Demand- side resistance to creative destruction in schumpeterian growth theory

The Schumpelerian model of endogeno~s growlh is generalized with lhe introduction of stochastic resislance. by agenls other Ihan producers. to lhe innovations which drive growth. This causes a queue to be formcd of innovations, alrcady discovered, bUI waiting to be adopled~ A slationary stochastic equilibrium (SSE) is obtained when the queue is stable~ It is shown that in the SSE, such resistance will always reduce lhe average growth iate hut it may increa~e wclfare in certain silualions. In an example, Ihis is when innovatiuns are small anti monopoly power great. The cont1icl hetween this welfare motive for resistance and those of rent-seeking innovalors.may well explain why growth rates differ.

Job destruction and propagation of shocks

We develop and quantitatively implement a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market matching and endogenous deterllÚnation of the job destruction rate. The mo deI produces a elose match with data on job creation and destruction. Cyelical fluctuations in the job destruction rate serve to magnify the effects of productivity shocks on output; as well as making the effects much more persistent. Interactions between the labor and capital markets, mediated by the rental rate of capital, play the central role in propagating shocks.

Formation and destruction of coalition groups under economic growth

This paper introduces a model economy in which formation of coalition groups under technological progress is generated endogenously. The coalition formation depends crucially on the rate of arrival of new technologies. In the model, an agent working in the saroe technology for more than one period acquires skills, part of which is specific to this technology. These skills increase the agent productivity. In this case, if he has worked more than one period with the same technology he has incentives to construct a coalition to block the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, in every sector the workers have incentives to construct a coalition and to block the adoption of new technologies. They will block every time that a technology stay in use for more than one period.