City sizes and industry concentration

In a general equilibrium model of trade under transportation costs between two cities we show how the relative population sizes are simultaneously detemined with the degree of geographic concentration of industries characterized by different elasticities of scale of production. The effect on city size of the presence of nontraded goods is also analyzed.

Duplication of R&D and industry concentration

The purpose of the literature on Research Joint Ventures (RJV), pioneered by DíAspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992), has been to combine the best of two worlds: to appropriately deal with R&D spillovers while preserving competition in the product market. Moreover, RJVs eliminate duplication of R&D. Thus, at least in theory, RJVs dominate other solutions such as subsidies. If, however, we are concerned about risks of cartelization, then Spenceís (1984) subsidy-based solution for independently acting firms, is a viable alternative that cannot be dismissed. Indeed, in contrast to the previous literature, we find that in the presence of R&D subsidies, market performance may unambiguously improve with the number of firms in the market.

Endogenous normative indices for the industry concentration

This paper presents new indices for measuring the industry concentration. The indices proposed (C n ) are of a normative type because they embody (endogenous) weights matching the market shares of the individual firms to their Marshallian welfare shares. These indices belong to an enlarged class of the Performance Gradient Indexes introduced by Dansby&Willig(I979). The definition of Cn for the consumers allows a new interpretation for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (H), which can be viewed as a normative index according to particular values of the demand parameters. For homogeneous product industries, Cn equates H for every market distribution if (and only if) the market demand is linear. Whenever the inverse demand curve is convex (concave), H underestimates( overestimates) the industry concentration measured by the normative indexo For these industries, H overestimates (underestimates) the concentration changes caused by market transfers among small firms if the inverse demand curve is convex(concave) and underestimates( overestimates) it when such tranfers benefit a large firm, according to the convexity (or the concavity) of the demand curve. For heterogeneous product industries, an explicit normative index is obtained with a market demand derived from a quasi-linear utilility function. Under symmetric preferences among the goods, the index Cn is always greater than or equal the H-index. Under asymmetric assumptions, discrepancies between the firms' market distribution and the differentiationj substitution distributions among the goods, increase the concentration but make room for some horizontal mergers do reduce it. In particular, a mean preserving spread of the differentiation(substitution) increases(decreases) the concentration only if the smaller firms' goods become more(less) differentiated(substitute) w.r.t. the other goods. One important consequence of these results is that the consumers are benefitted when the smaller firms are producing weak substitute goods, and the larger firms produce strong substitute goods or face demand curves weakly sensitive to their own prices.

City sizes and industry concentration

In a general equilibrium model of trade under transportation costs between two cities we show how the relative population sizes are simultaneously determined with the degree of geographic concentration of industries characterized by different elasticities of scale of production. The effect on city size of the presence of nontraded goods is also analyzed .

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

A moderação da concentração setorial no efeito do ambiente institucional na performance empresarial

O presente estudo avança a compreensão da performance empresarial ao propor que condições dos setores, especificamente a concentração setorial, moderam a relação entre instituições e desempenho das firmas. Já é sabido que o ambiente institucional impacta o desempenho das firmas (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004) e que as reformas pró-mercado contribuem para que esse efeito seja positivo, tanto para firmas domésticas como estrangeiras (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). A explicação desse efeito é baseada na economia dos custos de transação (Coase, 1937; Commons, 1934). Contudo, não se sabe se o efeito é o mesmo para todos os setores e se fatores moderam a relação. Esta tese contou com 230.222 observações referentes a 10.903 empresas em 64 países em um intervalo de 23 anos coletados em diferentes bancos de dados. Foi testada a interação de seis variáveis institucionais com o índice Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) para três variáveis dependentes diferentes: retorno sobre ativos (ROA), retorno sobre patrimônio líquido (ROE) e crescimento de vendas composto de três anos. Duas estratégias empíricas foram utilizadas: modelos com efeitos fixos e modelos hierárquicos (multinível). Os resultados confirmaram a hipótese de que a interação do HHI é significante e negativa com quatro variáveis institucionais: voice and accountability, efetividade do governo, qualidade regulatória e controle da corrupção. Concentração setorial modera o efeito do ambiente institucional na performance empresarial. Em contextos onde as instituições são sólidas, a força de agentes como sindicatos, associações, imprensa e consumidor assume poder de barganha, refreando o poder das empresas e o oportunismo. Regras legais, direito comum e instituições tendem a limitar o poder unilateral em relações contratuais de todos os tipos, independe da fonte do poder (Macneil, 1980). Observou-se adicionalmente que a proteção ao oportunismo se dá principalmente por meio das instituições informais, como a proteção à democracia, direitos do consumidor e controle da corrupção. Ao propiciar poder aos outros agentes que interagem com as empresas, instituições fortes garantem o enforcement de compromissos contratuais, em particular os contratos sociais (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). Como implicações, essa tese propõe que estratégias de expansão dentro do setor, aquisição de participação de mercado e fusões e aquisições dentro do setor são mais adequadas em ambientes institucionais mais fracos que em ambientes fortes. Empresas que possuem alta participação de mercado devem reconhecer o impacto negativo que podem sofrer em seu desempenho a partir de melhorias institucionais. Finalmente, o estudo reforça a importância do reconhecimento por parte de governos de que setores e firmas se beneficiam de forma desigual das mudanças institucionais. O conhecimento prévio desses impactos pode servir de direcionamento para a formulação de políticas públicas justas e eficientes. As principais limitações estão relacionadas à base de dados, exclusivamente composta de empresas com capital aberto, a forma pela qual a classificação de algumas empresas diversificadas foi feita e o fato dessa tese não investigar diretamente o poder de barganha nem ao menos o oportunismo, mas somente o poder moderador da concentração setorial no efeito das instituições no desempenho.

Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: evidence from Brazil

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988- 1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced, more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline specification, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Toward convergence? The brazilian stock market concentration and the role of private equity in its diversification

Using quantitative data obtained from public available database, this paper discusses the difference between of the Brazilian GDP and the Brazilian Stock Exchange industry breakdown. I examined if, and to what extent, the industry breakdowns are similar. First, I found out that the Stock Exchange industry breakdown is overwhelming different from the GDP, which may present a potential problem to asset allocation and portfolio diversification in Brazil. Second, I identified an important evidence of a convergence between the GDP and the Stock Exchange in the last 9 years. Third, it became clear that the Privatizations in the late 90’s and IPO market from 2004 to 2008 change the dynamics of the Brazilian Stock Exchange. And fourth, I identified that Private Equity and Venture Capital industry may play an important role on the portfolio diversification in Brazil.