Essays on decision sciences: exploring cognition, information processing, and complexity

This thesis provides three original contributions to the field of Decision Sciences. The first contribution explores the field of heuristics and biases. New variations of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT--a test to measure "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind"), are provided. The original CRT (S. Frederick [2005] Journal of Economic Perspectives, v. 19:4, pp.24-42) has items in which the response is immediate--and erroneous. It is shown that by merely varying the numerical parameters of the problems, large deviations in response are found. Not only the final results are affected by the proposed variations, but so is processing fluency. It seems that numbers' magnitudes serve as a cue to activate system-2 type reasoning. The second contribution explores Managerial Algorithmics Theory (M. Moldoveanu [2009] Strategic Management Journal, v. 30, pp. 737-763); an ambitious research program that states that managers display cognitive choices with a "preference towards solving problems of low computational complexity". An empirical test of this hypothesis is conducted, with results showing that this premise is not supported. A number of problems are designed with the intent of testing the predictions from managerial algorithmics against the predictions of cognitive psychology. The results demonstrate (once again) that framing effects profoundly affect choice, and (an original insight) that managers are unable to distinguish computational complexity problem classes. The third contribution explores a new approach to a computationally complex problem in marketing: the shelf space allocation problem (M-H Yang [2001] European Journal of Operational Research, v. 131, pp.107--118). A new representation for a genetic algorithm is developed, and computational experiments demonstrate its feasibility as a practical solution method. These studies lie at the interface of psychology and economics (with bounded rationality and the heuristics and biases programme), psychology, strategy, and computational complexity, and heuristics for computationally hard problems in management science.

Essays on monetary and banking theory

Esta tese de Doutorado é dedicada ao estudo de instabilidade financeira e dinâmica em Teoria Monet ária. E demonstrado que corridas banc árias são eliminadas sem custos no modelo padrão de teoria banc ária quando a popula ção não é pequena. É proposta uma extensão em que incerteza agregada é mais severa e o custo da estabilidade financeira é relevante. Finalmente, estabelece-se otimalidade de transições na distribui ção de moeda em economias em que oportunidades de trocas são escassas e heterogêneas. Em particular, otimalidade da inflação depende dos incentivos dinâmicos proporcionados por tais transi ções. O capí tulo 1 estabelece o resultado de estabilidade sem custos para economias grandes ao estudar os efeitos do tamanho populacional na an álise de corridas banc árias de Peck & Shell. No capí tulo 2, otimalidade de dinâmica é estudada no modelo de monet ário de Kiyotaki & Wright quando a sociedade é capaz de implementar uma polí tica inflacion ária. Apesar de adotar a abordagem de desenho de mecanismos, este capí tulo faz um paralelo com a an álise de Sargent & Wallace (1981) ao destacar efeitos de incentivos dinâmicos sobre a interação entre as polí ticas monet ária e fiscal. O cap ítulo 3 retoma o tema de estabilidade fi nanceira ao quanti car os custos envolvidos no desenho ótimo de um setor bancário à prova de corridas e ao propor uma estrutura informacional alternativa que possibilita bancos insolventes. A primeira an álise mostra que o esquema de estabilidade ótima exibe altas taxas de juros de longo prazo e a segunda que monitoramento imperfeito pode levar a corridas bancárias com insolvência.

Isolated capital cities and misgovernance: theory and evidence

Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.

Bank networks and firm credit: an agent based model approach

Starting from the idea that economic systems fall into complexity theory, where its many agents interact with each other without a central control and that these interactions are able to change the future behavior of the agents and the entire system, similar to a chaotic system we increase the model of Russo et al. (2014) to carry out three experiments focusing on the interaction between Banks and Firms in an artificial economy. The first experiment is relative to Relationship Banking where, according to the literature, the interaction over time between Banks and Firms are able to produce mutual benefits, mainly due to reduction of the information asymmetry between them. The following experiment is related to information heterogeneity in the credit market, where the larger the bank, the higher their visibility in the credit market, increasing the number of consult for new loans. Finally, the third experiment is about the effects on the credit market of the heterogeneity of prices that Firms faces in the goods market.