condições agregadas são custosas enquanto que as idiossincráticas têm custo zero. No Capítulo 2 investigo as consequências de choques monetários e anúncios de desinflação usando os modelos previamente estimados. Mostro que o grau de não-neutralidade monetária é maior no modelo em que parte da informação é grátis. O Capítulo 3 é um artigo em conjunto com Carlos Carvalho (PUC-Rio) e Antonella Tutino (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas). No artigo examinamos um modelo de fixação de preços em que firmas estão sujeitas a uma restrição de fluxo de informação do tipo Shannon. Calibramos o modelo e estudamos funções impulso-resposta a choques idiossincráticos e agregados. Mostramos que as firmas vão preferir processar informações agregadas e idiossincráticas conjuntamente ao invés de investigá-las separadamente. Este tipo de processamento gera ajustes de preços mais frequentes, diminuindo a persistência de efeitos reais causados por choques monetários.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Neighborhood information exchange and voter participation : an experimental study

We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating the role of information about other voters’ decisions. We do so in a participation game, where some voters (‘receivers’) are told about some other voters’ (‘senders’) turnout decision at a first stage of the game. Cases are distinguished where the voters support the same or different candidates or where they are uncertain about each other’s preferences. Our experimental results show that such information matters. Participation is much higher when information is exchanged than when it is not. Senders strategically try to use their first mover position and some receivers respond to this.

Information learning and the stability of fiat money

We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We show that in poorly informed economies, monetary stability depends heavily on the government's commitment to the long run value of money, whereas in economies where agents gather information more easily, monetary stability can be an endogenous outcome. We generate a dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual colIapse of overissued paper money. Moreover, our results provide an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is a very recent development.

Information mining and visualization of data from the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF): a case study

EMAp - Escola de Matemática Aplicada

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.