Preço de transferência de passivos sem vencimento de bancos comerciais : uma abordagem para aplicações automáticas

Os bancos comerciais têm como principais fontes de recursos os depósitos à vista, poupança e depósitos a prazo. Estes passivos têm liquidez diária, ou seja, podem ser sacados a qualquer momento por seus titulares. O gerenciamento do resultado e risco destes passivos sem vencimento é uma difícil tarefa para as instituições financeiras. Este estudo busca identificar o preço de transferência destes passivos, em especial das aplicações automáticas. Como resultado, são apresentados preços de transferência para a parcela estável e para a parcela instável das aplicações automáticas e a receita de funding paga pela tesouraria aos canais comerciais . A fórmula utilizada para o cálculo do preço de transferência de passivos sem vencimento considera as regras de exigibilidade do BACEN, e pode ser utilizada por qualquer instituição financeira comercial do Brasil. Para a identificação da maturidade foi utilizado o modelo de Nonmaturation e o preço de transferência é calculado pelo modelo de Matched Maturity Marginal Funds Transfer Price (MMMFTP).

O Acordo Antecipado de Preços – APA como solução para reduzir a insegurança jurídica na aplicação das regras de Preço de Transferência no Brasil

O presente trabalho monográfico é baseado fundamentalmente na comparação da legislação estrangeira e nos potenciais conflitos trazido pela doutrina brasileira na instituição de outros mecanismos de solução de controvérsias administrativos, já em operação no Brasil. Objetivando verificar a possibilidade de aplicação do Acordo Antecipado de Preços no direito brasileiro. Para tanto é verificado se o APA é uma forma eficiente de solução das inseguranças trazidas pela aplicabilidade das regras de preços de transferência em virtude da natureza específica das transações operacionalizadas entre pessoas vinculadas.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

The effects of credit risk transfer on bank monitoring and firm financing

This paper examines the efects of the transfer of credit risk associated with bank loans. We are interested in (a) whether the transfer of credit risk has any impact on the intensity with which banks monitor their borrowers and (b) whether credit risk transfer infuences the amount of financing that is provided to firms in an economy. Our model first develops conditions under which bank finance is available to firrms, mainly in the spirit of Holmstrom/Tirole (1997). We then introduce projects with uncorrelated pay-offs and argue that one possible economic rationale for credit risk transfer is diversi¯cation. We analyze whether and how within this scenario the transfer of the credit risk of loans changes a bank's incentives to monitor its debtors. Finally we investigate whether and what kind of impact this may have on the amount of ¯nancing available to firms in an economy. Our results indicate that the monitoring incentives are being eroded indeed and that credit risk transfer can increase the overall amount of obtainable funds in an economy.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

An SDF approach to hedge funds’ tail risk: evidence from Brazilian funds

The main purpose of this paper is to propose a methodology to obtain a hedge fund tail risk measure. Our measure builds on the methodologies proposed by Almeida and Garcia (2015) and Almeida, Ardison, Garcia, and Vicente (2016), which rely in solving dual minimization problems of Cressie Read discrepancy functions in spaces of probability measures. Due to the recently documented robustness of the Hellinger estimator (Kitamura et al., 2013), we adopt within the Cressie Read family, this specific discrepancy as loss function. From this choice, we derive a minimum Hellinger risk-neutral measure that correctly prices an observed panel of hedge fund returns. The estimated risk-neutral measure is used to construct our tail risk measure by pricing synthetic out-of-the-money put options on hedge fund returns of ten specific categories. We provide a detailed description of our methodology, extract the aggregate Tail risk hedge fund factor for Brazilian funds, and as a by product, a set of individual Tail risk factors for each specific hedge fund category.