Domestic violence in Brazil: social problems and legislative interventions

Recent statistical data confirms that domestic violence is a structural problem of exceptional gravity. We analyze the frequent legislative changes in Brazil since 2000 as a result of social pressure for protection of abused women. Only the Law 11.340 of 2006 was well received by lawyers, judges and the public opinion. We present the innovations and peculiarities of this statute and the allegations on unconstitutionality. We discuss cases of judicial review of this law and reject the arguments of unconstitutionality. That notwithstanding, we argue that penalization decisions is the wrong way from a criminological point of view because they do not take into consideration the desires and needs of the victims.

Disputing the application of laws: the constitutionality of the Brazilian Statute against domestic violence in the courts

This study aimed to map the key positions regarding the constitutionality of the Maria da Penha Law (Law 11.340/2006) in the Brazilian judicial system. The law, the result of political struggles by the Brazilian feminist movement, has been the subject of discussions in the public sphere and actions aimed at consolidating its constitutionality before the Federal Supreme Court. We examined and discussed the arguments used in the Courts, intending to show that the creation of law is not limited to the legislative moment, but rather that its social meaning is also constituted through disputes within the Judiciary.

A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.