On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Luxury brands and online consumer-generated content: dealing with the new lead of customers in brand perception

User-generated content – conteúdo gerado por usuários – cresceu consideravelmente na Internet nos cinco últimos anos, levando a grandes mudanças nas práticas de marketing. A força do e-word-of mouth, está aumentando e tem uma influência muito forte na percepção da marca pelos consumidores (Allsop, Basset & Hoskins, 2007). Todos os novos instrumentos fornecidos pela Internet permitiram a criação de comunidades de marca online, impactando o compromisso e a lealdade dos consumidores para com a marca (De Valk, Van Bruggen, Wierenga 2009). Todas essas interações criadas entre os consumidores e a marca são relativamente novas e incomuns para as empresas que devem adaptar suas práticas de marketing a essas mudanças. Dadas as especificidades que aplicam as marcas de luxo nas suas políticas de marketing (Kapferer and Bastien, 2009), a questão da adaptação das suas estratégias ao fenômeno de user-generated content é particularmente complicada. As marcas de luxo costumam ter habitualmente uma relação muito reservada com os seus consumidores, baseada em princípios de exclusividade e raridade (Kapferer, 1997). Esta dissertação busca proporcionar algumas pistas de entendimento sobre como as marcas de cosméticos de luxo podem adaptar suas estratégias de marketing em relação à expansão do conteúdo gerado por usuários na Internet. Esta pesquisa qualitativa sugere meios de controlar o conteúdo gerado por usuários, como o incentivar positivamente com certas práticas de marketing e como tirar proveito dele. A seguinte análise mostra que o conteúdo gerado por usuários tem duas facetas: pode atuar como um mídia digital para as empresas de luxo e como uma fonte de informação, inspiração e criação para o desenho dos novos produtos. Sendo um meio de comunicação, as empresas de cosméticos de luxo podem contar com a nova potência do “e-word-of-mouth” a fim de promover sua imagem de marca e seus produtos através do conteúdo gerado por usuários. Sendo uma fonte de inspiração, o conteúdo gerado por usuários pode conduzir a ótimos processos de co-criação e cooperação entre as marcas de cosméticos de luxo e seus consumidores com o objetivo de projetar produtos perfeitamente ajustados ao pedido dos consumidores.

Two heads may not be better than one : corporate board structure, managerial self-dealing,and common agency

This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which the CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two Boards, each responsible for a different task. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. A consequence of the first feature is that the CEO always exerts less effort toward production with a dual board. The effect of a dual board on CEO self-dealing is ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the higher monitoring, self-dealing is higher in a dual system. The model indicates that the strategic interdependence generated by the assignment of different tasks to different boards may yield results that are far from the desired ones.

Dealing with greenhouse gas emissions (Dublado)

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