6 resultados para flexible attendance
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
o presente trabalho propõe uma reflexão que gira em torno de três variáveis: a cultura, as pessoas e a capacitação. A adoção de novas práticas de aprendizagem tem como principal obstáculo à cultura não somente na organização, mas também no seu entorno onde está inserido. Diante da realidade de um mundo globalizado e multicultural, a investigação demonstra que a missão da capacitação é de promover aos indivíduos um comportamento proativo, gerando mais autonomia e responsabilidade pelos resultados que exigem criatividade e visão em longo prazo. Esse estudo pretende verificar a eficácia dos métodos aplicados na empresa em questão quanto à política de capacitação de pessoas, desenvolvendo profissionais proativos, criativos, flexíveis em atendimento ao mercado atual. A pesquisa será do tipo exploratória, descritiva e explicativa e realizada por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica, pesquisa de campo e estudo de caso, sendo neste último, abrangendo todos os funcionários da Internacional Serviços Aduaneiros Ltda.
Resumo:
We estimate the impact of having attended center-based daycare institutions during early childhood on Math test scores at the 4th grade of elementary school. Because enrollment in daycare centers may depend on unobservable character-istics of the family and the child, we build and estimate a structural model of endogeneous choice of school to deal with the selectivity problem. We nd that attendance to daycare institutions is associated with a gain of approximately 0,04 standard deviation in Math test scores. This result is important to the extent our OLS results as well as most of the studies for Brazil nd no e¤ect associated to daycare attendance, suggesting selectivity may play a role on this finding.
Resumo:
O presente estudo teve como objetivo testar se a situação econômica teve um impacto sobre os hábitos de consumo de cinema na França, no período contemporâneo (1992-2012). O estudo aborda a relação entre indicadores econômicos e consumo de cinema em um nível agregado e, em seguida, analisa se os vários tipos de filmes, tipos de cinemas e categorias de cinéfilos foram mais ou menos foram afetados pelo estado da economia. No nível agregado, estudos semelhantes já foram realizados em outros países. Este estudo confirma os resultados para a França: como em outros países desenvolvidos, a situação da economia tem pouca influência no consumo de cinema e o setor é resiliente. Este trabalho também traz novas análises detalhadas sobre o comportamento de vários sub-tipos de filmes, segmentos de locais e categorias de consumidores. Ele demonstra que para a maior parte dessas sub-categorias, drivers do mercado são oferta e preço, e que a situação da economia tem pouca influência. Quanto ao tipo de cinema, o estudo argumenta que, comparativamente, cinemas grandes conseguem crescer durante o período de crise.
Resumo:
The inability of rational expectation models with money supply rules to deliver inflation persistence following a transitory deviation of money growth from trend is due to the rapid adjustment of the price level to expected events. The observation of persistent inflation in macroeconomic data leads many economists to believe that prices adjust sluggishly and/or expectations must not be rational. Inflation persistence in U.S. data can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend. In the vector autocorrelation function both inflation and output are highly persistent and there are significant positive dynamic cross-correlations relating inflation and output. This paper shows that a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using a Taylor rule can account for these patterns. There are no sticky prices and no liquidity effects. Agents decisions in a period are taken only after all shocks are observed. The monetary policy rule transforms output persistence into inflation persistence and creates positive cross-correlations between inflation and output.
Resumo:
My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.