Fatores-chave na qualidade de sistemas de home broker : uma análise teórico-empírica

This work has as main objective the development of a key factors¿ model for the quality of Home Broker systems. An explanatory research was performed, based on a quantitative approach. To achieve this goal, some theoretical models of technology acceptance (TAM, TRA, TPB and IDT), reliability and quality of service were reviewed. It was proposed an extended key factors¿ model and developed a questionnaire, which was the research instrument used in this study. The questionnaire was applied over the Internet, from which was obtained a participation of 113 valid respondents, all of them users of Home Broker system. Once performed the data collection, statistical tests were used for the Factorial Analysis in order to achieve a definitive model. The key factors found were Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease of Use, Subjective Norms, Compatibility, Reliability and Relative Advantage. Some hypotheses from the model were also tested to investigate the relationship between the importance given to the factors and the resulting degree of satisfaction about quality of service. As a result of the study, a key factors¿ model for the quality of Home Broker systems was established, and identified that the factor Compatibility" has more explanatory power than the others."

Tax filing choices for the household under separable spheres bargaining

If household choices can be rationalized by the maximization of a well defined utility function, allowing spouses to file individually or jointly is equivalent to offering the envelope of the two tax schedules. If, instead, household ’preferences’ are constantly being redefined through bargaining, the option to file separately may affect outcomes even if it is never chosen. We use Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) separate spheres bargaining model to assess the impact of filing options on the outcomes of primary and secondary earners. Threat points of the household’s bargain are given for each spouse by the utility that he or she attains as a follower of a counter-factual off-equilibrium Stackelberg game played by the couple. For a benchmark tax system which treats a couple’s average taxable income as if it were that of a single individual, we prove that if choices are not at kinks, allowing couples to choose whether to file jointly or individually usually benefits the secondary earner. In our numeric exercises this is also the case when choices are at kinks as well. These findings are, however, quite sensitive to the details of the tax system, as made evident by the examination of an alternative tax system.