On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Empirical evidence of trade credit uses of brazilian publicly-listed companies

This research provides empirical evidence on the use of trade credit as either a substitution or a complement to bank debt for listed companies in Brazil, controlling for the firms reputation, as stated by Alphonse, Ducret and Séverin (2006). The sample consists of 263 publicly-listed companies for 2006. Our findings support all three hypotheses. We provide evidence that trade credit may be used as a signal for the firm’s quality.