Effects of the real plan of the Brazilian banking system

The aim of this paper is to assess the progress of the banking sector before and shortly after the Real Plan. We began by assessing the drop in the inflation revenues (negative real interest rates paid by the excess of demand deposits over total reserve requirements) as a result of the change in inflation from 40% a month for the pre-Real Plan period to a monthly average of 3.65% (IGP-DI), between July 1994 and May 1995. Then, using the financial statement data of a group of 90 banks, we attempt to estimate the net losses due to the inflation drop analyzing the profitability and other parameters of the banking industry. The calculations are made separately for private, state and federal banks. A later analysis on performance using information given to CVM (Securities Exchange Commission) by the six major private banks in the country is also discussed herein.

An essay on impression management: three randomized experiments with financial analysts

This thesis aims to explore the concept of impression management from the financial analysts’ point of view. Impression management is the definition of the act of an agent manipulating an impression that another person have of this agent, in the context of this thesis it happens when a company make graphics to disclosure financial-accounting information in order to manipulate the market’s perception of their performance. Three types of impression management were analyzed: presentation enhancement (color manipulation), measurement distortion (scale manipulation) and selectivity (the disclosure of positive information only). While presentation enhancement improved only the most impulsive financial analysts’ perception of firm’s performance, the measurement distortion improved the perception of performance for both groups of financial analysts (impulsive and reflective). Finally, selectivity improved the financial analysts’ perception of firm’s performance for both groups (impulsive and reflective), although impulsive financial analysts assigned lower ratings when compared to their reflective peers, on average, to a hypothetical company.

Testing the Markov property with ultra high frequency financial data

This paper develops a framework to test whether discrete-valued irregularly-spaced financial transactions data follow a subordinated Markov process. For that purpose, we consider a specific optional sampling in which a continuous-time Markov process is observed only when it crosses some discrete level. This framework is convenient for it accommodates not only the irregular spacing of transactions data, but also price discreteness. Further, it turns out that, under such an observation rule, the current price duration is independent of previous price durations given the current price realization. A simple nonparametric test then follows by examining whether this conditional independence property holds. Finally, we investigate whether or not bid-ask spreads follow Markov processes using transactions data from the New York Stock Exchange. The motivation lies on the fact that asymmetric information models of market microstructures predict that the Markov property does not hold for the bid-ask spread. The results are mixed in the sense that the Markov assumption is rejected for three out of the five stocks we have analyzed.

Enriching information to prevent bank runs

Sequential service in the banking sector, as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a barrier to full insurance and potential source of financial fragility against which deposit insurance is infeasible (Wallace, 1988). In this paper, we pursue a different perspective, viewing the sequence of contacts as opportunities to extract information through a larger message space with commitment to richer promises. As we show, if preferences satisfy a separating property then the desired elimination of dominated strategies (Green and Lin, 2003) occurs even when shocks are correlated. In this manner the sequential service promotes stability.

European business schools and global leadership: an examination of the admission criteria of the european master in management programs ranked by the Financial Times 2010

O aumento de empresas que operam internacionalmente requer o desenvolvimento de líderes mundiais para colocar as estratégias em prática. Embora este processo de desenvolvimento é importante para o mundo corporativo, muitos futuros executivos são graduados de escolas de administração de empresas que estão intimamente ligados ao mundo de negócios e, portanto, desempenhão um papel importante no processo. Esta pesquisa examina se os programas europeus “Master in Management” classificado pelo Financial Times em 2010 selecionam aqueles candidatos que são mais adequados para o desenvolvimento de liderança global. Portanto, três anteriores meta-estudos são sintetizados para produzir um perfil de competências classificadas de um líder global. Então, informações sobre os critérios de admissão dos programas de mestrado são coletadas e comparadas com este perfil. Os resultados mostram que seis competências são medidas por mais da metade dos programas: proficiência em Inglês, capacidade analítica (racionamento lógico e quantitativo), capacidade de comunicação, conhecimento do negócio global, determinação para alcançar, motivação e capacidade interpessoal. Além disso, as habilidades operacionais requerentes pelos líderes globais não são significativas no processo de admissão e o foco é sobre as habilidades analíticas. Comparação dos resultados com o perfil anteriormente desenvolvido abrangente indica que uma quantidade significativa de programas pode subestimar o significado de habilidades pessoais e características para o desenvolvimento de líderes globais.

A cross-country study on trade credit supply and financial crisis

O objetivo deste trabalho de pesquisa é investigar a oferta de crédito comercial durante períodos de crise financeira em seis países diferentes: Brasil, França, Alemanha, Itália, Espanha e Reino Unido, foram utilizadas informações de empresas de capital aberto entre 2000 e 2011. A literatura internacional documenta que durante o pico de crises financeiras a oferta de crédito comercial aumenta pois as companhias usam o crédito comercial como substituto e/ou complemento ao crédito bancário, apesar de após o momento de pico esta oferta diminui significantemente porque as empresas enfrentam problemas de liquidez causado por escassez de crédito. Mesmo que somente existam evidências pontuais de que a oferta de crédito comercial aumentou durante a crise financeira global de 2008, o efeito pós-crise é perceptível durante a crise Europeia de 2011, pois as empresas europeias diminuíram a oferta de crédito comercial, também evidenciando que estas companhias estavam confrontando problemas de administração de liquidez. Em relação ao uso de crédito comercial como ferramenta de transmissão de capital, nenhuma evidência foi encontrada para provar sua existência em tempo de crise financeira.

Bank dividends and signaling to information-sensitive depositors

Esta tese investiga se a composição do endividamento dos bancos afeta sua política de dividendos. Identificou-se que investidores sensíveis a informações (investidores institucionais) são alvos de sinalização através de dividendos por parte dos bancos. Utilizando uma base de dados exclusiva de bancos brasileiros, foi possível identificar vários tipos de credores, especificamente, investidores institucionais, empresas não financeiras e pessoas físicas, que são alvos potenciais de sinalização por dividendos. Adicionalmente, a existência de vários bancos de capital fechado, controlados e geridos por um pequeno grupo de acionistas, em que a sinalização direcionada a acionistas é implausível, permite inferir que bancos que utilizam mais fundos de investidores sensíveis a informações (institucionais) pagam mais dividendos, controlando por diversas características. Durante a crise financeira, este comportamento foi ainda mais pronunciado. Esta relação reforça o papel dos dividendos como uma forma custosa e crível de comunicar sobre a qualidade dos ativos dos bancos. A hipótese de que os dividendos podem ser utilizados como uma forma de expropriação dos depositantes por parte dos acionistas é refutada, uma vez que, se fosse esse o caso, observar-se-ia esse maiores dividendos em bancos com depositantes menos sensíveis a informação. Além disso, foi verificada uma relação negativa entre o pagamento de dividendos e o custo de captação (juros pagos em certificados de depósito bancário) e uma relação positiva de dividendos com o tamanho e com os lucros passados, e que os bancos de capital fechado pagam mais dividendos do que os de capital aberto, uma descoberta que também se alinha com a ideia de que os depositantes seriam os alvos da sinalização por dividendos. Finalmente, encontrou-se também uma relação negativa entre dividendos e adequação de capital do bancos, o que indica que pressões regulatórias podem induzir os bancos a pagar menos dividendos e que o pagamento de dividendos é negativamente relacionado com o crescimento da carteira de crédito, o que é consistente com a ideia de que os bancos com maiores oportunidades de investimento retêm seus lucros para aumentar seu patrimônio líquido e sua capacidade de conceder crédito.

Macroeconomic announcements, price discovery, and order flow efects in the stock market: evidence from incomplete data and multiple financial markets

This paper investigates heterogeneity in the market assessment of public macro- economic announcements by exploring (jointly) two main mechanisms through which macroeconomic news might enter stock prices: instantaneous fundamental news im- pacts consistent with the asset pricing view of symmetric information, and permanent order ow e¤ects consistent with a microstructure view of asymmetric information related to heterogeneous interpretation of public news. Theoretical motivation and empirical evidence for the operation of both mechanisms are presented. Signi cant in- stantaneous news impacts are detected for news related to real activity (including em- ployment), investment, in ation, and monetary policy; however, signi cant order ow e¤ects are also observed on employment announcement days. A multi-market analysis suggests that these asymmetric information e¤ects come from uncertainty about long term interest rates due to heterogeneous assessments of future Fed responses to em- ployment shocks.

Compliance com os requisitos de divulgação do IFRS - International Financial Reporting Standards e sua relação com o erro de previsão dos analistas de mercado

O objetivo deste estudo é fazer uma análise da relação entre o erro de previsão dos analistas de mercado quanto à rentabilidade das empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA S.A. (Bovespa) e os requerimentos de divulgação do International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Isto foi feito através da regressão do erro de previsão dos analistas, utilizando a metodologia de dados em painel no ano de implantação do IFRS no Brasil, 2010, e, complementarmente em 2012, para referenciamento desses dados. Partindo desse pressuposto, foi determinado o erro de previsão das empresas listadas na Bovespa através de dados de rentabilidade (índice de lucro por ação/earnings per share) previstos e realizados, disponíveis nas bases de dados I/B/E/S Earnings Consensus Information, providos pela plataforma Thomson ONE Investment Banking e Economática Pro®, respectivamente. Os resultados obtidos indicam uma relação negativa entre o erro de previsão e o cumprimento dos requisitos de divulgação do IFRS, ou seja, quanto maior a qualidade nas informações divulgadas, menor o erro de previsão dos analistas. Portanto, esses resultados sustentam a perspectiva de que o grau de cumprimento das normas contábeis é tão ou mais importante do que as próprias normas. Adicionalmente, foi verificado que quando a empresa listada na BM&FBOVESPA é vinculada a Agência Reguladora, seu erro de previsão não é alterado. Por fim, esses resultados sugerem que é importante que haja o aprimoramento dos mecanismos de auditoria das firmas quanto ao cumprimento dos requerimentos normativos de divulgação, tais como: penalidades pela não observância da norma (enforcement), estruturas de governança corporativa e auditorias interna e externa.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.