Health Care Reform or More Affordable Health Care?

This article investigates the impact on the U.S. economy of making health care more affordable. We compare health care cost reductions with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) using a rich life cycle general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We found that all policies were able to reduce uninsured population, but the PPACA was the most effective: in the long run, less than 5% of Americans would remain uninsured. Cost reductions alleviated the government budget, while tax hikes were needed to finance the reform. Feasible cost reductions are less welfare improving than the PPACA.

Essays on health care reform, wealth inequality, and demography

This thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter uses a general equilibrium framework to simulate and compare the long run effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and of health care costs reduction policies on macroeconomic variables, government budget, and welfare of individuals. We found that all policies were able to reduce uninsured population, with the PPACA being more effective than cost reductions. The PPACA increased public deficit mainly due to the Medicaid expansion, forcing tax hikes. On the other hand, cost reductions alleviated the fiscal burden of public insurance, reducing public deficit and taxes. Regarding welfare effects, the PPACA as a whole and cost reductions are welfare improving. High welfare gains would be achieved if the U.S. medical costs followed the same trend of OECD countries. Besides, feasible cost reductions are more welfare improving than most of the PPACA components, proving to be a good alternative. The second chapter documents that life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this chapter, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data – and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets. The third chapter documents that a common assumption adopted in life cycle general equilibrium models is that the population is stable at steady state, that is, its relative age distribution becomes constant over time. An open question is whether the demographic assumptions commonly adopted in these models in fact imply that the population becomes stable. In this chapter we prove the existence of a stable population in a demographic environment where both the age-specific mortality rates and the population growth rate are constant over time, the setup commonly adopted in life cycle general equilibrium models. Hence, the stability of the population do not need to be taken as assumption in these models.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

Federalismo e descentralização do SUS : formação de um regime polarizado de relações intergovernamentais na década de 1990

A presente tese teve como objetivo explicar a dinâmica político-institucional que produziu um quadro de relações intergovernamentais polarizado na política de saúde no âmbito do SUS ao final da década de 1990. Tal polarização ocorreu em virtude da presença simultânea de expressivo grau de municipalização e elevada capacidade indutiva e regulatória do Ministério da Saúde. As abordagens anteriores presentes na literatura sobre a descentralização do SUS produziam explicações parciais em virtude de apontarem como fatores explicativos da polarização um conjunto de razões específicas, em especial o escopo expressivamente descentralizador da Constituição de 1988, as preferências municipalistas do Movimento da Reforma Sanitária, o conteúdo das normas operacionais, o legado centralizador da trajetória da política de saúde no Brasil, a agenda centralizadora das reformas econômicas realizadas a partir da implementação do Plano Real, entre outros. Com base no arcabouço teórico do NeoInstitucionalismo Histórico, essa tese propõe uma abordagem que integra os diversos fatores condicionantes do jogo federativo setorial em torno de uma explicação sequencial das decisões que marcaram a trajetória da descentralização do SUS. Nessa abordagem, a trajetória das relações intergovernamentais é o resultado cumulativo de uma longa cadeia de decisões tomadas em contextos singulares que marcaram os governos Collor, Itamar e FHC, onde a escolha de um governo afetou o leque de opções disponíveis ao governo seguinte, deixando-lhe menos margem de mudança. Nessa lógica, a polarização federativa é vista como o produto não intencional de uma sequência de decisões que, acumuladas ao longo da década, concentraram poder, atribuições e recursos na União e nos municípios.