4 resultados para indivisible objects

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


Relevância:

60.00% 60.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case. Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditions under which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem with sibling priorities.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

A random-matching model (ofmoney) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called the banking sector, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called the non bank sector. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then the optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and note destruction (redemption) by members of the banking sector.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuais can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.