How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state a§ect the aggregated level of individuals and small businessesí loans. Higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to Öle for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credit. On the other hand, lower levels of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. ConÖrming the theoretical claims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuals and small businesses, where the optimal level of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in U.S. do not apply the optimal level, an intervention that brings the exemption level closer to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Word of mouth marketing in the digital age: a case study analysis of viral marketing campaigns

A era digital viu a ascensão da empresa focada no consumidor. Todos os dias, marcas e produtos são objeto de milhões de conversas em que os consumidores trocam pontos de vista, opiniões e informações antes de tomar a decisão de compra. Os profissionais de marketing entenderam a importância do boca a boca como um novo canal de comunicação estratégica e começaram a ancorar técnicas de boca a boca à estratégia de marketing global. A propaganda tornou-se um negócio de conversa: o novo desafio do marketing é criar um conteúdo envolvente e compartilhável que possa expandir e ressoar dentro de redes de sociais de consumidores. Quanto mais as pessoas falam sobre a sua marca, mais a probabilidade de ganhar a competição dura e aumentar as vendas. Mas como o boca a boca funciona? O que faz uma campanha de marketing um sucesso viral? Este trabalho tem como objetivo fornecer uma análise abrangente da teoria de marketing de boca a boca e usa um modelo descritivo para investigar as variáveis-chave de campanhas bem-sucedidas de marketing viral, a fim de proporcionar insights e sugestões para as práticas de marketing viral.

Adaptation of the international investment contract: the hardship clause

Este trabalho acadêmico explora, em linhas gerais, a questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional, e o tema ‘cláusula de hardship’ em específico. Objetiva-se efetuar uma análise detalhada da cláusula de hardship, como meio de adaptação e flexibilização de contratos internacionais de investimento sob a ótica da prática jurídica e mercantil contemporânea. A discussão se centra no contraste entre a possibilidade de adaptação do contrato por circunstâncias imprevisíveis e o imperativo de previsibilidade no investimento. Nesse sentido, o estudo busca oferecer soluções práticas para o dilema existente entre a necessidade de segurança na relação econômica (cumprimento do contato) e a prevenção da possibilidade de ruína financeira para quaisquer das partes no caso de uma mudança brusca no contexto dos negócios. O trabalho está centrado em uma investigação teórica acerca dos temas de readaptação contratual; diferenças entre sistemas jurídicos de estados-nações, e suas consequências no comércio internacional; e a cláusula de hardship em si. Como forma de contribuir para uma compreensão prática na questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional devido a fatores imprevistos, este trabalho analisa casos reais e tendências atuais observadas na arbitragem internacional.

How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state affect the aggregated leveI of individuaIs and small businesses' loans. Higher leveIs of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to file for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credito On the other hand, lower leveIs of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. Confirming the theoretical daims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuaIs and small businesses, where the optimal leveI of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in V.S. do not apply the optimallevel, an intervention that brings the exemption leveI doser to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.